Explaining Humanitarian Intervention in Libya and Non-Intervention in Syria by Hasler, Stefan
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
Explaining Humanitarian Intervention in
Libya and Non-Intervention in Syria
Hasler, Stefan













Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
EXPLAINING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN 








 Thesis Advisor: Mohammed Hafez 
 Second Reader: Robert Springborg 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Explaining Humanitarian Intervention in Libya and 
Non-Intervention in Syria 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Stefan Hasler 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______N/A______.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The emergence of the revolutionary movements of the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011 surprised the world. For the 
western democracies the often-violent reaction of the ruling regimes in the concerned countries caused political and 
moral challenges. Different approaches are discernible when for the Libyan case the west was willing to intervene 
against the regime but for the Syrian case no decisive action was taken. This thesis examines the importance and 
influence of humanitarian interventions in comparison to national geo-strategic interests and the influence of domestic 
politics. The thesis argues that the three examined western states U.S., Germany and France, acknowledge and stress 
the normative importance of humanitarian interventions but finally prefer geo-strategic interests and domestic politics. 
Next to own interests the parameters of the respective conflict are of highest importance as shown by the comparison 
of the political, social and military framework of Syria and Libya. The thesis concludes that normative arguments in 
international politics are overestimated and dominated by state interests and demands of governments. For western 
democracies normative reasons are of theoretical importance and part of their own self-awareness but in realpolitik 
their influence is minuscule.  
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Libya, Syria, Humanitarian Intervention, U.S., France, Germany, NATO, UN, 
Resolution 1973, Qadhafi, al- Assad, 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
217 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
EXPLAINING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN LIBYA AND NON-




Major (GS), German Army 
Diploma, University of the German Armed Forces Hamburg, 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
Dan Moran 
 iv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v 
ABSTRACT 
The emergence of the revolutionary movements of the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011 
surprised the world. For the western democracies the often-violent reaction of the ruling 
regimes in the concerned countries caused political and moral challenges. Different 
approaches are discernible when for the Libyan case the west was willing to intervene 
against the regime but for the Syrian case no decisive action was taken. This thesis 
examines the importance and influence of humanitarian interventions in comparison to 
national geo-strategic interests and the influence of domestic politics. The thesis argues 
that the three examined western states U.S., Germany and France, acknowledge and 
stress the normative importance of humanitarian interventions but finally prefer geo-
strategic interests and domestic politics. Next to own interests the parameters of the 
respective conflict are of highest importance as shown by the comparison of the political, 
social and military framework of Syria and Libya. The thesis concludes that normative 
arguments in international politics are overestimated and dominated by state interests and 
demands of governments. For western democracies normative reasons are of theoretical 
importance and part of their own self-awareness but in realpolitik their influence is 
minuscule.  
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A. OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
On October 20th 2011, the former Libyan ruler Muammar Muhammad Abu 
Minyar al-Qadhafi was killed in Sirte after eight months of fighting in Libya. Regular 
Libyan troops, loyalists, and tribesmen fought on Qadhafi’s side against the supporters of 
the National Transition Council of Libya (NTC), a coalition of different Libyan groups1, 
decisively supported by forces of a coalition lead by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)2.  
The rebellion in Libya was an event directly associated with the so-called “Arab 
Spring,” other parts of this unprecedented series of revolts were the successful 
revolutionary movements of Egypt and Tunisia. Other attempts, like the protest 
movements in Yemen and Syria, have not succeeded yet while the Kings of Jordan and 
Morocco have been able to try “to stay ahead of the curve of the protest.”3 
The unrest in Libya was fostered by discontent with poor performance of the 
government, insufficient living conditions, corruption, and by the despondency of large 
parts of the population over failed expectations that Libya's international political 
rehabilitation of the recent past would improve the democratic, economic, and day-to-day 
life in country.4 
                                                 
1 The composition and structure of the NTC has changed several times since its foundation in 
Bengahzi on 27 February 2011. To embrace all different political and social currents, a regional contingent 
was established. Today's structure and influence of the NTC is not part of the discussion. 
2 Forces from the U.S., France, Canada, Belgium, United Kingdom, Spain, Norway, Italy, Denmark, 
Qatar, and the United Arabic Emirates were part of the NATO-led coalition enforcing the UN resolution 
militarily. In total, 19 nations were engaged in the alliance to enforce the UN resolution 1973. 
3Tim Lister, Gadhafi’demise and the Arab Spring, CNN, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-
21/world/world_gadhafi-arab-spring_1_yemen-and-syria-sidi-bouzid-arab-spring?_s=PM:WORLD 
(accessed October 26, 2011)  
4 Alison Pargeter, Libya: Reforming the Impossible? Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 33, 




Without the massive support of the coalition forces5 engaged in operation 
“Unified Protector,” the success of the Libyan rebellion would have been impossible. The 
international intervention, based on United Nations (UN) Resolution 19736, happened 
after an extraordinarily fast decision-making process. Humanitarian reasons were the 
decisive arguments of the participating nations and NATO for intervention.  
Compared with the political treatment of the humanitarian situation in other 
countries, especially Syria, the determination and consequence of the global community 
participating in the coalition against Qadhafi was surprising and unique. While Qadhafi's 
troops were attacked only thirty-two days after the first protest began, the Syrian leader 
Bashar al-Assad has sought to suppress the ongoing revolt in Syria since March 15th 
20117 without an international military intervention. Thereby, there is a high probability 
that the Syrian conflict has killed more people than the Libyan forces did before the 
international intervention started.8 At first appearance, the different international 
response to these two cases is inexplicable. The protest movement in Syria has demanded 
rights similar to those demanded in Libya, and is based on comparable demands and 
needs of a young population: more democracy, the end of corruption, and a higher 
personnel standard of living.9  
                                                 
5 The forces under NATO command flew 26.281 sorties (attacks) on Libya from March 31st until 
October 22nd 2011. NATO JFC Naples. NATO and Libya, Operational Media Update for October 22, 2011. 
6 UN Security Council, SC 10200, 17 March 2011, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (accessed October 19, 2011) 
7 The first protests started already in January but the uprising was dated on March 15, 2011. 
8 The number of killed civilians of the Libyan conflict before the intervention started can only be 
estimated.  Different sources report about a number between 1,000 (Source: UN, March, 2011) and 6,000 
(Source: Libyan league fir human rights, March 05, 2011) killed civilians for the Libya, whereby the 
Libyan opposition publishes the highest numbers. The most sources estimated the number of victims 
between 1,000 and 5,000. For a compilation of different sources see: 
http://www.skeptive.com/disputes/2217 (accessed April 10, 2012). The number of killed civilians, rebels 
and soldiers for the Syrian conflict can also only be estimated because of only limited and constrained 
information’s from Syria. The numbers for the period between mid- March 2012 and mid- April 2012 range 
between 8,000 and 12,000. The most reliable sources of the UN estimated 8,000 killed people for mid- 
March. For a compilation of different sources see: http://www.skeptive.com/disputes/4755 (accessed April 
10, 2012).  
9 Joshua Landis, The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2012, 




Opinions and a broad discussion about the reasons why an intervention seemed to 
be relatively easy in Libya but nearly impossible in Syria—and the main distinctions 
between the two cases—are prevalent. Publicly, the most followed arguments about why 
the two cases are treated so differently is based almost solely on two single events: the 
publicly launched threats against the protestors of Qadhafi for the Libyan case, and the 
two-time Chinese and Russian rejection of any resolutions at the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) for the Syrian case. In scholarship, a broader and more sophisticated 
discussion has started. 
Comparing official statements and papers, the main trigger for the UN Resolution 
1973 on Libya, “authorizing all necessary measures to protect civilians”10 has been “the 
prospect of imminent massacre,”11 a “call for help,”12 and the ongoing oblivion of basic 
human rights in Libya by the Qadhafi regime. Following this justification for the massive 
military intervention, the world seems to be on the edge of a new era. The idea of military 
intervention to enforce human rights in general and to protect a population from its own 
leadership, in particular, not only appears politically agreeable but, furthermore, 
necessary. As a result of the unique development in Libya, theoretically, every 
government of a sovereign country dramatically endangering the human rights of its own 
population has to fear the same consequences as the Libyan regime. The idea of an 
international “responsibility to protect” (RtoP) and a possible enforcement of human 
rights could prevent authoritarian governments from hurting their own populations.  
On the other hand, the violent protests in Syria since 2011 with more than 8,000 
protestors killed13 is an example of non-intervention by the international community and 
an impressive example illustrating the limits to humanitarian concerns in international 
                                                 
10 UN Security Council, SC 10200, 17 March 2011, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm (accessed October 19, 2011) 
11New York Times. “Obama’s Mideast Speech.” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20prexy-text.html?pagewanted=all (accessed 
October 12, 2011) 
12 Ibid. 




politics.14 The passive behavior of the international community is remarkable because the 
action taken by the Syrian regime against the uprising is also violent, often deadly, and 
hurts the humanitarian rights of the population. This raises questions about the 
international context of the intervention in Libya, and possible reasons for differences 
between Libya and Syria. 
This thesis adopts the discussion, and evaluates the rationale for the international 
intervention in Libya in comparison with the enduring conflict in Syria, by answering the 
following questions:  
(1) What were the main reasons for the international intervention in Libya and the 
 non-intervention in Syria and how do they fit into a broader geo-strategic context?  
(2) Why was the decision-making process of NATO, the UN, and other 
 participating nations so fast in the case of Libya but so hesitant in Syria? 
(3) Does the intervention in Libya mean a serious implementation of the idea of a 
 “responsibility to protect”15 in international politics?  
(4) Have international norms generally changed in favor of the higher importance 
 of humanitarian rights, or is the intervention in Libya an individual case?  
To answer these questions, a precise definition of the terms "humanitarian 
intervention" and "responsibility to protect," and their classification and role in 
international politics and international relations, is necessary. Deduced from these 
definitions, especially from the legal status and the normative background of these 
concepts—including a definition of possible threshold conditions, objective criteria for an 
intervention, and an explanation of the decision-making process of states and 
organizations in general—a general argument to explain why states intervene in some 
                                                 
14 In addition to the Syrian situation, several other cases demonstrate a policy of non- intervention. 
The long-lasting violation of human rights in the Darfur region in Sudan, the protests in Iran after the 
election 2009, the current developments in Yemen, and the protests in Bahrain are only some selected cases 
of the recent past. 
15 The concept of “responsibility to protect” is a part of the outcome of the 2005 UN summit in New 
York. It aims to protect civil populations from: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity. If these principles are endangered, the UN is empowered to take collective action to save 




cases, and why they do not intervene in other cases, is possible. This discussion then 
provides the empirical basis for any further statements about the reasons for the 
engagement in Libya, the non-engagement in Syria, and the importance and role of RtoP 
and humanitarian interventions. To define clear criteria and assess the arguments may 
help predict the behavior of the international community in the future. It has to be 
assessed if the prospective behavior of the international community can be deduced by 
the ongoing spread of norms and, therefore, leads to a generally increase of the likelihood 
of humanitarian interventions.  
Comparing the arguments, the official interests, and the possible additional non-
stated interests of two actively involved nations (the U.S. and France) and one none-
engaged nation (Germany) for the Libyan case with the arguments and political behavior 
of these three nations for the Syrian case illustrates the real meaning of humanitarian 
interventions and the relevance of norms.  The objective is to analyze each case to 
determine the key factors that shaped the decision -making process in each nation for 
both cases, Syria and Libya.  
This thesis argues that the intervention in Libya is not solely driven by 
humanitarian concerns, but rather, that it follows national interests, geo-strategic 
considerations, constraints of domestic politics, and economic interests. “We will stand 
up for people who seek to assert their basic human rights…”16 and “we must not abandon 
civilian populations, the victims of brutal repression, to their fate”17 are statements that 
are surely true for Libya. Qadhafi’s announcement to “clean Libya house by house”18 
aroused these statements. However, comparing the Libyan engagement with the non-
engagement in the ongoing Syrian domestic conflict challenges the credibility of these 
statements about the sole reason for the engagement against Qadhafi. To verify my 
                                                 
16 Susan Rice. “Rachel Madow Show on MSNBC” on 24 October 2011, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3096434/#45025263 (accessed 25 October 2011) 
17 Speech of French ministre d’Etat, Minister of Foreign and European Affair, Alain Juppé, at the UN 
Security council on 17 March 2011, 




hypothesis, other possible reasons have to be assessed, such as: economic motives19, a 
possible redemption policy of the Western states20, national interests of the Western 
states, domestic reasons, geo-strategic consideration within a politically unsettled 
region21, and the obvious weakness of the Qadhafi regime. 
The UNSC adopted UN Resolution 1973 (2011), allowing all "necessary 
measures to protect civilians"22 in Libya, by a vote of 10 in favor and 5 abstentions. By 
contrast, attempts to condemn the Syrian government for its violent crackdown on the 
protesters have failed twice23. However, Western states and NATO have proved in the 
past that they are able and willing to act to protect civilians without a mandate of the UN 
Security Council. The NATO-led operation "Allied Force" in 1999 against Yugoslavia to 
protect the Albanian population of Kosovo is exemplary. States themselves have different 
internal criteria and thresholds for a military engagement to protect human rights and, 
therefore, do not have comparable objective criteria that allow for a reliable predictability 
of their individual or common action.  
This leads to my argument that the weakness of the Libyan military and the 
isolation of Qadhafi made an international alliance against Libya likely, while Syria's 
alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, its higher military level and its economic and military  
 
 
                                                 
19 Libya is an important oil producer. Before the conflict started, it produced 1.6 million barrels of oil 
per day. It was the 17th-largest producer in the world, the third-largest producer in Africa, and held the 
continent's largest crude oil reserves. 
20 Almost all the Western states misinterpreted the beginning of the Arab spring in Egypt and Tunisia 
and continued supporting the old regimes. Even when former Egyptian president Mubarak and former 
Tunisian President Ben Ali started to fight their own populations, the Western community stayed hesitant 
and indecisive. The start of the uprising in Libya offered an opportunity for different countries to revise this 
impression and to set an example that they supported the movement. Paris, for example, expressed “hope it 
can make a mark on whatever emerges from upheaval across the Arab world, and make up for lost 
diplomatic confidence." Reuters, “Analysis: France sees Libya as way to diplomatic redemption.” 
www.reuters.com, (accessed October 23, 2011). 
21 Syria and its neighboring states has been a far more unstable region within the recent past in 
comparison to Libya. This will have huge influence on the geo- strategic consideration of the actors. 
22 UN Security Council, SC 10200, March 17, 2011. 
23 Two attempts of the UNSC on October 04, 2011 and February 04, 2012 to adopt resolutions against 




ties with Russia and China protect the Assad regime from an intervention. The risk of 
military setbacks and the risk of a possible expansion of the domestic conflict into a 
regional conflict are examples of individual national thresholds.  
Despite nations' main focus on self-interest, their adoption of a waiting attitude in 
cases of humanitarian crisis and the non-automatism of the "responsibility to protect" 
concept, some scholars argue that "the international community has grown increasingly 
adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities."24 Finally, I argue and 
predict that despite the general denial of an automatism to intervene in a domestic 
conflict by every state, the massive exposure of human rights violations through mass 
media has changed the international perception of them. This led to an altering of norms 
and, therefore, at least may cause a significant increase in the likelihood of interventions 
for the near future. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The political situation in the Middle East is one of the most analyzed and assessed 
topics in political literature. Nevertheless, the sudden development of the "Arab Spring" 
starting in December 2010 surprised scholars and politicians in the region and the world. 
Hence, the political literature about this revolutionary movement is relatively limited and 
mainly based on newspapers, magazines, and online sources. On the other hand, the 
concept of humanitarian intervention, which has advanced since the 1990s, and the 
analogous concept of "responsibility to protect," which has developed since 2005, both 
offer a large assortment of research papers, assessments, and different opinions. For my 




                                                 
24 J. Western and J. Goldstein, J.: Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons From Somalia to 




The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of 
states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of 
the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens 
without the permission of the state within whose territory force is 
applied.25 
To establish a framework to discuss the major research questions for my thesis, I 
need to assess the theoretical framework of humanitarian interventions and the concept of 
a "responsibility to protect" and the historical and current political and economic relations 
between Libya, Syria, and the three examined Western countries: Germany, France, and 
the U.S. Therefore, I divide this literature review into three main areas: (1) Humanitarian 
interventions—a framework; (2) The concept of a "responsibility to protect;" (3) Political 
relations and national interests.  
While for the first two parts, which include the revue of humanitarian 
interventions and the responsibility to protect—most sources are obtained from books 
published by scholars and articles and essays in professional journals, the third part that 
deals with national interests and political relations relies predominately on articles in 
newspapers and online sources, because of its topicality. Generally, the literature review 
first follows the "idea of summarizing the findings"26 of a research topic and then 
presents a large variety of quotations, statements, and assessments to illustrate where 
ideas presented in the third part are not "accurate and complete."27   
1. Humanitarian Interventions - a Framework 
The UN-mandated operation "Unified Protector" that enabled Libyan rebels to 
seize power and prevent the announced mass murder of the Qadhafi regime, and the 
contrary situation in treating Syria, again place special emphasis on the topic of 
"Humanitarian Intervention." This topic is discussed emotionally, in general, and, in the 
Libyan case, in particular, on a wide scale, containing reactions from unlimited 
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endorsement to total refusal. In March 2011, it was nearly undisputed in Western media 
and society that the engagement in Libya is a humanitarian intervention. However, as 
time passed a growing number of scholars deny this assessment. Bush, Martiniello, and 
Mercer stated early on that "Imperialist intervention uses the language of 
humanitarianism to justify its use of force..."28 and named the whole intervention 
"Humanitarian Imperialism."29 Roberts disbelieves the importance of humanity in the 
whole intervention30, and others also argue that the mission used value-based arguments 
as well as interest-based arguments.31  
However, as shown by the discussion, the question about the existence and 
necessity of humanitarian intervention is current again today. An entire assessment of all 
aspects of humanitarian intervention is impossible. To understand why humanitarian 
interventions take place, or not, requires a discussion about the most important and 
necessary factors framing the idea of humanitarian intervention. These are the 
reasonableness, the importance, the morality, the justification, the legal status and, 
finally, the enforceability of humanitarian interventions.  
The reasonableness of a humanitarian intervention in cases of an imminent 
genocide is, by this time, widely accepted in scholarship. The negative experiences of the 
"turbulent decade”32 of the 1990s, with failed humanitarian UN interventions in Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia, along with the UN Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, when the 
international community either did not intervene or did not intervene sufficiently to avoid 
massacres, formed this opinion. Nevertheless, the best method, the context, and also the 
                                                 
28 Ray Bush, Giuliano Martiniello and Claire Mercer (2011): Humanitarian imperialism, Review of 
African Political Economy, 38:129, 357‒365,. 
29 Ibid.  
30 The essay of Hugh Roberts criticizes several topics of the decision-making process itself and doubts 
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whole idea of a military humanitarian intervention, are still controversial. Pieterse 
opposes the whole concept of humanitarian intervention in its current form because it 
"reinforces authoritarianism, hard sovereignty, [and] militarization."33 Furthermore, he 
asks for a large variety of political and economic measures. Demanding a variety of 
measures seem logical, and is the most common and useful approach to assess the context 
of a humanitarian intervention. Doyle and Sambanis share Pieterse's opinion, but 
constrain his radical view and note that "enforcement operations alone cannot create the 
conditions for a self-sustaining democratic peace."34  
Additionally, the current discussion about reasonability is increasingly influenced 
by an economic debate. With the ongoing crisis in government budgets, the question is 
raised, both publicly35 and in scholarship, about the relationship between monetary input 
and the outcome of humanitarian interventions. This debate about the relation between 
monetary input and saved lives seems cynical, but as Valentino concludes: "military 
intervention is a particularly expensive way to save lives.”36 His statement is based on 
different cost calculations of several humanitarian interventions37 and describes a 
mounting problem.38 Valentino compares alternatives to military interventions. His 
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discussion leads to a necessary question about most the cost-effective measures and 
concepts and, finally, leads back to the question of reasonableness. Other parts of the 
scholarship are even more pessimistic. Mandelbaum notes that future budget cuts will 
lead to a situation where "the feature of twenty-first-century foreign policy likeliest to be 
eliminated, and the one with which the country can most easily do without, is the type of 
the military intervention ... in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq."39  
Reviewing the importance, the moral aspect, and the justification, leads to a 
conflict between two major camps: on one hand, the discussion about a moral obligation 
to avoid or stop mass atrocities and their outcome; and, on the other hand, a political 
viewpoint with a focus on geo-strategic interests, political objectives, national interests of 
states—and for some nations—the preference of national sovereignty as the most 
important idea of international relations. The moral obligation to intervene in 
humanitarian conflicts is countered by some scholars who see a moral obligation not to 
intervene. In the first period of humanitarian interventions after the cold war, Huntington 
argued against any participation of U.S. forces, stating that "it is morally unjustifiable and 
politically indefensible that members of the [U.S.] armed forces should be killed to 
prevent Somalis from killing one another."40 This generally adverse reaction is rarely 
seen in today’s discussion. 
However, the alleged moral obligation to support one faction in an inner-state 
conflict has, as Valentino mentioned, "on the ground ... a much more complicated 
reality."41 This finally leads to a situation where "... the most important costs incurred by 
military interventions have been moral ones."42 A foundation for this important 
assessment is the conclusion that in almost every inner-state conflict the supported 
faction, itself, hurts human rights significantly. Another aspect of the morale debate is 
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whether a humanitarian intervention is allowed to take lives, "including innocent 
ones?"43 On the other side of the wide spectrum of the moral aspect, Finnemore argues in 
a theoretical essay that "norms about multilateral action had been strengthened, making 
multilateralism not just attractive but imperative."44 
Despite Pattison's acknowledgement of the Libyan intervention as "morally 
permissible,"45 he recommends a "more morally defensible test,"46 to avoid a case-by-
case discussion about normative indicators and moral standards. The International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) provides this test47. This 
point of view seems reasonable. A fixed standard for a necessary intervention could 
theoretically simplify any discussion when a case of atrocity occurs. As I will show, in 
practice—obviously—not a single nation will accept an automatism for intervention, but 
the idea is important for my thesis. 
Pattison's attempt to define a binding scale for intervention directly leads to the 
question of the justification for a humanitarian intervention. Because every justification is 
a moral argument, every argument that justifies a humanitarian intervention is also a 
moral argument. Finally, as Phillips Griffith argues, "moral judgment is not calculation or 
deduction"48 and, therefore, really relies on moral authority. A discussion about the 
justification of a humanitarian intervention automatically goes back to the wide-ranging 
morale discussion. 
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The whole discussion about morale standards, obligatory tasks, and justifications 
for intervention or non-intervention49 finally depends on the will and the ability of a 
government to react. Therefore, as I prove in this thesis, national politics based on 
interests and strategies have the most important share of the discussion about 
humanitarian intervention. 
The political viewpoint of humanitarian interventions contains a large variety of 
opinions. National interests play an important role and are used as a main argument 
against interventions. Statements of politicians can powerfully underline attitudes in 
relation to humanitarian interventions. At the beginning of the recently ended operation in 
Libya, one U.S. politician on the U.S. intervention concluded that "it is doubtful that U.S. 
interests would be served by imposing a no-fly zone over Libya."50 Valentino argues in 
the same direction: "humanitarian interventions have won the country few new friends 
and worsened its relations with several powerful nations."51 Samantha Power, currently a 
member of U.S. President Obama's administration, is one of the most influential 
advocates of pro-humanitarian interventions and a critic of the precedence of national 
objectives. She argues the following about former non-interventions: "American leaders 
did not act because they did not want to."52 Simultaneously, she identifies a coincidence 
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opposition to deploying forces in humanitarian interventions argues that countries may in 
the future be forced to intervene in domestic conflicts, "... lurching from conflict to 
conflict, often with little idea of how they will end ..."54 
Walzer discusses the often-claimed suspicion of the imperial of force for 
humanitarian purposes and concludes that this is a weak argument because most powers 
have no geo-strategic interest in states that need a humanitarian intervention55. This 
opinion is directly rejected by Bello who fears that "great-power logic soon overwhelms 
the humanitarian rationale for intervention."56 
Important to the framing of the whole discussion about the justification of 
humanitarian interventions is to point out that, in this thesis, the three examined countries 
only evaluate the Western view. This is of importance because it is the different ideas and 
the different understanding of political concepts that largely influences discussions on 
Syria. While for the Western states an intervention—a massive interference into states 
sovereignty—is seen as acceptable and a logical consequence of the behavior of the 
regime, for non-Western states, this approach is less acceptable. Therefore, for the Syrian 
case the Russian, as well as the Chinese governments, are distinctly less willingly to 
support another intervention that may violate a state’s own sovereignty based on "its 
habit of standing [...] against encroachment on the principle of state."57 This attitude is 
enforced by the Western interpretation of UNSC resolution 1973, which included a 
regime change.  
As shown, many scholars and politicians doubt the national interest of 
humanitarian interventions or, at least, doubt the humanitarian rationale. Assessing the 
officially stated reasons for intervention, compared to possible additional reasons, 
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therefore, must be an important part of the analysis in the thesis. The definition of 
national interest and geo-strategic goals in relation or contrast to humanitarian 
interventions has significant importance for decision makers and the decisions they make. 
Discussing national interests, how they matter and their reliability in regard to 
humanitarian interventions, especially for the background of the Libyan and Syrian cases, 
is of highest importance for assessing the major research questions. 
The literature review already shows that the implementation of national interests 
is sometimes difficult. Three major reasons have to be assessed: 
First, states must have real national interests and promote them officially. The 
structure of officially defined national interests is varying in different countries. While 
Germany has not even defined its national interest, particularly, but defines security 
guidelines in its Weissbuch58 and in the Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien59 of the 
Ministry of Defense, the United States has published its national interest in a far more 
detailed way in its National Security Strategy60, including normative aims. The "French 
White Paper on defense and national security" 61 takes a middle ground by stating aims 
more detailed than the German papers but not as detailed as the U.S. paper. All three 
papers remain as superficial as possible, a procedure that will be explained in the paper. 
Second, the interpretation of national interest even within a government, 
parliament or political environment of a state is sometimes difficult. While U.S. President 
Obama is not interested in additional conflicts in the Middle East, other members of both 
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political fractions of the Senate try to pressure him to intervene in Syria.62 The same 
conflict is verifiable for all three countries and this thesis will discuss the outcome of this 
procedure.  
Finally, national interests are sometimes influenced by superior external reasons. 
As Radu points out, an increasingly globalized modern media and the rising number of 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) and their political influence "have made some 
governments take decisions which are not directly related to national or security interests 
but rather are in response to public pressure."63 Comparing the national interest of the 
U.S. and France as involved nations, and Germany as a non-involved counterexample, 
and then assessing the link between their officially stated interests and their actual 
actions, is an important but very difficult part of the thesis.  
From the beginning, the legal status of humanitarian intervention has never been 
resolved with any finality. There are a wide range of assessments about the legal status 
for humanitarian intervention without the approval of the involved state. They stretch 
from the conclusion that the use of force in a humanitarian intervention is generally 
"illegal"64 to Chesterman's assessment that the Libyan intervention (in particular) 
contradicts international law65 and, finally, to the opposite end of the range with Anne 
Orford's view.66 Hurd concludes the following about this problem in his essay: 
"Contemporarily international law can be read as either allowing or forbidding 
international humanitarian interventions, and the legal uncertainty around humanitarian 
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interventions is fundamental and irresolvable."67 This reflects the discussion about the 
legal aspect of humanitarian interventions and, therefore, these aspects will have to be 
treated superficially in the thesis. The legal situation of both cases will only be 
commented on, but not discussed conclusively. 
After considering the legal questions of mandates and legal issues, the review will 
take a look into literature about the enforceability of humanitarian interventions, leading 
to a necessary discussion about forces, their effectiveness, their sustainability and 
suitability, and the different stages of a humanitarian intervention. Two different main 
thoughts dominate this discussion: the rejection or the acceptance of military 
interventions in different situations. 
Wertheim, who criticizes the discounting of three challenges to intervention, 
represents the critical group when he states:  
First, they [humanitarian activists] downplay the difficulty of halting 
ethnic conflicts, understanding force requirements and dismissing risks of 
escalation. Second, they [humanitarian activists] ignored what happens 
after [the] war.... Thirdly, many [humanitarian activists] thought public 
opinion would or should not constrain decisions to deploy troops.68  
On the other side are the proponents of military humanitarian interventions. 
Western and Goldstein, supporting interventions, discuss the future level of military 
interventions and argue that the international community has to: (1) act as fast as 
possible, and for that purpose a standing force would be desirable; (2) equip humanitarian 
interventions with suitable forces and reserves; (3) stand against the opposition and 
pressure that may arise in case of civilian or coalition casualties; (4) organize multi-
lateral coalitions based on a coalition of international, regional, and local actors; and 
finally, (5) have an exit strategy.69 
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For every humanitarian intervention, including the Libyan intervention, the force 
provision is an important factor. Most scholars conclude, like Radu, that "the United 
States is ultimately the only power that can provide effective humanitarian intervention 
forces."70 Also, less complex and limited interventions can be equipped by European 
powers. Parent and MacDonald contradict this assumption, and underline the minor part 
U.S. forces played in the Libyan intervention, finally concluding that the U.S. also can 
play a secondary role."71 This different assessment has significant influence on the 
discussion of the Libyan and the Syrian cases, because in reverse, not every humanitarian 
intervention would depend on political positions of the U.S., as is often stated for 
different reasons. 
2. The Concept of a "Responsibility to Protect"  
Since the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) formulated the principle of the concept of "responsibility to protect"72  (RtoP) in 
2001, not a single international intervention has been fully based on this new concept.73 
With the humanitarian intervention in Libya, the debate in international scholarship about 
the status and the role of the RtoP concept has again intensified. Two main groups are 
identifiable in the discussion. One group denies nearly any importance of the RtoP 
concept, and the other one argues that RtoP is a milestone in humanitarian interventions. 
Thereby, the different groups, themselves, are heterogenic in their argumentation.  
Chesterman, a supporter of RtoP, agrees with the normative importance of RtoP, 
but simultaneously assesses the concept as a compromise and denies any binding legal 
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character74. Orford argues in the same direction, but accentuates the political importance 
of the concept "as conferring public power and allocating jurisdiction."75  More euphoric, 
Kinsman considers the Libyan conflict the inaugural application of "the responsibility to 
protect.”76 Several scholars share Goldstein and Western's view that RtoP, as a main 
module of humanitarian interventions, "has become integrated into a growing toolkit of 
management conflict strategies.”77  
Critics primarily fault the unclear legal position, the non-binding nature of the 
concept, and the attempts to declare the RtoP concept a duty for the international 
community. Cunliffe unifies all three critiques, especially the idea of converting the 
concept into a "duty to care,” and concludes that a consequence of implementing the 
concept is damage to the international relations of states.78 Bellamy criticizes the general 
ambiguity of the concept79, and Stahn concludes that "responsibility to protect is thus in 
many ways still a political catchword rather than a legal norm."80 Finally, the most 
common and useful assessment, that RtoP is an important tool, will be part of the thesis. 
3. Political Relations and National Interests 
After reviewing the literature of two widely examined topics, the examination of 
any further literature about political relations should also initially rely on a number of 
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well-known scholars. This approach—of using basic books published by scholars and 
articles and essays in professional journals—is also for suitable for discussing the 
political theory, history, national interests, and geo-strategies of all five nations that are 
the focus of our discussion.  
The framework to connect the concept of human intervention with classical 
International Relations (IR) theory relies on the work of several respectable academics. 
Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, et al. defined the theory of realism. The connection 
between realism and humanitarian interventions is not discussed conclusively in theory. 
To deny any leeway within realism for normative ideas is a well-known reflex; however, 
as Lechner points out, a connection is at least explainable.  
For domestic politics, Snyder's and Putnam's papers81 underline that international 
politics and domestic politics mutually influence each other by stating: "It is fruitless to 
debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. 
The answer to that question is clearly "Both, sometimes.""82 A direct connection between 
humanitarian intervention, RtoP, and the IR theory of domestic politics is not discussed in 
scholarship so far. 
The connection between the normative idea of humanitarian interventions and the 
norm-based theory of constructivism is obvious. Although the discussion about 
humanitarian intervention is very widespread, the constructivist approach contributes 
only a few significant arguments—like the famous article of Martha Finnemore83—to the 
debate. The argument itself is based on norms, but widely excludes the constructivist 
approach. 
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Generally, an integration of the concept of humanitarian intervention into IR is 
only somewhat fruitful. The classic IR scholarship has not intensively examined the idea 
of humanitarian interventions. Therefore, the discussion will be very brief in this thesis. 
The history and development of Libya and Syria is sufficient evaluated using 
basic works of Dirk Vandewalle for Libya84, and Raymond Hinnebusch85 for Syria. Both 
depict a clear picture of the political, historical, and social background of the conflict. 
Supplemented by official assessments of the U.S. Department of State, Research papers 
of the Congressional Research Service, and other academic sources like the International 
Crisis Group along, with additional authors, we obtain the background knowledge needed 
on Libya and Syria. 
For the last part of this thesis, the UNSC decisions are needed foremost as basis of 
our discussion. The decision-making process of the UN as the sole supranational 
organization that can justify military action, and of NATO as the most powerful alliance 
to execute this action, is decisive. Basic papers of both organizations are required for this 
thesis. In the discussion about the recent events within Syria and Libya—the different 
decision-making processes, the classifications of actions (in context) and of all possible 
explanations why some actions were taken and others were not, and of contemporary 
assessments and reports—are decisive. Therefore, several newspapers and their online 
editions have to be analyzed and their content integrated into this thesis. The online 
editions of the New York Times, The Washington Post, BBC, Reuters, Al Jazeera and 
several others have been selected as the only reliable sources. Online sources require a 
confirmation by another reliable source.  
4. Summary 
This literature review outlined the variety of literature that deals with 
humanitarian interventions, the norm of a "responsibility to protect,” Syria, Libya, and 
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the current and ongoing events in the region. By far, not every important aspect that is 
discussed in this thesis is conclusively discussed in the literature.  
The argument for the international non-intervention in Syria and the fast 
intervention in Libya, and the comparison of both topics, still lacks a comprehensive 
analysis in scholarship. The ongoing change in media and society in the assessment of the 
real reasons for the respective actions is replicable in the argumentation. This thesis seeks 
to provide a comprehensive analysis and explanation for the distinction between both 
cases and, simultaneously, assess the influence of humanitarian interventions and RtoP as 
political factors in current international politics.  
C. METHOD AND SOURCES 
While the NTC leadership declared, "Libyan lands have now been completely 
liberated"86 on October 23rd, 2011, the old Syrian regime is still in power and, despite 
the large number of killed people, Bashar al-Assads declares "I did my best to protect the 
people," and "I cannot feel guilty when you do your best. You feel sorry for the lives that 
have been lost. But you don't feel guilty when you don't kill people."87   
The crucial factor for these opposing developments in Libya and Syria is the 
international assessment of the respective situations in regard to national interest and 
politics. An analysis of the objectives and strategies for acting and non-acting of nations, 
especially the influence of humanitarian reasons, can only be done in a limited 
framework. This thesis will particularly present a Western view on the situation. 
Therefore, this master-thesis will approach answering the research questions using a 
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http://abcnews.go.com/International/bashar-al-assad-interview-defiant-syrian-president-




qualitative, exploratory,88 comparative case study of three nations: Germany, France, and 
the U.S. Within this comparison and analysis, the considered period for Libya ends with 
the end of the mission Unified protector on 31 October 2011. For the unsolved Syrian 
conflict, the examined period for all events ends with the due date of 29 February 2012, 
although current literature sources have been updated and used as recently as 15 May 
2012. 
Comparing these three countries is for several reasons useful to analyze the 
processes and strategies that led to the international developments in regard to Libya and 
Syria. The U.S., Germany and France share several similarities: all three states are 
democratic, are members of NATO, participate together in the military operation in 
Afghanistan and the Gulf of Aden, cooperated in former humanitarian interventions in 
Somalia89 and against Yugoslavia90, were members of the UN Security Council when the 
Libyan Resolution 1973 was passed91 and share generally common humanitarian 
values92. 
In addition to these commonalities, the countries differ significantly in their 
approach to the Libyan situation. While France was a driving force in establishing an 
anti-Qadhafi coalition, the U.S. was more reserved but decisively involved and Germany 
refused any participation. Astonishingly enough, all three nations are nearly united in 
their strategy against the Syrian leadership. 
This composition of the case study should analyze the influence of national 
interests, geo-strategic considerations and domestic politics in assessing the attitude 
                                                 
88 An exploratory case study is used to explore those situations in which the intervention being 
researched has no clear single set of outcome. Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, Qualitative Case Study 
Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers, The Qualitative Report Volume 
13, Number 4, December 2008 p. 544- 559. 
89 UNITAF (1992- 1993) 
90 NATO operation "Allied Force" (1999) 
91 France and the U.S. are permanent members; Germany joins the Security Council as non- 
permanent member from 2010 to 2012.  
92 While France and the U.S. have adopted the UN Declaration of human rights in 1948, Germany's 




towards a humanitarian intervention. Coincidently, the Syrian case will underline this 
preference for specific interest in contrast to moral fundamentals. Additionally, the 
decision-making process of NATO and UN can be well assessed by this case 
composition. 
While the discussion about humanitarian intervention in general is widespread 
and intensive in scholarship, books and in articles, the recently ended intervention in 
Libya and the still ongoing domestic conflict in Syria lack these detailed literature 
sources. Assessing the decision-making processes that led to different behaviors by the 
states in dealing with the developments in Libya and Syria, therefore, also relies on: 
(1) Comments, articles, reports, and analyses of serious newspapers, including 
 well-approved political divisions and professional journals. The regional priority 
 of these sources is Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East region; 
(2) Statements of—and interviews with—politicians, military personnel, and 
 witnesses of the processes, from open media sources; 
(3) Reports and films from open media sources; 
(4) Absolute data from open sources, required for verifying the analysis: 
Surveys/ opinion polls of residents from all three countries of the case study93  
Different economic94 data explaining the initial situation of Syria and Libya on 
the eve of the domestic conflicts. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This first chapter gives an overview of the approach taken in this thesis.  
Chapter II builds up the theoretical framework for the discussion about the so-
called humanitarian intervention in Libya, and the thereby discussed idea of a 
                                                 
93 For example: For U.S. gallup.com or pollingreport.com, for France: France24.com and for Germany 
www.infratest-dimap.de. 
94 Different databases are available to show the economic development of those countries. Most data 





"responsibility to protect," and briefly integrates the concept of humanitarian intervention 
in the political theories of realism, domestic politics and constructivism.  
It is important to present this theoretical discussion about both concepts to 
understand the action and non-action of the three examined states— the U.S., France, and 
Germany. The dichotomy between the later presented acknowledgement of these 
concepts in the national strategies and the stated interests of the three countries, and the 
action taken, must be understood. Especially, the demonstrated procedures and action 
patterns that states can use to generally deny any responsibility to act on the normative 
based idea of humanism—and contrarily, the ease to use the argument of humanism to 
intervene—are important in the discussion about the situation in Syria and Libya. 
Additionally, these actions are highly recurrent political patterns. A discussion of the 
brief integration of humanitarian interventions into international relations theories rounds 
out the theoretical framework. It proves that the current motives and political procedures 
in cases of human right violations are still similar to past procedures and arguments, and, 
therefore, help to explain what influence a norm-based argument really has.  
After discussing the theoretical background of humanitarian interventions, 
Chapter III presents and discusses the historical and political background of the conflict 
areas in Syria and Libya, and the bilateral relations of both countries with Germany, the 
U.S., and France before the uprisings started. Finally, the chapter gives an overview of 
events since early 2011. The review of the past relationships between the different 
countries is of high importance to understand the behavior of the political actors and the 
national and geo-strategic interests that influenced their decisions in 2011. Political and 
economic relations of the more recent past shape the national interests and the geo-
strategic approach of the actors in 2011/ 2012. The overview of events in Syria and Libya 
elucidates that—from a humanitarian viewpoint—the initial situation seems to be 
comparable and, therefore, supports the idea of this thesis that the main trigger for the 
decision to intervene or not is a different one. 
Chapter IV explains the motives of France and the U.S. to join and pressure an 




negative conduct of all three for any engagement in Syria. With the examination of the 
officially stated and the non-stated reasons for or against an intervention in Libya and 
Syria, in comparison to the official policy of all three countries, the respective decisions 
will be clarified and made understandable. It is of high importance to present the existing 
gap between official stated policy and finally executed action. Every taken action is well 
considered, but differentiates within the three Western states in regard to the idea of 
following a long-term strategy or simply deciding on a case-by-case basis. By analyzing 
the action of the states, the official statements are unmasked as pure platitudes that are a 
necessary tool used to justify, in each case, whether to act militarily or not. 
Linking the theoretical framework, the bilateral relations before the crisis, the 
timeline of the conflicts, and the different domestic, national, and geo-strategic interests 
is done in Chapter V. The application of my hypothesis clarifies the different important 
considerations that are necessary to give a complete overview of the argumentation of the 
thesis. The finding that Libya and Syria are (contrary to the first impression) quite 
different cases, the brief classification of the theoretical approach of the U.S., France, and 
Germany, the rationale of the actors, and the explanation of the real influence of norms, 
underline the validity of my hypothesis. 
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the findings and concludes the analysis of the 
differences between the international engagement in Libya and the non-engagement in 
Syria, predicts the future of humanitarian interventions, the "responsibility to protect," the 
possibility of intervention in Syria, and gives a brief argument why both concepts, and 




II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
A. DEVELOPMENT AND OVERVIEW 
The idea of "Humanitarian intervention" as rationale for a military intervention of 
one or several states within the territory of another sovereign state is more than 180 years 
old. Already, the Russian intervention in the Greek War for independence (1821–1827), 
the French intervention in Greater Syria (a part of the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s), the 
Russian engagement in Bulgaria (1876–1878), and the threat of force of some European 
powers to stop the genocide of the Armenian people in Turkey (1894–1917), have been 
claimed as examples of humanitarian interventions.95 Justification, planning and 
execution of humanitarian intervention have changed since the idea of protecting civilians 
had emerged but the normative foundation of violating another’s nation sovereignty 
remained unchanged.   
Humanitarian norms and their evolution within and between states over the last 
180 years have driven the idea of humanitarian intervention. Affecting another's state 
sovereignty founded by norms contradicts the usual international political pattern and 
behavior since its emergence. Neither realists (who would expect to gain some 
geopolitical or strategic self-interest by the interveners), nor liberals (who would seek 
economic gains or the spread of democracy for the intervening country), can finally 
explain interventions like Somalia (1989) or Kosovo (1999). Most likely, humanitarian 
intervention—and, therefore, norms—correspond to a constructivist approach96.  
                                                 
95 These four cases are called humanitarian intervention but their execution and motivation was 
decisively different from today’s interventions. The definition of who was human was different and 
therefore the motivation of the intervening states was given by this determination. For example, the French 
intervention in Lebanon/ Syria 1860-1861 was motivated to help solely the Christian population. At the 
same time other massive violations of human rights by the same nations remained unheeded.   
96 Finnemore, Martha. Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in The Culture of National 






This still ongoing development of norms explains the variety of types of 
interventions over time. Since the end of World War II, the general definition of who is 
human, and which norm violations justify an intervention, has fundamentally changed. 
Additionally, after the end of the cold war in 1989, "norms about multilateral action had 
been strengthened, making multilateralism not just attractive but imperative."97 
Therefore, today’s humanitarian interventions obviously depend on a broad approval of 
the international community of states, an institutionalized mandate of the United Nations, 
and sometimes also needs the additional support of other supranational institutions.98 
Those formal institutions simultaneously shape norms that legitimize international 
interventions in sovereign states and frame the implementation of the intervention.  
An important constraint has to be made about the binding character of norms that 
support the rationale for humanitarian intervention. They are still permissive norms that 
enable the international community to intervene under certain conditions, but they do not 
require any kind of intervention.99 The advancement of norms finally created the concept 
of "responsibility to protect" as the bedrock for an attempted shift of humanitarian 
intervention from a permissive norm to an automatically binding norm. 
Although the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) had already formulated the principle of the concept of "responsibility to 
protect"100 (RtoP) in 2001, and the UN adapted the concept at the World Summit in 
2005101, not a single international intervention has fully been based on this new 
                                                 
97 Finnemore, Martha. Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in The Culture of National 
Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein, New York, Columbia University 
Press, 1996 
98 During the preparation of the NATO-led intervention in Libya (2011) the driving nations (U.S., 
France, Great Britain) tried to build up a broad- based coalition and, therefore, involved the League of Arab 
Nations as much as possible during the whole process. This was necessary to avoid the impression that the 
"West" arbitrary tries to intervene in an Arabic country. 
99 These conditions generally include multilateralism and require a UN mandate. 
100 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.) 
101 UN, General Assembly, World Summit outcome, 2005. Furthermore the UN reflects on the World 




concept.102 The normative importance of RtoP has been acknowledged in scholarship, 
but simultaneously, scholarship assesses the concept as a compromise and denies any 
binding legal character103. Finally, the assessment of RtoP as an important tool in the 
discussion about humanitarian interventions is an important part of the thesis. 
B.  HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION  
Social and political science offer a multitude of different definitions to explain the 
concept of humanitarian intervention. Keohane's definition of humanitarian 
intervention104 that is used in this thesis particularly excludes non-forcible 
interventions—such as the threat or the use of economic, diplomatic, or other sanctions 
and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state’s own 
nationals.105 
A comprehensive analysis of different ethical fundamentals and theories of 
humanitarian intervention (like communitarianism, social contractarianism, and 
utilitarianism), and the question of importance and justification, is not expedient—and 
therefore—not part of this thesis. Rather interesting and of high importance is the legal 
status of humanitarian intervention. Although the intervention in Libya was backed with 




                                                 
102 Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well after Libya, Ethics & International Affairs, 25, no. 3 
(2011). 
103 Chestham points out that, finally, either UN resolution 1973 or the RtoP concept has changed the 
general legal position of humanitarian interventions. Simon Chesterman, Leading from Behind: The 
Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya, New York 
University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 282 (2011). 
104 "The threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing 
or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its 
own citizens without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied."J.L.Holzgreve,.The 
humanitarian intervention debate, in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J.L. Holzgreve and Robert O. 





intervention, especially of the extended version that surely was more than establishing a 
'no-fly-zone.'106 Therefore, a brief discussion about the legal status of humanitarian 
interventions helps to build the framework for the Libyan and Syrian cases. 
1. Legal Status of Humanitarian Interventions 
From the beginning of humanitarian interventions, their legal status has not finally 
been resolved. The range of the assessment of the legal status for a humanitarian 
intervention, without the approval of the involved state, is wide. It stretches from the 
conclusion that such use of force in a humanitarian intervention is generally "illegal,"107 
the assessment that the latest intervention in Libya (in particular) contradicts international 
law108 and, finally, to the opposite with Anne Orford's view.109 
Hurd concludes the following about this problem in his essay: “Contemporarily 
international law can be read as either allowing or forbidding international humanitarian 
interventions, and the legal uncertainty around humanitarian interventions is fundamental 
and irresolvable."110 Therefore, only some generally accepted legal aspects of 
humanitarian intervention are depicted here. Article 38 (I) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice defines that international norms are legally binding if they 
are a part of international conventions or international custom. This statute is widely 
accepted as the binding statement of international law.111   
                                                 
106 "The basis for the intervention under international law was dubious from the start", Eric A. Posner, 
“Outside the law.” Foreign Policy, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/25/libya_international_law_qaddafi_nato?page=full 
(accessed April 26, 2012). 
107 For the Kosovo case, Independent International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned, (2000). 
108 Simon Chesterman, Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Libya, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 
282 (2011). 
109 Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
110 Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, Ethics & 
International Affairs, 25, no. 3 (2011), p. 311. 
111 J.L. Holzgreve.The humanitarian intervention debate, in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J.L. 




Alongside to this statement, international conventions govern the exercise of 
forcible humanitarian intervention. The widely claimed normative necessity of a 
multilateral approach for those military measures underlines the importance of the UN 
Charter112 as the most important international convention regarding to humanitarian 
intervention. Although the legal status of the UN charter, its commitment and its 
jurisdiction in inner state conflicts is also under discussion, the "most important source of 
international law, international conventions, seems to permit the UN Security Council to 
authorize humanitarian interventions by its members."113 This assessment is based on 
Chapter VII, especially Article 39, of the UN Charta that "may authorize the UN Security 
Council the use of force in response to any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression."114 
Interventions that are unauthorized by the UN are still more controversial. 
Examples of unauthorized interventions—like the Iraq intervention (1992 and 1993), and 
NATO's intervention in Bosnia (1995) and in Kosovo (1999)—prove their importance, 
although such interventions are generally infrequent. This decline is explained by 
changing norms towards multilateral and authorized interventions. 
Arguments pro and against unauthorized interventions are versatile and have their 
origin in a large variety of reasons. Critics of unauthorized interventions almost refer to 
Article 2 (4) of the UN Charta stating: “All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”115 The discussion about the legitimacy leads to several approaches to 
prove the justification for unauthorized interventions. The most important approaches are:  
                                                 
112 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, January 1985,. 







• Customary international law116; 
• The status quo approach117; 
• The "excusable breach" approach118; 
• The clear legal doctrine approach119 
An important element of the discussion is the normative trend towards multilateral 
interventions. Therefore, interventions require a broader basis of approval and hence the 
probability to intervene unauthorized decreases because most states are orientated 
towards the UN Security Council and its decisions.  
For the intervention in Libya the vast majority of scholarship acknowledges the 
legitimacy of the intervention based on the UNSC mandate. Notwithstanding as a general 
ambiguity the discussion about the actual dimension of the intervention that exaggerated 
the mandate, as well as legal concerns for the decision-making process within some 
participating nations still exists.120   
Conclusively, the legal status of humanitarian intervention is not finally resolved 
and it is highly likely that also in next future every single case has to be considered and 
even after intensive discussions doubts will remain within scholarship and international 
                                                 
116 This customary right to intervene is based on state practice during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. J.L. Holzgrefe, The humanitarian intervention debate, in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. 
J.L. Holzgreve and Robert O. Keohane, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2003). 
117 This approach is based on the idea that an intervention only can be lawful, if its authorized by the 
UN Security Council or is an act of self- defense. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking humanitarian intervention: 
the case for incremental change,in: Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, 
(2003) 
118 It acknowledges that a humanitarian intervention without mandate is illegal but argues that it may 
be "morally and politically justified in certain exceptional cases." Ibid. 
119 This most widely liberal attempt claims a right for humanitarian intervention. The supporters of 
these attempts argue that with a UN Charta amendment or a UN General Assembly declaration such a right 
should be codified in international law. Ibid. 
120 In the U.S. the discussion about President' Obama's decision to intervene in Libya is still ongoing. 
Some scholars deny the legitimacy of his decision to intervene without acknowledgement of the U.S. 
Congress. Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment On the Justice Department’s 
Libya Opinion† Harvard National Security Journal Forum, April 2011; Louis Fisher, Obama’s Military 
Commitment in Libya A Paper Presented at the Wilson Center, “Congress, the U.N. and the War Power: 




politics. The legal review of the extensive NATO intervention in Libya will influence 
every new discussion and already has impact on the discussion about the possible 
intervention in Syria. 
2. Incidence and Non-Incidence of Humanitarian Intervention 
After compliance with the main requirements -- widespread and grave violations 
of the fundamental human rights of individuals that contradict generally accepted 
international norms, the support of international institutions in acknowledging these 
violations, the buildup of a multilateral coalition and at least an inherently legal base -- 
humanitarian interventions theoretically can occur.  
However, as the record of humanitarian intervention since 1990 (table 2) shows, 
the use of force across borders to defend human rights is a rare incident. Surely the 
structural change of norms after World War II has increased the number of major 
interventions but the absolute number is still low. Especially if the number of 
interventions is compared with the large number of civil wars and armed conflicts (figure 
2) that were ongoing since 1990 the interest of the international community to engage in 
conflicts to protect civilians seems very limited.121  Therefore the puzzle is the question 
"why has the international community missed most occasions to intervene?" To answer 
this question the political process that leads to a humanitarian intervention briefly has to 
be assessed again.  
                                                 
121 Reliable database about the number of civil wars is not available. Different definitions of the 
available sources and a large variety of different interpretations hamper an impartial overview. A variety of 
civil wars and a reliable overview of major armed conflicts underline the scarcity of humanitarian 





Figure 1.   Political decision-making process of humanitarian intervention 
As depicted in the graphic, the whole process finally depends on a single variable:  
The objective assessment of institutions, supranational organizations and their member 
states that a violation of basic human rights and norms has occurred and is currently 
ongoing. Unequivocally the UN Security Council is the sole institution that has the 
international legitimacy to justify any kind of military intervention122. Once the Security 
Council has confirmed a massive violation of human rights, further measures like 
sanctions to increase the political or economic pressure on the regime can start. In a case 
of an ongoing non-compliance an intervention as most powerful tool to end the conflict 
                                                 
122 Mark S. Stein, Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2004. 
Although other supranational institutions like the European Union, African Union or the League of Arab 
states raise claims to be able to solve conflicts internally the final institution in regard to legitimize 




can be used. Generally a pattern of political procedures in regard to massive human right 
violations is identifiable. States use this action pattern to justify and explain their support 
or rejection for requested humanitarian interventions. 
The discussion about Libya and Syria in this thesis will bear reference to this 
pattern. 
3. Pattern for the Non-Incidence of Humanitarian Interventions 
Although most states of the world acknowledge a basic set of human rights 
through a large variety of different treaties and conventions123 and human rights are 
theoretically undisputed, a recognition of the violation of human rights through the 
UNSC sometimes happens only very restricted or stays out totally. 
Refusing the occurrence of atrocities and violations of human rights by UNSC 
members, especially Security Council veto powers, is an easy and common method to 
stop measures against blamed states. This non-identifying and downplaying of the 
violation of basic human rights by members of the UN Security Council can, besides 
adding to the reluctance to deploy a force, lead to a non-intervention or a seriously 
delayed intervention, even in cases where atrocities obviously occur. The most prominent 
examples are: the killing of ten thousands of Tutsis in Rwanda (early 1970s); the murder 
of 100,000 Kurds in Iraq (1988–89); the conflict in Darfur, Sudan (2003–2011); the 
genocide in Rwanda (1994); and also, the current situation in Syria (since 2011), where 
approximately more than 8,000124 people have already died in the ongoing conflict.  
Generally, this argumentation of non-involved states is used to secure national 
interests and geo-strategic aims like: 
                                                 
123 For Example: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (1981); United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment (1984); United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child (1989). For more conventions 
and texts see J.L. Holzgrefe, , The humanitarian intervention debate, in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. J.L. 
Holzgreve and Robert O. Keohane, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2003) and: Mark S. Stein, 
Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention, Social Philosophy and Policy, 2004 




• Military and political alliances; 
• Economic interests and treaties; 
• Political principles; 
• Geo-Strategic interests; 
• History and traditional practices;  
Additionally, politicians also have to consider specific domestic politics125 of 
their countries and the possible effects within their own population. 
If states want to avoid any engagement in a domestic crisis of a country, the 
plainest justification for non-intervention is to reject the finding that a regime violates its 
own population human rights officially and, thereby, preventing measures of the UN. 
This argumentation follows a political pattern that is finally based on three main 
explanations:  
1. Fundamental doubts or insufficient evidence for widespread and grave 
violations of the fundamental human rights of a population committed by the ruling 
regime.  
Despite the wide spread of modern media also in less-developed countries the 
assessment of a fundamental human right violation by the ruling regime is often difficult. 
Often neutral observations of the areas that are concerned in the conflict are difficult 
because: 
• They are out of the focus of politics and media126 or are unidentified; 
                                                 
125 The role of domestic politics within the different states is of decisive importance. Politicians have 
to consider internal factors like the mood and attitude of the own population in regard to send troops 
abroad, feelings towards the country that is under suspicious to violate human rights and its own history. 
Additionally hard economic data is getting more attention in domestic discussions about military 
interventions.     
126 Media sometimes fail to recognize and report signs of imminent danger even if they take notice of 
the occurrence itself.  For the U.S. media Donald R. Shanor determines a "cost of apathy" towards the 




• Those areas possess only underdeveloped modern media technology to 
communicate events reliably; 
• Neutral observation is aggravated by general violence in the concerned 
areas and sometimes technically127 and politically suppressed by conflict 
parties; 
• Different statements and reports from a variety of sources that partially 
have a biased agenda prevent an impartial assessment.128 
Thereby not only those member states of the UN that are generally very critical 
towards military interventions may doubt the alleged massacres, tortures or genocides but 
also NGO's and scholarship often differs in their assessment of reported violations of 
human rights. This different assessment of events makes this argument to an easy tool to 
reject any requested humanitarian intervention or even more moderate sanctions by the 
UNSC.  
For the Syrian case, China and Russia use a variety of this argument as a tool to 
prevent any condemnation of the Syrian leadership. Main arguments are the alleged 
partisanship of the resolution drafts of the UNSC and the insufficient mentioning of the 
crimes of the Syrian opposition. 
                                                 
127 Attempts and implementation of regimes to shut down communication in a crisis area and thereby 
prevent reports from those areas is a common tool to avoid critical reports. In the recent past the Egyptian 
the Libyan regime shut down the Internet in their whole countries during the rebellions in 2011 to stem 
critical reports. Additionally several more states regularly directly interfere in internet capacity, speed and 
permeability of data. Matthias C. Kettemann, The Legality of Internet Blackouts in Times of Crisis: An 
Assessment at the Intersection of Human Rights Law, Humanitarian Law and Internet Governance 
Principles, GigaNet, Sixth Annual Symposium, (2011) 
128 For example: The reported number of victims of the inner- Libyan conflict before the NATO-led 
intervention started differed between 233 (February 22, 2011, Human Rights Watch), 1000 (February 23, 
2011, Italian Foreign Minister), and thousands (February 25, 2011, UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights) killed by the Quadhafi regime, while the regime itself published no information about it. Some 
scholars doubt the whole number of victims and the matter of fact of an starting genocide because "despite 
ubiquitous cellphone cameras, there are no images of genocidal violence, a claim that smacks of rebel 
propaganda.’ So, four weeks on, I was not alone in finding no evidence for the aerial slaughter story." Hugh 
Roberts, Who said Gaddafi had to go?, London Review of Books, Vol. 33, Number 22, 17 November 2011, 
and Alan J. Kuperman, “5 things the U.S. should consider in Libya.” USAToday 





2. Deliberate negation of existing human right violations committed by the ruling 
regime. 
Rejecting the claim that atrocities occur is the second major argument why 
member states of the UNSC refuse their approval to intervene militarily in a humanitarian 
crisis. Fueled by the argument that human right violations did not occur, the origin of the 
violations is vague or with the indication of only poor evidence, they try to keep the 
status quo in the concerned region.  
Thereby the evaluation of the situation in concerned regions differs substantially 
within the UNSC. Because a general impartial assessment is almost impossible, a 
consideration on a case-by-case base has to be done to find out what happened and who is 
responsible. This process often is very time-consuming and resumes in delaying or 
sometimes preventing an intervention.  
For both cases, Syria as well as Libya, this argument was not possible because the 
occurrence of human right violations by the ruling regimes was and for the Syrian case, is 
still evident.  
3. Disinterest, risks and lack of a chance of success. 
In addition to the deliberate and targeted attempt to prevent an UNSC mandate or 
resolution to intervene in a crisis area, even if the violation of human rights is obvious 
and proven, the international community sometimes fails to intervene adequate and in 
time. 
Most prominent example is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 when UN 
institutions, global public and politicians worldwide where aware of the atrocities that 
happened there and the UN had already a limited mandate to intervene and maintained a 
force (UNAMIR) in the country. Nonetheless the Hutu militias and also the population 
got the opportunity to kill hundreds of thousands Rwandan citizens.129 The main reasons  
 
                                                 
129 The number of the victims of the genocide differs between 500,000 and 1,000,000, depending on 
the source. A reliable number of the victims do not exist. The majority of the victims were members of the 




for the non-intervention in Rwanda were disinterest caused by an international lack of 
political and economic interests in Rwanda, and the negative experience of the disastrous 
humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993.  
Non-provision of forces to intervene or limited financial means to support an 
intervention follows the same major rationale like the cases where states deliberately 
refuse to recognize an incident. States have an absolute preference of national interests 
and governments of domestic politics and, therefore, tend to neglect responsibility 
towards humanity. Eventually this preference of national interests and domestic politics 
may lead to a political abstention and non-support of an intervention. Depending on the 
countries that absent from a participation this behavior is likely to prevent an intervention 
from the beginning because interventions are extremely difficult or impossible without 
the participation of some key nations.130 
A Western government that considers a humanitarian intervention cannot state its 
political disinterest, the assessment that an intervention may be too risky or the 
assumption that an intervention lacks a realistic chance of a success. Norms as the 
definitional background for Western self-awareness prohibit this behavior. Therefore, 
other reasons have to be quoted. Especially for the Syrian case this behavior will be 
evident. 
4. Pattern for the Incidence of Humanitarian Interventions 
As shown above the motives and political reasons why states try to avoid 
humanitarian interventions are manifold. An extensive assessment of reasons why 
humanitarian interventions occur is easily derivable from this argument. However, 
additionally another major argument, a kind of undeniable obviousness, leads to an 
explanation why humanitarian interventions occur. Necessarily any kind of a violation of 
human rights as a sine qua non has to happen. The assessment of this violation again 
                                                 
130 James Kurth assess that interventions depend on "modern, professional, and expeditionary military 
forces" because without those forces is unlikely. Only the U.S., Great Britain, France, Canada and Australia 
maintain those forces. James Kurth , The Iraq War and Humanitarian Intervention, Global Dialogue, 




underlies the same critical appraisal as every time when a violation is claimed. Especially 
since the 1990s the number of humanitarian interventions has increased significantly with 
the successful examples of Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Sierra 
Leone (2000) and Libya (2011). 
1. Obvious violation of human rights leads to measures and an intervention as last 
resort. 
The simplest explanation why interventions occur is the undeniable and publicly 
recognized existence of a grave violation of human rights and the resulting concern of 
Western populations and politicians. Despite the above-mentioned difficulties to report 
impartially of the proceedings in a crisis area, in some cases violations of human rights 
happen so publicly and allocable that finally the international community is pressured by 
media and public opinion to intervene (CNN-effect)131. The Rwanda case of 1994 proves 
this assessment but also proves the possible tremendous length of this process to 
subordinate national interests under humanity.132 For smaller and less spectacular cases 
this almost media driven pressure to act never sets up.  
The discussion about the announced atrocities of Qadhafi in comparison to the 
proven and confirmed number of victims of the events in February 2011133 and the 
ongoing discussion about the number of victims and the perpetrator in Syria show the 
difficulty to base an intervention on impartial evidence. 
More interesting is the question why interventions happen in uncertain situations 
where proves are disbelieved and the case itself is inconclusive. 
                                                 
131 The theory in political science and media concludes that the emergence of CNN as the first 24/7 
news station and, in its aftermath, of a several more news stations influences politics and decisions of 
politicians substantially. In today's discussion the CNN effect in enforced by new social media networks. 
132 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell, New York, Basic Books, 2003. 
133 Huge Roberts, Who said Gaddafi had to go? London Review of Books, Vol. 33, Number 22, 17 
November 2011. 
Alain J. Kuperman, “False pretense for war in Libya?” The Boston Globe, 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/04/14/false_pretense_for_war_in




2. Non-acceptance of existing human right violations because of other than 
normative reasons.  
Even if the UN Security Council generally acknowledges a case of atrocities 
against a state’s own population and the media tries to pressure the international 
community to react, a reaction, as shown above, is not natural. Conversely sometimes 
interventions occur although the state of evidence seems to be uncertain and the claimed 
and proposed extent of the violation is possibly doubtful.  
Surely, it has to be considered that nowadays the rationale for every single case of 
interventions is doubted by anyone. While several scholars generally reject the idea of 
interventions134 other scholars, governments, institutions or individuals criticize the 
rationale or the implementation of interventions on case-by-case basis. Above all official 
rationale of international politics for humanitarian interventions is—without any 
difference between authorized and unauthorized ones—to end violations of human rights. 
This is normative mandatory to justify the use of military against other humans and, 
therefore, to accept new human rights violation.135 Another major reason why the 
humanity rationale is always foregrounded is the necessity of democratic countries to get 
the approval of its own population for interventions and the use of own forces.   
Humanity as the main rationale for interventions in official statements and reasons 
has a unique characteristic. No additional reasons seem to motivate states to intervene. 
However, it is undisputed that in some cases, any rationale besides humanity is difficult 
to find. Prominent examples are the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor. 
Nonetheless, to generalize the assumption that states intervene primarily because of pure 
humanity is as wrong as the assumption that states only act because of self-interest. 
                                                 
134 For example: Jan Nederveen Pieterse opposes the whole concept of humanitarian intervention in 
its current form because it "reinforces authoritarianism, hard sovereignty, militarization."; Sociology of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia, Rwanda and Somali Compared, International Political Science Review 
(1997), Vol. 18, No. 1. 
135 The discussion in scholarship about the normative justification of humanitarian intervention is 




However, to follow the argument that interventions are driven by pure humanity would 
conclude that in every case of a massive violation of human rights an intervention would  
occur with the same intensity and the same will to act. Because this is not happening and 
interventions are more the exemption of the rule other reasons must be of major 
importance. 
Similar to the assessment why states do not intervene, national interests and 
domestic politics shape the rationale why states intervene. As easy to explain as the 
reasons governments do not to intervene, are the reasons why they do intervene. The 
following national interests and geo-strategic considerations have a decisive influence on 
the decision-making process of states: 
• Military and political alliances; 
• Economic interests and treaties; 
• Political principles; 
• Geo-Strategic interests; 
• History and traditional practices.  
Additionally, politicians also consider specific domestic politics136 of their 
governments and the effects within their own population. 
For the intervention in Libya, the involved states followed this pattern. 
5. Conclusion  
In a modern media society, where it is highly likely that reports of violations of 
human rights are widespread, states and their governments are trapped in a stress ratio 
between intervening and non-intervening. As a result, in every extensive single case that 
is reported, passionate proponents pro and against the respective decision will criticize 
the unsolicited or unacceptable decision. The modern media allows for the publishing of 
                                                 
136 The role of domestic politics within the different states is of huge importance. Politicians have to 
consider internal factors like the mood and attitude of the own population in regard to send troops abroad, 




critiques and arguments quickly and worldwide. Nonetheless, governments finally have 
to make decisions that balance national interests, geo-strategic considerations, domestic 
constraints, and both national and international norms. The most important conclusion is 
that it is impossible for governments to publicly announce any rationale other than purely 
humanitarian ones, for the following reasons: 
• The legal constraints for interventions within the UN Charta; 
• The international community will not accept encroachments on the 
sovereignty of other states for any other reasons; 
• Today’s international norms preclude other reasons; 
• Especially in Western and democratic states, interventions for other 
reasons are likely to be unacceptable because of norms, financial 
conditions, and the unwillingness to risk the lives of their own soldiers; 
• The need to fulfill the normative claim of a multilateral base for 
interventions; 
Consequently, states that want to intervene are forced to hide all other possible 
reasons other than humanity. Simultaneously, this offers the state that hurts international 
human law and wants to avoid any kind of intervention the opportunity to discredit the 
intervening states and their possibly real rational of humanity. 
The patterns presented are also applicable for discussion about the actions of the 
Western states with regard to the Libyan and Syrian cases. To understand their action, it 
must be understood that states apply established norms differently and evaluate specific 
incidents differently (or even contrarily).  
C.  RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The term responsibility to protect (RtoP) was first presented in a report137 by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in December 
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2001138 and is only the title of an overall concept that also assumes other wide-ranging 
responsibilities of the international community than only engaging a regime that failed to 
protect its own population.139  
In public discussion the term 'responsibility to protect' abridges the complex idea 
to an assumed responsibility to protect civilians when their own government endangers 
them. The responsibility to protect includes three different elements:  
• The responsibility to prevent,  
• The responsibility to react, and  
• The responsibility to rebuild.  
Besides the idea of protecting people against their own governments as part of the 
responsibility to react, the other primary reasons are not discussed, and are almost not 
mentioned in discussions about the concept; they, therefore, will also be excluded from 
this thesis.  
After a period of neglect caused by the world’s state of shock after the 9/11 
attacks, and a general decline of the acceptance and popularity of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention after the Iraq invasion of the U.S.140, the importance of 
humanity in politics has once again increased. The UN and its General Secretary Kofi 
Anan were the driving forces to push RtoP, through the formation of the "High Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change" which is mandated to report on how the UN 
should engage with violations of human rights in the 21st century. In 2005, the UN World 
Summit included the idea of RtoP in its outcome document141. The statement includes:142 
                                                 
138 The formation of the ICISS served to answer the question of UN General Secretary Kofi Anan 
when the international community must intervene in cases of violation of human rights. 
139 The responsibility to protect, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
International Development Research Centre, Canada, 2001. 
140 The U.S. tried to argue that the invasion of Iraq was not only an attempt to overthrow the Hussein 
regime and to find WMD but also a humanitarian intervention because of Hussein's despotism and the 
ubiquitous violation of human rights.  




Heads of State and government agreed to the following:  
That each individual state has the primary responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing. And it is also a responsibility for prevention of these 
crimes. 
That the international community should encourage or assist states to 
exercise this responsibility. 
The international community has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means to help protect 
populations threatened by these crimes. When a state manifestly fails in its 
protection responsibilities, and peaceful means are inadequate, the 
international community must take stronger measures, including collective 
use of force authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. 
Before 2011, the RtoP had been merely mentioned in some official UN 
documents, and remained relatively unheeded in international politics, even though it did 
have acceptance on the domestic level in several countries and regional organizations143. 
This changed with the Security Council Resolution 1970144 and 1973145 on Libya. For 
the first time, a responsibility to protect on the part of  Libya (Res. 1970: “Recalling the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population,”) and of the international 
community (Res 1973: "...to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat 
of attack in the country...") is implied. With the Security Council resolution 1975 on Cote 
d'Ivorie, which also includes a passage based on a responsibility to protect civilians, the  
tendency to rely on RtoP has continued146. Nonetheless, even though the concept argues 
that states have a real political responsibility to protect, not a single international 
intervention has fully been based on this new concept.147 
                                                                                                                                                 
142 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, “An Introduction to RtoP”, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop (accessed December 12, 
2011) 
143 RtoP is mentioned in the national interests of France, Germany and also in some declarations of the 
African Union. 
144 Security Council SC/10187/Rev.1**, 26 February 2011. 
145 Security Council SC/10200, 17 March 2011. 




Since its emergence in 2001, the concept of 'responsibility to protect' has been 
discussed emotionally and passionately. Proponents and opponents of this concept 
desperately argue for their conviction. The intervention in Libya has increased the 
discussion about this concept once again, without any substantial conclusion so far. 
Finally, RtoP represents more of a normative idea and argument than a mandatory rule, 
policy, or strategy. The normative power of RtoP shapes its importance within the 
discussion about interventions and their rationale. 
D. POLITICAL THEORY AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS  
After presenting a general overview of the idea of humanitarian intervention and 
generally answering the question why they sometimes occur and why at other times they 
do not, the theoretical framework for this case study of the U.S., Germany, and France (in 
regard to their behavior in the light of the incidents in Syria and Libya) necessarily needs 
a brief review of the relevant political theory. 
As shown above, a large variety of reasons may be used to generally justify either 
intervention or non-intervention. An assessment of all possible theoretical frameworks for 
state behavior is impossible because of its large variety. For the Libyan intervention and 
the Syrian non-intervention, the thesis finally will focus on three major schools of 
thought that have a high likelihood of having influenced the decision-making processes 
within the three examined cases.148 
First, the application of classical realism, with its focus on states and their primary 
interest, is investigated. Second, the influence of domestic policy upon the foreign affairs 
of the U.S., Germany, and France is assessed. Third, the rationale of constructivism, with 
its normative approach, is examined.149 Thereby, a neutral observer would expect that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
147 Thomas G. Weiss, RtoP Alive and Well after Libya, Ethics & International Affairs, 25, no. 3 
(2011). 
148 The consideration of liberalism will be neglected because its influence is assessed as low. 
149 Conditioned by the large variety of currents and trends within the definitions and explanations of 
these three schools of thought only a generalized overview and definition can be used to apply the behavior 
of states in a case of intervention. For an overview on different currents see: Stephen M. Walt; International 





influence of constructivism, the origin of the idea of humanitarian intervention, will 
almost conclusively explain the reasons why France and the U.S. intervened, and why 
Germany rejected this approach. The different decision-making process and the national 
interests of the three states are tested in Chapter V, with regard to the different 
approaches of these three states.  
1. Realism and Humanitarian Interventions 
In a classical definition of realism,150 with anarchy as the overarching constraint 
of world politics, the principles of self-help, states as the primary actors within the 
international system, a focus on military power and state diplomacy and the non-
acknowledgement of international institutions as a real sustainable political force, 
humanitarian intervention appears to have even less meaning and, therefore, seems highly 
unlikely. An intervention means a violation of the principle foundational to the modern 
state system of sovereignty. Nevertheless, generally, interventions do not contradict 
realism—they are instead mentioned in another light.151  
The necessary nexus of classical realism with humanitarian interventions leads to 
the assessment that states would only intervene if they could gain influence, expand their 
power, or could harm another competitive state—at least indirectly—through their acting. 
Indeed, those reproaches of "Imperialist intervention"152 accompany almost every 
intervention and are common methods used to discredit the discussion about intervention 
                                                 
150 For the definition of realism see:  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York; 
McGraw Hill, 1979; Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York: Alfred a. Knopf, 1966; Robert 
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, 
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton, 2001.  
151 Realists justify intervention as a foreign policy tool by claiming that it serves the national interest. 
Silvija Lechner, Humanitarian Intervention: Moralism versus Realism?, International Studies Review, 
Volume 12, Issue 3, p. 437- 443, September 2010. 
152 For the Libyan case: Ray Bush, Giuliano Martiniello and Claire Mercer (2011): Humanitarian 




as a useful measure.153  A more sophisticated reading argues that realism itself is a theory 
that includes ethic aspects, "postulating that an action is good only if it produces certain 
desirable outcomes."154 Even if this seems to pave the way to assume that under realism a 
humanitarian intervention can occur, the conclusion that political realists are 
consequentialists who "treat the good of their own community as a primary good"155 
neglect this approach. 
To assume that the foreign policy and international relations of Germany, France, 
or the U.S. follows a realism approach leads to the conclusion that, conversely, the 
motivation for a humanitarian intervention cannot be based on purely normative or 
ethical grounds. 
2. Domestic Politics and Humanitarian Interventions 
In international politics, the "state as a unitary and rational actor" approach, based 
on realism, is still common. Therefore, the main assumption of the realism approach is 
that domestic politics play a subordinate role in international relations. Domestic politics 
includes a large variety of different branches and topics within a state,156 and 
consequently a large number of factors influence politics and politicians. As shown in the 
discussion above, the only valid argument in public for an intervention is humanity; every 
other argument is normative, and insupportable. Therefore, especially in cases of 
interfering with the sovereignty of another state, it is of great importance that the 
interfering state does not raise the suspicion that the foreign intrusion is somehow linked 
                                                 
153 For the Syrian case: Russian foreign minister Lavrov repeatedly blamed Western states that seek a 
UN resolution against the Assad regime of "take sides" in internal conflicts where both sides act violently. 
Therefore, Russia will Veto every attempt to prepare an intervention like in Libya. Michael Heath, “Russia 
Won’t Allow Libya-Style Syria Solution”, Bloomberg Businessweek, February 02, 2012 
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-01-31/russia-won-t-allow-libya-style-syria-solution-lavrov-
says.html (accessed February 2, 2012). 
154 Silvija Lechner, Humanitarian Intervention: Moralism versus Realism?, International Studies 
Review, Volume 12, Issue 3, p. 437- 443, September 2010. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Domestic policy includes business and economy, education, energy, health care, law enforcement, 
taxation, natural resources, social welfare, monetary policy, and personal rights and freedoms. Thereby, 
domestic policy depends on a nation's history, its experience, its cultural background, its social system and 




with domestic politics within its own state. Nevertheless, several scholars have published 
theories and studies that prove the direct linkage between domestic and foreign 
politics157. Fearon assumes that:  
If a systemic IR theory pictures states as unitary, rational actors, then a 
domestic-political explanation is one in which domestic-political 
interactions in at least one state yield a suboptimal foreign policy relative 
to some normative standard. Or, if a systemic IR theory pictures states as 
unitary, rational actors and also requires that attributes of particular states 
not enter the explanation, then a domestic-political explanation is any one 
that involves state characteristics other than relative power.158  
Finally, de Mesquita points out:  
"Leaders, not states, choose actions. Leaders and their subjects enjoy the 
fruits and suffer the ills that follow from their decisions. Alas, leaders 
seem to be motivated by their own well-being and not by the welfare of 
the state. The state’s immortality beyond their own time is secondary to 
the quest of leaders for personal political survival."159 
Although this conclusion is very disenchanting, a direct relationship between 
domestic politics and international relations is undeniable and, therefore, also had an 
impact on the decision to intervene in Libya and the still ongoing discussion about 
possibilities to stop the violence in Syria.  
 
                                                 
157 For example: Robert D. Putnam, within his often cited paper about the interaction between 
international politics and domestic politics, states: "It is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really 
determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly "Both, sometimes." 
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games; International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3. (Summer, 1988), pp. 427-460. Also see: Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: 
Domestic Politics and International Ambition, Cornell University Press, 1991). 
158 James D. Fearon, Policy and Theories of International Relations, Annual Review Political Science 
1998. 1:289-313. 
159 Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, Domestic politics and international relations, International Studies 




3. Constructivism and Humanitarian Interventions 
Like all theories of international relations, constructivism contains several ideas 
and different approaches160. However, all of the approaches that interpret and explain 
international relations and politics are generally based upon two general tenets: the social 
construction of reality (including social facts)161 and a special influence of the 
importance of the identity of states and state actors. One important result of this process 
is the emergence of norms. 
As shown above, the influence of norms within international and domestic politics 
increased since the end of WW II, and shapes the base of the idea of humanitarian 
intervention. The idea of norms as the main trigger for humanitarian interventions is a 
main assumption for the participation and build-up of the anti-Quadhafi coalition of 
France and the U.S. Anyway, the question remains: why did France and the U.S. join a 
humanitarian intervention based on norms, and hence supports a constructivist approach 
in a broader sense, even though both nations are historically unsympathetic towards the 
strain of constructivism. At the same time Germany, another Western nation, refused to 
support a humanitarian intervention—although, it is true that norms are historically more 
important in this country. 
4. Conclusion 
Using a general classification for the foreign policy and international relations of 
the U.S., France, and Germany can help assess the actions of each of these states. If one 
state generally follows one specific political current, and then suddenly uses a normative 
argument to explain its action, there at least exists a need to explain this change of mind. 
                                                 
160 For a more liberal and current of constructivism: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999: Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of 
It, International Organizations, Vol. 46, No 2. (Spring 1992) pp. 391- 425.; John Gerad Ruggie, What 
Makes the World Hang Together? Neo- Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 
International Organizations, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 855- 885. 
161 Definition of social facts: "Facts that exist because all the relevant actors agree they exist. Social 
facts like sovereignty, property, human rights, and collective security are for constructivists the stuff of 
world politics, and human agency constructs those social facts." Brian Frederking; Constructing Post-Cold 




Therefore, the classification of the policy of all three states helps to explain which 
arguments of the three states of the case study for the Libyan and the Syrian case appear 
reliable, and which seem artificial to hide real intentions. Additionally, the rationale with 
regard to the taken action is highlighted on a broader level. Assessing the states behavior 
in this framework with a focus on the arguments of the governments of France, Germany, 










III. LIBYA AND SYRIA 
A. OVERVIEW OF LIBYA BEFORE THE CRISIS  
Before the rebellion in Libya started, the country with its 6,400,000 inhabitants 
was assessed as an authoritarian regime. Its foreign relations had been determined by 
Qadhafi'. His "principal foreign policy goals have been Arab unity, the incorporation of 
Israel and the Palestinian Territories into a single nation of "Isratine," advancement of 
Islam, support for Palestinians, elimination of outside, particularly Western, influence in 
the Middle East and Africa, and support for a range of "revolutionary" causes."162 Before 
the conflict started, Libya was—among others—a member of: the Arab League, the Arab 
Magharibi Union, the African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the 
conference of non-Aligned states, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), and the United Nations. A Libyan “charm offensive,”163 attempting to 
normalize the economic and political foreign relations of the country, coined the last 
decade. Libya sought to improve the relations to North African states, to increase its 
influence in Africa in general and to normalize the relations with the EU and the U.S.164 
Additionally, domestic economic reforms proceeded. Reasons for those attempts were 
above (all economic ones), but they also had a well-considered political aim. 
On the international level, the Libyan oil industry was, after decades of sanctions, 
technically outdated and Libya needed expertise, technology, and investments from the 
West.165 However, Libya also needed the economic improvement to reassure the Libyan 
population. The well-educated middle-class of the country was aware of the deficits of 
                                                 
162 Background Note Libya, U.S. Department of State, July 2011. 
163 Michael C. Moynihan, A Libyan Charm Offensive, Reason magazine, March 2010.  
164 The Qadhafi regime solved some troubles with the EU, supported African states financially, 
mediated the Darfur conflict successfully and in 2003 Libya officially dismantled its WMD program. 
Especially the initially compensation payments for the Lockerbie bombing (Pan Am Flight 103) of 2.7 
billion U.S.$ but also the later compensation for the victims of the La Belle bombing in Berlin in 1986 and 
for the victims of UTA flight 772 bombing paved the way for an agreement with the U.S. and the EU.  




the domestic economy and the isolated political position in world politics, and demanded 
modernization and an improvement of both the personal and general Libyan situation. 
The population would no longer accept the price for political adventures, isolation, and 
support of terrorism. 
After more than four decades of Qadhafi's rule, the population was somehow at 
odds with itself. On the one hand, they saw Qadhafi with "some grudging 
admiration"166—but on the other hand, the Libyans expected and demanded more 
political freedom and better personal opportunities. Therefore, the reforms of the regime 
in the last decade were designed to reassure the population that things would improve. 
Qadhafi and his advisors were aware that their revolutionary movement—through some 
forms of rationalization and institutionalization over time—had become susceptible to the 
need for change on the part of the population. "Willy-nilly, social differentiation, and the 
clamor for greater participation among a new, educated generation, and for more efficient 
use of local wealth, has taken place in Libya."167 Qadhafi's son Seif-el-Islam announced 
in 2005 that the first target of economic reforms would be to increase private ownership 
and spread the wealth of the country.168 
Therefore, the reforms were also an early attempt to calm down the domestic 
situation that was driven by discontent about different issues,169 and simultaneously tried 
to fulfill the demands of the population before protest movements and social unrest (like 
                                                 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid.  
168 "It is important to restructure in a way that does not repeat the mistake of concentrating wealth in 
the hands of a few," Qaddafi said. "The first target in this privatization will be the citizens of Libya and 
increasing their private ownership." This statement followed a bundle of announcement of economic 
reforms at the World Economic Forum 2005 in Davos. Thomas Crampton, “Qaddafi son sets out economic 
reforms: Libya plans to shed old and begin a new era”, New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/28/news/28iht-libya_ed3_.html (accessed February 10, 2012). 
169 In addition to the economic situation, conflicts between radical Islamists and moderate Muslims 




that from the period between 1980 and 2000) could develop170. The Libyan leadership 
realized the growing dissatisfaction of the citizens and tried to encounter it with careful 
reforms.  
All approaches to reform the Libyan society and economy had mandatory 
constraints. Four key elements of Libyan society were sacrosanct:  "Islam and the 
application of Sharia; Libyan security and stability; national unity; and Muammar 
Qadhafi."171 The latter was—obviously—above all the most important element for the 
ruling regime. Finally, domestic politics and rising discontent with the speed of the 
reforms—the lack of individual freedom and the gap between promised and achieved 
reforms—fueled the rebellion that started in early 2011.  
At the same time, Libya's initial situation seemed to be more stable on the 
international level. Several countries were highly interested in intensifying economic ties 
with the oil-rich country that obviously had a huge backlog for consumer goods, 
infrastructure, and services. The motives of most Western countries that renewed political 
relations with Libya were economic ones. The states wanted an intact political 
environment for their business, although the economic ties between EU member states 
and Libya endured even in times of political disagreements and international 
embargos.172 The EU—especially some of its southern members—also had an interest in 
improved relations with the Libyan regime to stop or at least control illegal migration into 
                                                 
170 Between 1980 and 2000 in Libya, radical Islamic movements, especially in Eastern Libya and the 
Benghazi region, challenged the regime. Qadhafi's answer was a "systematic iron- fist- policy" with 
repression and violence but also attempts to calm down the situation with religious and economic reforms. 
These carrot and stick policy finally ended the open violence and was followed by a relatively quiet period 
between 2000 and 2010. Yehudit Ronen, Qadhafi and Militant Islamism: Unprecedented Conflict, Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No.4, October 2002, pp1-16; Alison Pargeter, Political Islam in Libya, Terrorism 
Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 6, 2005; Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense 
of Libya Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, 6 June 2011. 
171 Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (V): Making Sense of Libya Crisis Group 
Middle East/North Africa Report N°107, 6 June 2011. 
172 The EU and the U.S. policy towards Libya differentiated the most. The EU was less strict in the 
implementation of embargos and also lifted its embargos against Libya earlier than the U.S.. Already in 
1999, directly after the ban of the UN sanctions, the EU invited Libya to join the Third European-
Mediterranean Conference of Ministers as an observer, a status that had allowed Libya to have normal 
political relations with the EU. Yahia H. Zoubir, Libya and Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the 




their countries and the EU. Libya was assessed to be a strategic player for the prevention 
of illegal migration from African into Europe. The EU supported Libya with financial 
assets while Libya and Italy started to execute joint maritime patrols173.  
Despite Qadhafi's attempts to reintegrate the country into the international 
community, and its undoubted success in improving Libya's international relations across 
the world, Libya still remained a politically isolated country without reliable allies. 
Qadhafi's notorious interference in the internal affairs of other countries, his support for 
terrorism, his claim to leadership, his sometimes quirky political perspectives, his 
sometimes weird political appearances, and his unique interpretation of Islam led to the 
isolation of Libya. When the revolution started, Qadhafi must have recognized very 
quickly that he had no reliable allies in the world. The West, Russia, and China were only 
acting out of their own national interests but never had any real interest in, or sympathy 
for, the Libyan leadership. 
B. LIBYA AND ITS RELATION TOWARDS THE U.S., FRANCE, AND 
GERMANY BEFORE THE CRISIS 
1. Libya and the U.S.  
Relations between Libya and the U.S. were erratic before the intervention in 2011. 
After Libya's independence in 1951, which was supported by the U.S. at the UN, the U.S. 
established the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya (in 1954). With the start of the oil boom 
in 1959, U.S. companies established close economic relations with Libya. After Qadhafi 
took power in a bloodless coup174—caused by the increasing corruption of the ruling 
king's entourage, the weak institutions and administrations, the growing nationalism and 
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The EU granted Libya 20 million Euro in 2009 to fight illegal migration. Yahia H. Zoubir, Libya and 
Europe: Economic Realism at the Rescue of the Qaddafi Authoritarian Regime, Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies, 17:3, 401-415 (2009). 
174 A Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) organized the coup on 1st September 1969. Qadhafi 
was only one member of the RCC but very soon he was able to dominate it and finally he established in 




pressure from outside175—relations between the U.S. and Libya deteriorated fast. In 
1970, the U.S. had to close the Air Force Base—and with Qadhafi's decision in the 1970s 
to partially nationalize the country's oil wealth—U.S. oil companies lost influence, 
although they were able to avoid a total expropriation.176 Libya’s cooperation with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), ideological differences177, Qadhafi's idea of 
Islamic socialism and third universal theory, Libyan attempts to develop WMD and, most 
importantly, the Libyan support of international terrorism dominated relations with the 
U.S.  
The level of mutual resentment varied until 2006, from attempts to overthrow or 
kill Qadhafi to direct attacks on Libya178 by the U.S. and the classification of Libya by 
U.S. presidents as a "soviet satellite,” the "mad dog of the Middle East," or a "rough 
state."179 The resentment focused on the attack on the PanAm plane over Lockerbie in 
1988,180 by terrorists which had been supported by Libya. Economic ties have been 
completely banned by unilateral U.S. embargos against Libya since 1986 and by UN 
sanctions since 1993.181 
The bilateral relations started to relax in the 1990s when Libya improved and 
expanded its international relations by tackling terrorism and starting to open its economy 
to foreign investments. The U.S. did not want to get left out, and so it also made efforts to 
                                                 
175 Especially the foreign oil companies that were unsatisfied with the speed of the Libyan 
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176 Yahia H. Zoubir, The United States and Libya: the limits of coercive diplomacy, The Journal of 
North African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2011, 275- 297; Dirk Vandewalle, A History of modern Libya, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
177 Libya supported movements and states, which the U.S. government actively opposed. 
178 The U.S. attacked Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 as a response to a terror attack on a 
nightclub in Berlin that left several Americans killed and wounded. 
179 Yahia H. Zoubir, The United States and Libya: the limits of coercive diplomacy, The Journal of 
North African Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2011, 275- 297. 
180 The explosion of a bomb onboard the PanAm Jumbo during its flight from London to New York 
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improve relations. Nevertheless, the U.S. sanctions were kept until 2006, although the 
UN sanctions were already lifted in parts in 1999.182 By accepting responsibility in the 
Lockerbie bombing and paying compensation to the relatives of the victims, as well as 
abandoning its WMD program in 2003, Libya finally seemed to be reintegrated in the 
international community. In 2004, U.S.-Libyan relations normalized on a low diplomatic 
level.183 
In 2011, on the eve of the Libyan uprising, the political relations between both 
countries had generally normalized, but tensions about human rights, democracy and the 
mutual behavior in the past still existed. Finally, the relations were "free of the formal 
constraints that once precluded cooperation,” but "the relationship remains relatively 
undefined after decades of tension."184  
The economic ties between both countries were virtually insignificant after 24 
years of U.S. embargo—until 2006—but the U.S. oil industry was very interested and, 
therefore, active in building up business relationships in the oil sector.185Additionally, 
both countries signed a 'Trade and Investment Framework Agreement' in 2010, but the 
implementation was not able to occur before the intervention. 
2. Libya and France 
Both countries share a long common history. French, together with Great Britain, 
replaced Italy as the colonial power in 1943186. After its independence, and until Qadhafi 
came to power, French-Libyan relations were almost completely based on arms deals187. 
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Politically, the French participation in the occupation of the Suez Canal in 1956, and the 
French arms deals with Israel before and after the 1967 Israeli-Arab war, burdened 
relations.  
After Qadhafi took power, France was one of the countries that benefited 
economically from the change. France was able to make major arms sales to Libya 
between 1970 and 1976, and to sign an agreement guaranteeing oil supplies in return for 
technical and financial cooperation in 1974.188 While the level of mutually beneficial 
relations peaked in 1977, after Libya supported France to free some French citizens in 
Chad, the bilateral relationship deteriorated after 1977 over France's Middle Eastern 
policy and the French engagement in the Chad conflict—when the French government 
required a Libyan withdrawal from Chad in 1982. Libya finally blamed the U.S. and 
France for the defeat in Chad.189 The conflicted culminated in the Libyan attack on a 
French passenger plane in 1989, which killed 170 people, including 54 French 
citizens.190 
With the Libyan attempts to reintegrate with the international community, and the 
opening of the Libyan economy to foreign investments, relations improved. After solving 
the UTA flight incident in 1999 judicially, the way was paved for improved economic 
relations. Libya was interested in foreign investments and France wanted to support its 
domestic economy. As a direct outcome of the strong French interest in economic 
relations with Libya, the French President Jacques Chirac flew to Libya in 2003, directly 
after all UN sanctions were banned, to broker the compensation for the victims of the 
UTA flight.  This removed the last obstacle for normal political and, above all, economic 
relations. This development peaked with Qadhadi's visit to Paris in 2007. Although 
criticized by parts of the French government, Libya signed contracts worth 10 billion 
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Euros, including an atomic energy plant, a desalination plant, and 21 Airbus planes. The 
French Prime Minister Francois Fillon defended the contract as a "French interest,"191 but 
nevertheless, the economic ties between both countries are at a low level. In 2009, 
France's exports to Libya had a volume of $1 billion and imports from Libya were about 
$3.1 billion, mostly oil and oil products, making it Libya's third largest export market 
after Italy and Germany.192 
3. Libya and Germany 
Bilateral relations between Germany and Libya have been normal since the end of 
WWII. Mutual indifference characterized the foreign policy of both countries until the 
1980s. The relationship worsened significantly after two major events. First, after the 
assault on the Berlin nightclub "La Belle,"193 conducted by Libyan terrorists on the order 
of the Libyan government. Second, after the "Imhausen" scandal was published, when a 
German company delivered an entire chemical factory to Libya, despite the strict 
embargo of the 1980s194.  
As a result, the mutual relations dampened significantly. The relationship 
improved in the course of the Libyan attempts to relax its international relations, 
reintegrate in international politics, and open the country for foreign investments. During 
the last decade, Germany's foreign policy towards Libya was embedded in the EU policy: 
a more central role now addressed the economic relations with Libya.  
The mutual economic relations were more important for Libya. In 2009, Germany 
imported goods in a volume of 3.1 Billion Euro, mainly natural resources (oil and gas), 
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and exported goods for one billion Euro, mainly vehicles and machinery.195 With a 
mutual trade volume in 2009 of approximately 4 billion dollars (0.5% of Germany’s total 
trade volume), Libya is only a minor trade partner for Germany, despite its position as the 
fifth-largest oil supplier for Germany.196 Conversely, Germany was one of the most 
important export and import partners for Libya with an estimated 8% of Libya's trade 
volume in 2010.197   
4. Conclusion 
The bilateral relations between U.S., France, and Germany and Libya before the 
uprising started were very different. The U.S., as a cold war superpower, had a 
historically tense relationship with Libya. Coined by a full spectrum of conflicts in the 
last decades, the political relationship between both states was—despite Qadhafis latest 
attempts to improve them—still very tense. Events of the past still had influence on the 
relationship with the Qadhafi regime before the uprising started. Economically, the 
relationship was insignificant, although U.S. companies hoped to benefit from a political 
detente.  
While France and Libya had tensions that originate from the colonial past and the 
German-Libyan relationship was negatively influenced by the occurrences of the 1980s, 
both countries were highly interested in the economic prospects that improved after Libya 
liberalized its economy. The need to support their domestic economy, especially after the 
financial crisis started in 2008/2009, encouraged all three governments to renew or 
improve relations with the Qadhafi regime, even if this would mean accepting Qadhafi as 
a negotiating partner. 
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C. DEVELOPMENT IN LIBYA IN 2011 
The uprising in Libya started on 15 February 2011 in the east-Libyan town of 
Benghazi after Libyan authorities arrested a human rights activist. It escalated radically 
after the funeral of a victim of the three-day old protests was attacked by Libyan loyalists 
on 18 February. During February, a growing number of Libyan forces, diplomats and 
politicians defected to the opposition while several towns198 fall into the hands of the 
rebels and violent protests and clashes started also in Tripoli. This development induced 
Qadhafi to start a military counteroffensive with all means of force, including artillery, 
tanks, and warplanes. As a direct outcome, the Qadhafi forces were able to retake several 
cities such as Brega and Ra's Lanuf, forcing the rebels to withdraw along the whole front, 
leading to the siege at Misrata. 
The UN Security Council passed an initial resolution on 26 February that 
condemned the violence, imposed a series of international sanctions on Libya and on 
Qadhafi and his family, and referred Libya's crackdown on rebels to the International 
Criminal Court. 199 At about the same time, and in the following weeks (before any 
action was taken), several other supranational organizations like the European Union 
(EU)200, the African Union (AU)201, the League of Arab States (LAS)202, the 
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Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)203 and the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)204 condemned the behavior and the actions of the Qadhafi regime, and asked for 
international measures like a no-fly zone and summoned the Qadhafi regime to stop the 
violence.205 Only Turkey and Russia rejected the idea of a no-fly zone in Libya during 
that phase of events. While Turkey followed their own specific interests, the Russian 
position already characterized their general stance to deny foreign interventions into 
sovereign states. 
March 2011 was the decisive period for international politics to shape the 
development in Libya. On 5 March, the NTC declared itself in a letter to the UN General 
Assembly to be the "sole representative of all Libya and called for the international 
community to protect the Libyan people without any direct military intervention on 
Libyan soil"206  
The outcome of a meeting of NATO defense ministers on 10 March was 
discordant about the policy and measures towards Libya, but in accordance about the 
necessity of the endorsement of the UN for any kind of intervention.207 The differences 
that were obvious within the NATO meeting as it continued one day later at the EU 
summit in Brussels. The EU came to an agreement to consider that "...in order to protect 
the civilian population, Member States will examine all necessary options, provided that 
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there is a demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region."208 They 
also decided that Qadhafi had to resign. The range of single statements afterwards was 
large. In contrast to the EU statement, German chancellor Angela Merkel "described 
herself as fundamentally skeptical" of military action and, in contrast, the French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy indicated that France and Britain were contemplating 
airstrikes in Libya.209 
The idea of different approaches amongst the European powers continued also at 
the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Paris on 14–15 March, when the U.S. Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton had an informal meeting with the leader of the NTC, Mahmoud 
Jibril, and the members of the G8 were unable to find a common stand on Libya. 
Germany already signaled no willingness to participate in a military intervention, and the 
U.S. seemed to be non-committal.210 With the determination of U.S. politics to demand 
and push for a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution to allow the use of military force 
on 16 March—and the negotiations between France, Great Britain, and the U.S. over the 
language of a necessary resolution—the way was paved for further action.  
Qadhafi’s infamous reaction to the unfavorable developments for his regime was 
an aggressive and disturbing speech where he underlined his will to "have no mercy" 
with the rebels.211 This speech was afterwards used as a justification for the decision of 
the UNSC only hours later. On 17 March, the UNSC adopted resolution 1973 that 
represented the legal base for an intervention in Libya by stating that it: 
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Authorizes Member States ... to take all necessary measures, 
notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians 
and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya...212 
The UNSC resolution passed with ten votes in favor and, surprisingly, with five 
abstentions. Germany refused approval—along with Brazil, Russia, China, and India. In 
the rebel territory within Libya, the UNSC resolution led to cheers and approval. 
On 19 March, the first strikes conducted by French forces against Libyan forces 
began. NATO officials declared that the mission was not under the leadership NATO, but 
rather under the lead of Great Britain and France213. An international response to the 
attacks followed on 20 March. Qadhafi called the attacks a "blatant colonialism,"214 and 
several states and organizations also disagreed with the decision to attack targets actively 
in Libya, instead of taking the more passive role of imposing a no-fly zone. The LAS, the 
AU, China, Germany, and Russia expressed their concerns about the intervention and 
warned that the attacks may have exceeded the UN mandate. 
Two days into the intervention in Libya, a discussion about the leadership of the 
coalition of the 19 participating states had already begun. The U.S. did not want to lead 
the mission because of international relations and for domestic reasons, and other single 
nations did not have the militarily capacity to lead it. Therefore, the idea to give the lead 
to NATO emerged immediately despite some doubts about whether a NATO-led 
operation in a Muslim country may cause new resentments.215 After several days of 
discussion, NATO announced on 24 March that they would take over the responsibility 
for the no-fly zone from the U.S., but initially rejected leadership of the whole operation. 
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Especially Turkey, France, and Germany opposed this idea.216After long negotiations, 
NATO finally took over the full implementation of resolution 1973 with the aim to 
protect civilians on 24 March, through the NATO mission "Unified Protector" that would 
be effective on 01 April 2011.217  
The international response to this decision was varied. While Germany started to 
withdraw its officers from the NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples that had the 
operational lead for Unified Protector as a consequence of the declared non-
participation218, Turkey tried to broker a new cease-fire and the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China), along with others, once again criticized the whole mission.219 
During the months that followed, criticism of "Unified Protector" emerged 
regularly, partially because of a lack of efficiency220, partiality because of bias related to 
the arms embargo,221 and because of the killing of noninvolved civilians.222 The most 
important criticism, which had great importance and influence for the development in 
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Syria, were the supposed attempts to kill Qadhafi in opposition to the UNSC 
resolution.223 The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov criticized that NATO had 
exceeded the coverage of the resolution and announced for the future that "if somebody 
would like to get authorization to use force to achieve a shared goal by all of us, they 
would have to specify in the resolution who this somebody is, who is going to use this 
authorization, what the rules of engagement are and the limits on the use of force.”224 
After more than seven month of fighting, the NTC declared its victory on 23 
October 2011 and NATO officially ended its mission on 31 October 2011225. Finally, 
without the massive support of the coalition forces226 engaged in operation “Unified 
Protector,” the success of the Libyan rebellion would have been impossible. After the 
killing of up to 30,000 people, the conflict ended.227 
Despite several criticisms, discord on all international levels (and within the UN 
and NATO), and in spite of emotional discussions in politics and scholarship, the 
international coalition enforced the UNSC resolution 1973. The assessment of the 
resolution has been exceeded and, therefore, the West’s support for the rebels until they 
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finally defeated, captured, and killed Qadhafi is still under discussion. Several single 
states and supranational organizations rejected NATO’s interpretation of UNSC 
resolution 1973. They argue that the establishment of a no-fly zone and the protection of 
civilians would have been possible without massive bombardments. A direct impact of 
this extreme interpretation of a UNSC resolution is the difficulty in reaching international 
agreement on a statement towards the Syrian leadership. Especially Russia and China, as 
UNSC veto nations, are concerned about the consequences that a resolution against Syria 
could have. 
D. OVERVIEW SYRIA BEFORE THE CRISIS  
Syria, a multi-ethnic state with approximately 22.5 million inhabitants, has been 
ruled by different Arab Ba'ath Party regimes since 1963—and since a bloodless coup by 
Hafez al-Assad in 1970, by the al-Assad family. The state, officially a parliamentary 
republic, is governed autocratically with a leading role of the Baath party that establishes 
the basis for the rule of the al-Assad family. After Hafez al-Assad's death in 2000, his son 
Bashar al-Assad took power as a result of a deliberately prepared process. Very soon after 
Bashar al-Assad's takeover, hopes were dampened that the Western-educated ruler would 
sustainably reform the country. Instead, he followed the idea to "modernize or upgrade 
authoritarianism," which means to improve the system without real changes or a more 
democratic approach towards domestic Syrian policy.228 The ruling family has an 
Alawite background, an offshoot of Shiism, and is thus part of a religious minority group 
in Syria (which majority is Sunni).229 Therefore, the conflict between the ruling Alawite's 
and the revolting Sunni majority also represents another chapter in the long-lasting 
history of tensions and conflicts between Shia and Sunni Muslims in the whole region.  
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Before the conflict started, Syria was—among other groups—a member of the 
Arab League230, of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, of the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the United Nations. 
The primary goals of Syria's foreign policy are "ensuring regime survival, 
maintaining influence among its Arab neighbors, and achieving a comprehensive Arab-
Israeli peace settlement, which includes the return of the Golan Heights..."231 The 
frequent interferences in its neighbor’s affairs are a result of Syria's historic formation, 
and the thereof resulting Arab nationalism that dominates Syria's identity and politics to 
this day.232 The different attempts to influence its neighbors—both directly and 
indirectly—caused several conflicts in the past and tensions with its neighbors to this day. 
An instrument of influence in the development in the region is the active support of  
terrorism and Islamic organizations by the Syrian regime, especially by supporting and 
influencing Hamas233 and Hezbollah234. In addition to militant attempts of regional 
power projection, Syria also uses political negotiations to achieve its goals.   
To ensure its primary goal of returning the Golan Heights, Syria negotiated with 
Israel in the late 1990s, but the attempt failed. As a direct result, Syria shifted its focus of 
foreign policy increasingly to the East and improved its economic and political relations 
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with Iraq in 2000. This brought Syria on a collision course with the U.S. after the 2003 
Iraq invasion when the Assad regime decided to oppose the invasion politically235. 
Disputes with Lebanon, where Syria has permanent interests236, led to a tighter 
relationship with Iran, and to increased support for and influence on the Hezbollah in 
Lebanon to counterbalance Israel and the U.S.. Despite the assumed Israeli bombing of 
Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007, Syria and Israel started new peace negotiations in 2008, 
mediated by Turkey.  
Syria has maintains close connections to Russia for more than four decades. These 
close ties are highlighted by the Russian navy base in the Syrian city of Tartus that was 
founded in 1971. Currently, the Russian forces are expanding the Tartus naval base to 
allow larger warships to enter the only Russian base in the Mediterranean.   
After the first attempts of Hafez al-Assad in the mid-1980s and late 1990s to 
reform the Syria's economy because of domestic pressure, the economic situation for the 
majority of the population has remained unchanged, tense, and difficult.237 The last 
decade was crucially impacted by Bashir al-Assad's attempts to modernize the Syrian 
economy under the premise of its own retention of power on a 'middle' way by expanding 
the private sector, while reforming the public sector, and maintaining social protection 
through a concept of a 'social market' economy.238 This attempt failed and Syria's 
political support for Iraq since 2002/ 2003 had a significant economic cost caused by U.S. 
embargos. Syria’s entanglement in the murder of the former Lebanese Prime Minister 
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Rafic Hariri in 2005239 also deteriorated political and economic relations with the EU. As 
a result of political and economic isolation by the West, Syria improved its economic 
relations with China, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab world. Nevertheless, in "2010 the 
European Union (EU) was Syria's biggest trading partner, accounting for 22.5% of Syrian 
trade, followed by Iraq (13.3%), Saudi Arabia (9%) and China (6.9%.) Turkey was in 
fifth place with 6.6% and Russia was ninth with 3%."240 Syria’s most important export 
good is oil and oil products. Syria produces approximately 400.000-barrels of oil per day 
and 250.000 of those barrels are exported.241 
Although the economic ties to Russia and China represent only 10% of Syria's 
trade volume, these connections have a special meaning. Since 2006, Russia increased its 
arms exports to Syria substantially, from 16 million U.S.$ in 2006 to 162 million U.S.$ in 
2010242 and additional future contracts, including modern weaponry, worth 4 billion 
U.S.$ are already signed243, underlining the importance of Syrian-Russian relations. For 
China, Syria is an important export market with a volume of exports of more than 2.2 
billion Euros, while Syria's exports to China only had a volume of 27.8 million Euros.244  
Similar to Qadhafi's attempts to reintegrate Libya in the international community, 
Bashar al-Assad also wanted to improve Syria’s political and economic relations after he 
came to power. After his unsuccessful attempts previous to 2008, he changed his focus 
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from the West to the East, but failed with his attempts to create sustainable independence 
from the West. Syria's opaque connections with terrorism in Iraq, its support for 
Hezbollah, and its close ties with Iran finally isolated Syria not only from the West, but 
also from parts of the Arab community. When the uprising in Syria started, al-Assad had 
to realize that his allies are few and far between. In addition to Iran and the Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, only Russia and China seemed to be reliable allies—because of their own 
domestic interests in Syria and the political aim of counterbalancing U.S. influence in the 
region. 
E. SYRIA AND ITS RELATION TOWARDS THE U.S., FRANCE, AND 
GERMANY BEFORE THE CRISIS 
1. Syria and the U.S.  
U.S. President Barack Obama started a political initiative in 2010 to improve the 
U.S.-Syrian relationship245. After a five-year absence, the U.S. appointed a new 
ambassador in Damascus and attempted to intensify the diplomatic contacts between both 
countries. As a symbol for the normalization of the bilateral contacts, additionally, the 
official travel advisory for U.S. citizens to Syria was removed. A fundamental change in 
the bilateral relations seemed possible. 
Despite this political offensive, Barack Obama has not removed the economic 
sanctions on Syria. This was a distinct sign that there are still too many unsolved conflicts 
between both countries, historically caused by the Syrian support for the Warsaw block 
during the cold war. Although Syria is listed on the U.S. list of State Sponsor of terrorism 
since 1979, during the Gulf War of 1990/1991, Syria had been a member of the anti-Iraq 
coalition and the mutual relationship had been normalized in the 1990s after some 
disputes in the past.  
Nevertheless, the relations between the U.S. and Syria during the last decade had 
steadily deteriorated again. After the U.S. started the 'war on terror' in September 2001, 
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Syria initially supported the U.S. in its attempts to fight al-Qaeda actively.246 However, 
the unsolved dispute about the Golan Heights and the breakdown of the negotiations 
between Israel and Syria247, Syria's opposition to the U.S. campaign against Iraq,248 
disagreements about Syria’s role in Lebanon, Syria's close connections with Iran, and its 
support for Hamas and Hezbollah burdened the relationship between the countries. 
After the U.S. engagement in Iraq started in March 2003, Syria continued to 
support terrorism in the region and was held accountable by the U.S. for active support of 
the insurgency in Iraq249. As a reaction, the U.S. designated Syria as a sponsor of 
international terrorism and U.S. President George W. Bush signed the Syria 
Accountability Act250 that allows specific sanctions against Syria. This act was finally 
imposed in May  
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2004, and it expands the already existing general applicable sanctions. Altogether the 
U.S. issued a large number of different sanctions based on a variety of laws during the 
last decade.251 
Despite the large number of sanctions on Syria, the volume of bilateral trade did 
not reduce significantly between 2005 and 2007; it even increased in 2008 and 2009, and 
peaked in 2010 with a mutual trade volume of about 934.9 million U.S.$.252 Although the 
U.S. sanctions also hampered business between Syria and other countries, Syria's 
economy did not suffer under the restrictions because Syria was able to substitute the no 
longer available economic relations with the U.S. through intensified business with other 
states.  
Based on Barack Obama's new attempts to renew bilateral relations, mutual 
political and economic relations seemed to improve steadily. This process stopped with 
the start of the unrest in Syria and the violent crackdown of the protests. 
2. Syria and France 
France and Syria have shared common relations since the end of World War I 
when France had a political mandate over Syria. Since Syria's independence in 1946, the 
bilateral relations generally remained close and also personal253, although the Syrian 
policy in Lebanon sometimes strained the bilateral relationship254. The political relations 
have distinctly deteriorated since 2003, caused again by the Syrian policy in Lebanon and 
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the French attempts to improve their own relations with the U.S.255. After the 
assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005, the relations were at a low point and did not recover 
until 2008.  
With the signing of the Doha Agreement and the Syrian attempt to negotiate a 
peace treaty with Israel, the bilateral relationship improved significantly and a 
"succession of contacts and bilateral visits (President Bashar al-Assad’s visit on the 
occasion of the summit of the Union for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008, visits to 
France of the Syrian Ministers of Culture and Foreign Affairs, and that of the Vice Prime 
Minister of Economic Affairs, emissaries sent by the French President to Damascus, 
Bernard Kouchner’s visit to Syria in late August and then President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
visit on 3 and 4 September 2008)"256 followed. In 2010, the French Prime Minister 
Francois Fillon met his Syrian counterpart Naji Otri in Damascus to expand the bilateral 
economic relations, and in late 2010 Bashar al-Assad met with the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy to improve mutual relations. 
The mutual economic relationship was modest. In 2007, Syria was only 71st 
among consumers of French products, and in 57th place as supplier. The trade balance for 
France showed a deficit in 2007 because of a sharp drop in French exports (-39%, to 310 
million Euro) and an increase in imports (+36%, to 416 million Euro). The French market 
share in Syria moved from 3.5% in 2006 to 1.8% in 2007.257  
3. Syria and Germany 
Traditionally, Germany and Syria have had close and mutually friendly relations. 
They established diplomatic relations in different stages in the 1950s through 1960, until 
the German Embassy was finally opened in 1961. Only the between 1965 and 1974 the 
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changed its mind because the relations with the U.S. were substantially damaged through this policy. 
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256 France Diplomatie. Political relations with Syria. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
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diplomatic relations were suspended. In the recent past, relations have improved and 
intensified rapidly. With a large number of top politicians of both countries officially 
visiting each other,258 and Syria's status as a partner country for German development 
politics since 2002, the last decade has been the most intensive and best period of 
bilateral relations in the common history of both countries. The mutual relationship was 
described as friendly. 
The main impulse for the intensive relations in the recent past was the idea to tie 
Syria closer to the West and to improve bilateral economic relations259. In addition to a 
'bilateral investment promotion and protection agreement' that has existed since 1980, in 
2010 the Syrian-German Business Council was opened in Damascus and a bilateral 
taxation agreement was signed in 2010 (and has been in force since 1 January 2011). 
The bilateral trade volume increased from 2009 to 2010 for more than 42% on 
1.81 billion Euros, and also for the first six month in 2011 the volume increased more 
than 16%260 before the violence decreased the volume dramatically. Germany has a 
significant trade deficit with Syria because of its oil imports. Syria is Germany's eight-
largest oil supplier, and Germany is Syria's largest oil demander261. Therefore, these 
economic relations are significant for both countries. 
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The bilateral relations between Syria and the U.S., France, and Germany are very 
different. The respective bilateral relations follow a pattern similar to the bilateral 
relations with Libya. 
The U.S., as a cold war superpower, and based on its close political ties with 
Israel, has a historically tense relationship with Syria. Events of the recent past had 
already had a huge negative influence on the relationship with the al-Assad regime before 
the uprising started. Syria possibly could have been a main profiteer of Barack Obama's 
attempts to improve the U.S. relations within the whole Middle East region, but missed 
the opportunity. Economically, the relation was insignificant, although U.S. companies 
hoped to benefit from a political detente.  
Germany and France's mutual political relations were unremarkable during the 
past. While France and Syria had tensions that originated from the colonial past of France 
in Lebanon, the German-Syrian relationship was free of such significant political 
occurrences. Germany and France were highly interested in the economic prospects that 
grew after Syria liberalized its economy.  
Similar to the situation with Libya, the need to support their domestic economy, 
especially after the financial crisis started in 2008/2009, encouraged all three 
governments to renew or improve the relations towards Syria. Only the U.S. had a further 
strategic political interest in Syria.  
F. DEVELOPMENT IN SYRIA IN 2011–2012 
While on 14 January 2011 President Ben Ali in Tunisia was already ousted, and 
on 11 February 2011 the Egyptian population forced President Hosni Mubarak to resign, 
Syria was still not even superficially affected by the uprising of the 'Arab Spring' that hit 
the Middle East at this time. The first protests against the ruling Baath party and 
President Bashar al-Assad had already started in February 2011, but Syrian security 




After the Friday prayer on 18 March, large-scale protests took place in several 
cities across Syria with a focus on Dara'a, a southern town near the Jordan border, where 
security forces weeks before had arrested 15 teenagers that had sprayed anti-regime 
slogans on walls in the city.262 The rough treatment of the teenagers led to a 
demonstration, during which the security forces killed at least six protestors. This event 
triggered a spiral of violence that finally led to violence and the killing of 15 to 50 
protestors within one week by the police.263 On Friday 25 March, the protests broke out 
over the country and the uprising started that finally led to more than 8,000264 killed 
civilians and security forces and brought Syria close to a civil war. 
President al-Assad replied to the protest movement with a speech before 
parliament on 30 March, in which he accused foreign powers of being responsible for the 
uprising and announced his intention to "defeat those behind the 'plot'.”265 Although the 
security apparatus tried to suppress protests with extremely violent measures, al-Assad 
also tried to calm down the situation by announcing limited reforms. On 19 April, the 
Emergency Law266 was lifted after 48 years, Assad ordered an investigation of police 
killings, the state security court (which handled the trials of political prisoners) was 
abolished, and a new law allowing the right to peaceful protests was approved. 
Nevertheless, the violence culminated during the week and preliminarily peaked on 22  
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April when at least 81 people were killed.267 First indications of resistance within the 
forces occurred when soldiers refused to fire upon protestors and affiliated themselves 
with the protest movement.  
In a political response to the violence on 25 April, the UN high commissioner for 
human rights, Navi Pillay, condemned the violence and the U.S. government warned that 
it was considering imposing sanctions. On 28 April, attempts by the UNSC members 
France, Britain, Germany, and Portugal to condemn the Syrian approach against the 
protests in the UNSC failed because of the veto of Russia and China, and the denial of 
India and Lebanon. While the violence continues and the Syrian forces attack Homs, 
Dara'a, and other cities with artillery and tanks, the EU enforced an arms embargo, a 
travel ban, and the freezing of assets against 13 members of the Syrian leadership on 9 
May that was expanded on 23 May, now including Bashar al-Assad and several others.268  
The following months were defined by international political silence, the 
unchanged continuation of violence in Syria (including a steadily rising death toll)269 and 
attempts of the Syrian leadership to calm down the political situation with 
announcements of domestic reforms like the allowance of new parties270. However, the 
Syrian opposition and large parts of the international community evaluate the reform 
announcements as false promise designed to gain time for the regime. Attempts by al-
Qaida to use the Syrian uprising as a vehicle to gain international attention were rejected 
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by the rebels on 28 July271. One day later, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) announced its 
formation272, a reservoir of deserted Syrian soldiers that tries to organize the military 
resistance against the Syrian regime and has a growing importance in the conflict. A valid 
estimation of the total strength of the FSA is not possible, however, and the data 
presented by the FSA about itself seems overstated.273 
The development of a political response to the situation in Syria remained 
unusually slow and meaningless. Without the backing of the UNSC, the different 
diplomatic attempts remained a political patchwork.  On 2 August, the EU expanded their 
embargo on 30 more members of the Syrian leadership. On 6 August, the GCC 
condemned the escalating violence in Syria and use of excess force and two days later 
Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador from Syria. Envoys from different countries 
traveled to Syria on 9 August to convince al-Assad to end the violence, but their mission 
failed. Under lead of the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany, the U.S. and the EU prompted 
al-Assad to resign and announced a new attempt to impose sanctions against Syria in the 
UNSC. On 2 September, the EU—Syria's most important trading partner—imposed an 
oil embargo on Syria starting on 14 October 2011274 that continues to seriously hurt the 
Syrian economy. 
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In opposition to that decision, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev warned the 
Western states not to increase pressure on Syria because this was "absolutely not 
needed."275 Therefore, Barack Obama's new attempt on 21 September to urge the UNSC 
to impose sanctions against Syria was without success. As an outcome, Russia and China 
on 4 October vetoed a European-backed UNSC resolution that threatened sanctions 
against the Syrian regime if it did not immediately halt its military crackdown against 
civilians. Within Syria domestic politics, the different major opposition groups agreed to 
work together in the Syrian National Council (SNC), an important step to end the 
paralyzing fragmentation of the Syrian opposition.276 
The diplomatic game of threat by the EU, the U.S. and the Arab League—and the 
ignorance and the counter-threat of the Assad regime277—went on during the year with 
several attempts to move al-Assad to resign or reform the country.278 Simultaneously, al-
Assad tried to gain time by accepting attempts for political solutions like the LAS peace 
plan from 02 November, but finally not implementing them. As an outcome of this 
behavior, Syria was excluded from the LAS on 12 November, and sanctions by the LAS 
were announced. On 18 November 2011, Bashar al-Assad agreed to allow the LAS to  
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send observers into Syria but then rejected this decision nine days later. Finally, the 
Syrian president again agreed to allow observers to come to Syria on 19 December 2011, 
and the observer mission started on 27 December 2011.  
The outcome of the observer mission was disastrous. Members of the mission 
ended their duty prematurely because of the violence and the whole mission was 
suspended by the end of January 2012. The LAS finally asked the UN for help on 12 
February 2012, resigning because of the failure of their own attempts to solve the 
crisis.279  However, the UNSC also remained helpless in the face of Syria. The double 
veto of Russia and China on 11 February 2012 against a resolution that backed a LAS 
peace plan demonstrated that Syria still has reliable allies. 
After more than eleven months of fierce fighting and a death toll of more than 
8,000 280 killed, the conflict in Syria is still unsolved and ongoing. Bashir al-Assad has 
impressively proven that with the support of at least one strong ally within the UNSC, 
attempts to force the regime to change its inhuman policy are doomed to fail. There is 
also the still-existing fragmentation of the Syrian opposition, even though "Syrian 
opposition groups have grown more organized as the uprising has unfolded, but remain 
divided over strategy, tactics, coordination, and leadership."281 These opposition groups 
needed more than six month after the conflict started to unite somehow in the SNC,282 
and the slow-moving approach of the LAS, the EU, and the U.S. to the situation also 
helped support the regime. Empty diplomatic gestures like expelling ambassadors and 
calls to stop the violence are senseless against a resolute leader. 
The question remains if a UN resolution would have changed anything as long as 
military means are not included. The resolution drafts that were vetoed by Russia and 
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281 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions 
Against the Asad Regime  by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard. CRS Report RL 33487. 
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282 The SNC tries to secure political support and recognition for their organization. Until now no 
country does recognize them officially. Even the Arab states refuse recognition because the SNC lacks the 




China contained diplomatic gestures, but did not contain real sanctions—although crimes 
against humanity have been proven several times, even in an UN report accusing Syria of 
gross violations of human rights. 283 
Bashir al-Assad's game of cat and mouse with the UN, the LAS, and the West—
and his delaying tactics—have been very successful until now. In addition to the missing 
UNSC resolution that still seems highly unlikely, even the supposition of a humanitarian 
intervention is a long way away. Not a single government had sustainably and intensively 
discussed the idea of an intervention like the in Libya during the past year. Finally, it 
seems like the al-Assad regime is able to survive the revolution at least for the near future 
based on the strong military, the weak opposition, and the hesitant international 
community.284 The behavior of the West displays political awkwardness in handling the 
Syrian conflict. A total suppression of the revolt by the Syrian security apparatus is not 
unlikely. 
G.  THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF THE UN AND NATO 
As explained in the second chapter, a military intervention without a UN mandate 
is in nowadays highly unlikely. The only military powers that would have the ability to 
intervene in Syria are the U.S. or NATO with the U.S. as necessary ally. Therefore, the 
focus of the decision-making process has to be on the UN and NATO. Regional 
organizations like LAS or EU may have the power to influence developments but, finally, 
without decisive character. In the Libyan case, the interaction between NATO and UN 
finally led to the intervention; for the Syrian case this interaction has not started because 
of the slow or hampered decision-making processes caused by political reasons. 
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1. Rapid Decision-Making Process in the Libyan Case 
a. United Nations 
Only eleven days after the protests started in Libya on 15 February 2011, 
the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1970, proposed by Germany, the U.S., Great 
Britain, and France, including tough measures against the ruling regime. As the last 
speaker at the UNSC meeting, Ibrahim Dabbashi endorsed the sanctions against Libya. 
Dabbashi had repudiated the leadership of Qadhafi and joined the rebel camp on 21 
February. Conceding the right to speak in front of the UNSC to a defected diplomat and, 
contrarily, the non-existing right of Libya to defend itself was surprising and unusual. 
Neither was Libya a member of the UNSC, nor did he, as the active deputy ambassador 
of Libya at the UN, defend his home country against a military sanction. This highlighted 
the line of thought within the group of supporters for an intervention in the UNSC. 
As the next main step, the UNSC on 17 March 2011 passed 'Resolution 
1973 on Libya' but this time with five abstentions; China, Russia, India, Brazil, and 
Germany refused the approval. 
The whole diplomatic process within the UN happened fluently, mainly 
influenced by the Libyan delegation at the UN, that had defected from Libya and started 
to work against the Qadhafi regime actively, and caused by the support of the LAS for the 









India from denying the Resolution, although they had emerging doubts and concerns 
about the real intentions.285 
b. NATO 
The decision-making process within NATO to intervene in Libya was, 
even for the experts, extraordinary fast.286 During the whole political process to create 
and adopt the resolution at the UN, NATO stressed that it was not preparing itself for a 
military mission, and thus the NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated 
on 24 February 2011:  
I do not consider the situation in Libya a direct threat to NATO or NATO 
Allies, but, of course, there may be negative repercussions. Such upheaval 
may have a negative impact on migration, refugees, etc., and that also goes 
                                                 
285 "Russia's specific and absolutely logical questions concerning the maintenance of the no-fly zone 
regime and rules for the use of force" were left unanswered, Russia's envoy to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, 
stated. He also remarked that the Resolution offers the possibility of a full-scale military intervention. 
RiaNovosti. “UN Security Council adopts resolution on Libya.” RiaNovosti. 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20110318/163067336.html (accessed February 20, 2012). 
The Chinese foreign ministry spokes man Jiang Yu stated that "Considering the concern and stance of 
Arab countries and the AU as well as the special situation in Libya, China and some countries abstained 
from voting on the draft resolution," but "we oppose the use of force in international relations and have 
some serious reservations with part of the resolution". Saihal Dasgupta. “China opposed UN resolution on 
Libya.” The Times of India.  http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-03-
18/china/29144182_1_libya-resolution-countries (accessed February 20, 2012). 
Ambassador Maria Luisa Viotti Permanent Representative of Brazil to the U.N. remarked: "We are not 
convinced that the use of force as contemplated in the present resolution will lead to the realization of our 
most important objective – the immediate end of violence and the protection of civilians." CNN. “Obama’s 
potentially awkward Brazilian arrival.” CNN. http://whitehouse.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/18/obamas-
potentially-awkward-brazilian-arrival/ (accessed February 20, 2012). 
India's deputy permanent representative to the UN Manjeev Singh Puri explained India’s abstention by 
stating: “There must be certainty that negative outcomes were not likely before such wide-ranging 
measures were adopted.” Sanjeev Kumar Shrivastav, India's Response to the Libyan Crisis, IDSA Issue 
Brief, 13 April 2011. 
286 U.S. defense secretary Leo Panetta remarked: "After the UN Security Council Resolution was 
passed, it took only ten days for NATO to decide to act.  For those familiar with the complexities of getting 
28 nations to decide on anything, this was a stunning achievement." United States Mission to 
NATO.” Secretary Panetta at Carnegie Europe.” http://nato.usmission.gov/panetta-carnegie-2011.html 




for neighboring countries. But I would like to stress that NATO as such 
has no plans to intervene.287  
Already on 9 March, NATO started to extend its air surveillance in 
Mediterranean on a 24/7 basis, although Rasmussen again denied any planning for an 
intervention at this time288. Ten days after the UNSC resolution 1973 was passed, the 
NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC), the principal political decision-making body of 
NATO, agreed to take over the different military missions of the U.S., France, Canada, 
Great Britain, and others.289 On 27 March, five days after NATO took control about the 
arms embargo and three days after taking control of establishing the no-fly zone, both 
measures were included in resolution 1973. The NATO General Secretary stated: 
NATO Allies have decided to take on the whole military operation in 
Libya under the United Nations Security Council Resolution. Our goal is 
to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack from 
the Gaddafi regime. NATO will implement all aspects of the UN 
Resolution. Nothing more, nothing less.290 
NATO was successful in hiding its planning and preparation of mission 
'Unified Protector' because it was unsure if the NAC would achieve the necessary voting 
result. Any decision of the NAC is subject to the NATO principle of consensus. This 
means that all 28 single member states of NATO have agreed to execute the mission 
Unified Protector,' including Germany—that had not supported the UNSC resolution 
1973 against Libya ten days earlier—and France, which tried to avoid the leadership of 
NATO. 
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during the Secretary General’s visit to Ukraine. NATO. “NATO Secretary General's statement on the 
situation in Libya.”  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70790.htm (accessed February 19, 2012). 
288 Interview with NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen on NATOchannel.tv on 09 
March 2012. NATO. “NATO extends air surveillance in Mediterranean.” 
http://www.natochannel.tv/?uri=channels/454282/1245809 (accessed February 19, 2012). 
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290 NATO. “Taking responsibility.” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71808.htm (accessed 




The approval of the U.S. to hand over the leadership of the Libya mission 
to NATO was natural because they were the driving force for the change of command 
because of domestic politics,291 and to avoid another conflict with a Muslim country 
under U.S. leadership. Germany's approval after abstaining during the UN resolution was 
more surprising, but was constrained by the German policy not to block NATO. After 
extensive criticism within German domestic politics and on international level for the 
decision to abstain from the UNSC resolution against Libya, Germany did not want to  
risk another political scandal. Germany's approval under the constraint of not 
participating with its own troops was guaranteed, and this position was well known at the 
NAC before the vote.292 
France resisted the full takeover of NATO because the French President 
Nicholas Sarkozy apprehended that NATO will not act determined enough and will be 
unable to integrate non-NATO states like United Arab Emirates and Qatar in the military 
anti-Libya coalition. Sarkozy preferred a political committee of those eleven nations that 
actively took part in the mission, to coordinate the mission politically, while NATO 
should frame the military action without any decision-making power.293 Finally, the U.S. 
secretary of state Hillary Clinton convinced Sarkozy to support the NATO approach and 
enabled a unanimous decision at the NAC. 
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292 During a telephone press conference after the decision of the NAC, about the transfer of Libya 
operation control to NATO, U.S. senior administration officials stated: "With respect to the Germans, 
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Sarkozy reignites row over NATO military role.” The Guardian.  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/25/nicolas-sarkozy-nato-libya-row?INTCMP=SRCH (accessed 




2. No Decision-Making Process in Syria 
a. United Nations 
Since the uprising in Syria started, two attempts to adopt resolutions 
against the Syrian leadership failed. The first attempt on 4 October 2011, which had been 
heavily watered down during month of negotiating within the UN, was proposed by Great 
Britain, France, Germany and Portugal—in cooperation with the United States. The draft 
resolution, which had voiced deep concern over the recent violence in Syria and strongly 
condemned “the continued grave and systematic human rights violations and the use of 
force against civilians by the Syrian authorities,” was vetoed by Russia and China.294 
Russia argued that the "draft would not promote a peaceful solution of the crisis,” 
although Russia does not support the Syrian leadership.295 Russia especially criticizes 
that the resolution "did not take into account the violence directed by extremists against 
the government in Syria."296 China’s Ambassador Li Baodong underlined that his 
country is highly concerned about the violence in Syria. However, the text of the 
resolution draft would only complicate existing tensions because it was overly focused on 
exerting pressure on Syria, and included the threat of sanctions, which would not resolve 
the situation.297 
The second attempt failed on 4 February 2012, when the draft resolution 
backed an LAS plan of 22 January to try to resolve and end the crisis in Syria. Before 
being drafted, this resolution draft of the origin Arab League plan has been watered 
down, too. Nevertheless, China and Russia again vetoed the resolution in the UNSC that 
condemned "all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, and in this regard demands 
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that all parties in Syria, including armed groups, immediately stop all violence or 
reprisals, including attacks against State institutions."298 This time the draft also  
condemned all violence, irrespective of where it comes from, and in this 
regard demands that all parties in Syria, including armed groups, 
immediately stop all violence or reprisals, including attacks against State 
institutions,299 to accommodate the Russian position.  
 
Despite this new passage within the resolution draft, Russia rejected it 
because it would have "sent an unbalanced signal to the Syrian parties.”300 The Chinese 
ambassador supported the amendments proposed by Russia and, therefore, refused their 
approval.  
The double veto of China and Russia triggered loud criticism by the UN 
itself, by almost all Western states and also by most Arab states. As a backlash, the 
general Assembly of the UN on 17 February "strongly condemned the continued 
“widespread and systematic” human rights violations by the Syrian authorities and 
demanded that the Government immediately cease all violence and protect its people."301 
The resolution of the General Assembly, which has no binding character, backed the 
peace plan of the LAS that has been the origin for the failed draft resolution in the UNSC 
on 4 February. Only 12 states voted against the condemnation of the Syrian leadership, 
with 17 abstentions and 137 states in favor for the resolution. 
Despite this strong moral support for the uprising in Syria, the process 
within the UN in regard to Syria is without any success to this day. Even the first attempt 
to condemn the action taken by the regime in Syria and to adopt sanctions took more than 
seven month. The UN is currently not able to support the rebels in Syria with more than 
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professions of sympathy. Other organizations like the EU or the LAS have been more 
successful and faster in implementing sanctions against the Syrian government, but these 
measures lack any decisive character. As long as Russia and China will not relent, the UN 
will remain helpless.  
b. NATO 
Similar to the development during and before the NATO intervention in 
Libya, NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that the alliance has no 
intention of intervening in Syria. After NATO prepared its mission against Libya, almost 
unrecognized by the public, political observers may expect that the approach to Syria 
would be the same. However, the denial for a NATO mission in Syria is broader, and 
based on a very specific argument. The NATO General Secretary also doubts the 
possibility of a NATO intervention, even with a UN mandate, and instead urges the Arab 
states to find a regional solution. Main reasons for this political position (that constitutes 
a strong distinction to the Libyan intervention) are that "Syria is also a different society, it 
is much more complicated ethnically, politically, religiously. That's why I do believe that 
a regional solution should be found,” stated Rasmussen on 17 February 2012.302  
In addition to the current political displeasure to intervene, a confidential 
NATO report after mission "Unified Protector' makes clear that an engagement of NATO 
in Syria also contains military risks and preconditions that have a large influence on the 
whole decision-making process.303  First, the military intervention against the weak 
Libyan forces revealed several military flaws within NATO and, second, proved the 
dependence of the alliance on the active contribution by U.S. forces. This knowledge 
finally influences the whole decision-making process of NATO for the Syrian case and 
contains two uncomfortable truths for NATO: first, without a large U.S. contribution a 
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mission is not possible; and second, even with these contributions the advanced Syrian 
forces may cause some major problems for the Western forces.  
Ultimately, the NATO General Secretary is only presenting the position of 
the NAC. Therefore, the non-existing will and the lack of enthusiasm of the NATO 
member states to start a new military mission against a Muslim state are easy to 
recognize. Reading the General Secretary's statement carefully reveals that the members 
of NATO clearly recognize the higher military and political risks of an intervention in 
Syria and, therefore, prefer not to intervene. 
H. THE ROLE OF THE EU 
Although the EU announces its "unique range of instruments"304 for a common 
foreign policy and the enforcement of human rights, and imagines itself "recognized as an 
important contributor to a better world,"305 it remained nearly invisible when the military 
options of an intervention in Libya were discussed and also remains invisible with regard 
to the Syrian case. Despite its security structures of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) that was established after the Nice summit in 2000, particularly including 
military capabilities, the EU was not able to use any of these tools during either crisis.306  
To this day, the influence of the EU on both cases is reduced to political measures 
like sanctions, declaration, travel bans, and the freezing of assets. As for robust military 
measures, the EU remained without participation,307 and any discussion about the 
possibility to use military structures and capabilities for Libya or Syria did not even 
begin.  
                                                 
304 European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing 
Security in a Changing World -, Brussels, 11 December 2008 S407/08. 
305 ibid. 
306 The EU implemented a European Union Military Committee, the European Union Military Staff 
and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability to be prepared to engage in military missions. 
307 The EU officially launched on 1 April 2011 the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
mission Eufor in Libya, a military mission that should coordinate humanitarian help equipped with a budget 




This has significant consequences for all EU members. The missing common 
policy forces every member state to follow its own national interests, instead of acting 
collaboratively. For Germany and France, this development had sweeping consequences. 
Both countries filled the existing political vacuum that resulted from the political silence 
of the EU with their own very different national and domestic interests. 
I. COMPARISON OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND MILITARY 
ALLIANCE OF LIBYA AND SYRIA 
The military strength and capabilities of the regular forces and militant supporters 
of a country on the brink of being targeted by an intervention play an important role. 
Before an intervention can take place, the military alliance against the country that is 
accused of hurting human rights and conducting atrocities will necessarily consider the 
military abilities of the possible target. Any political decision on an intervention 
necessarily depends on the assessment of the military, because starting (or just 
threatening) an intervention without having the military capabilities to execute them 
would create a political stalemate. 
This process had been accomplished very quickly for Libya within the complex 
military decision-making process of NATO,308 although the necessary "consensus is 
rarely immediately achieved on complex undertakings, and working groups meet 
regularly to troubleshoot and work through issues."309 Additionally, some single member 
states of "Unified Protector" were very swift in their own national decision that the Libya 
mission was feasible.  
For Syria, NATO is less optimistic to achieve a fast solution. In addition to the 
current non-existing formal legal requirements, additionally, the difficult assessment of 
                                                 
308 Before NATO is able to analyze a situation and generate a military mission, a difficult process 
between politicians of all 28-member countries has to be finished. The whole political process of the North 
Atlantic Council, the military and political committee’s and the International Military Staff of NATO is 
based on consensus. 
309 NATO. “The International Military Staff.” 
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the military capabilities of Syria, and the possible military effects on NATO of an 
intervention, are hampering the speed of any decision-making process. 
A brief comparison of the main military data shows the decisive difference 
between the Libyan and Syrian forces, which plays an important role in the decision to 





 Libya Syria 
Forces   




Tanks 530 4950 
Infantry fighting vehicle 2840 6610 
Artillery  650 2160 
Anti air weapons 580 3310 
Aircraft 480 830 





Long range strike systems -- Existing, number unknown 
Force Readiness Low Low-media 
Sustainment Poor Poor 
Country   
Population 6,400,000 22,500,000 
Geography Mainly desert Stony desert 
Mountains 
*Other estimates range from 300,000 to 400,000. 
Table 1.   Comparison of important military data of Libya and Syria before an 
intervention310 
The influence of possible allies of Syria and Libya also plays an important role in 
the military assessment. While Libya was militarily and politically isolated in 2011, for 
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Syria the situation is different. With Hamas and Hezbollah as non-state actors, and Iran 










IV. NATIONAL INTERESTS, THE RELEVENCE OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS OF U.S., FRANCE, AND GERMANY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The traditional definition of national interest is divided into two main basic 
schools of thought. The first one "holds that national interests should be defined in terms 
of a state’s tangible power and sphere of influence relative to those of other states."311 
Thereby the use of military and balancing political power are main elements. The second 
one "holds that national interests should be defined more broadly to encompass 
intangible, but nevertheless highly prized, values like human rights, freedom from 
economic deprivation, and freedom from disease."312  
As James F. Miskel explains in his paper313, today states tend to find a middle 
way in-between these two definitions. An important element of state definition of 
national interest is that states tend to define them as broadly as possible for a simple 
reason: if national interests leave enough space for interpretation, the actions of their own 
government is not dependently constrained by the interests and leaves enough scope for 
other action. For research this broadness generates some difficulties.  
Therefore, this chapter will first research and present the official national interests 
of the U.S., France, and Germany towards Libya, Syria, humanitarian rights and 
interventions. Then, it will additionally discuss the influence of domestic politics and 
non-stated national geo-strategic interests in regard to the willingness to participate in 
humanitarian interventions in Libya or Syria. In some cases, an analysis of very special 
single events in domestic politics is necessary to explain the foreign policy of the actors. 
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B. U.S. INTERESTS IN LIBYA AND SYRIA 
1. U.S. National Interest and Geo-Strategic Objectives  
The White House released the most recent official U.S. paper that defines the 
general political and geo-strategic objectives of the United States of America in May 
2010. This paper, the National Security Strategy (NSS) 314, clearly underlines the 
unconditional focus of U.S. foreign policy on the safety and security of American 
people315, the strengthening of the U.S. economy, and the maintenance of U.S. military 
supremacy. The strategic approach emphasizes the following four major strategic 
approaches: 
• The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and 
partners; 
• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open 
international economic system that promotes opportunity and 
prosperity; 
• Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and 
• An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to 
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The NSS enhances this commitment to universal values317 and the necessity of 
international cooperation, with a focus on the UN and NATO, with several statements. 
The U.S. claims a moral leadership and, therefore, supports attempts of the international 
community to spread basic human rights.  
Humanitarian interventions themselves are not mentioned by name in the NSS. 
However, the possibility or necessity to enforce human rights and international norms is 
discussed conclusive and clearly. While the paper states that the U.S. "will not seek to 
impose these values through force"318 and will not promote its principles through an 
"effort to impose our system on other people,"319 it, coincidently, explicitly allows the 
deployment of U.S. forces "to preserve broader peace and security, including by 
protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis."320 In this context also, the RtoP 
and the resulting measures are mentioned. The U.S.  
have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide 
and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this 
responsibility passes to the broader international community when 
sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or 
when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or 
respond to such crimes inside their borders.321  
Within a multilateral or bilateral context, the U.S. announces it intent to use 
military means to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities, if all other 
measures fail to stop it. 
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318 National Security Strategy, The White House, Washington 2010,   
319 Ibid. 
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Therefore, the NSS prefers peaceful measures to force nations that breach agreed 
international norms to accept and guarantee those universal norms, but simultaneously 
leaves the possibility to use U.S. forces to enforce human rights militarily. The necessary 
decision-making process within the U.S. is specific to every individual case. 
The fact that the White House publishes the official position paper of U.S. foreign 
policy underlines the extraordinary influence of the U.S. President on this important 
topic. Although the making and carrying out of America’s foreign policy involves all 
three branches of government322 and a complex array of governmental institutions and 
agencies323, the U.S. foreign policy is determined above all by the President. The U.S. 
Department of State is only an administration that assists the White House to demand its 
standards. Therefore, the Obama doctrine324 also has a large influence on the decision-
making process with regard to humanitarian interventions. Although Barack Obama has 
the constitutional power to deploy troops into a crisis region and utilize military force, 
this power is limited by some conditions.325 Therefore, any use of forces has to be 
considered carefully and at best based on the approval of the Congress. 
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responsibility to preserve the Council’s credibility and to ensure that its edicts do not turn out to be “empty 
words”; and (3) in any event, Congress has allowed the President to undertake this action through the War 
Powers Resolution, which permits him to use force for up to 60 days without specific, advance approval. 
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Libya,” May 16, 2011; Michael J. Glennon, The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment On the Justice 
Department’s Libya Opinion† Harvard National Security Journal Forum, April 2011; Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 35, Authority to use 




Barack Obama's foreign policy approach differs from his predecessor's approach 
in several tasks. Although some critics tried to conclude that his strategy is nearly similar 
to George W. Bush's doctrine of 2002, the 'Obama doctrine' differs decisively. Based on 
two major speeches in 2011, one regarding Libya326 and the other one the Middle East in 
general327, his doctrine is described by Dimitrova328 as 'smart power strategy.' 'Smart 
power' is defined as the combination of soft and hard power,329 and this definition 
describes the U.S. approach to combine defense, diplomacy, and development. For the 
Libyan case, the approach is evident by Obama's statement in an address to the nation: 
American leadership is not simply a matter of going it alone and bearing 
all of the burden ourselves. Real leadership creates conditions and 
coalitions for others to step up as well, to work with allies and partners so 
that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs; 
and to see that the principles of justice and human dignity are upheld by 
all330 
This statement shows a new importance of humanity, common responsibility, and 
burden sharing.331  
The specific national interests and geo-strategic aims of the U.S. in regard to the 
Middle East are shaped by the recent past since the end of WWII. As the only existing 
political and military 'Superpower,' the U.S. still tries to balance the power in the region 
and, therefore, follows some long-standing U.S. policy goals like "regional security,  
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global energy supplies, U.S. military access, bilateral trade and investment, counter-
proliferation, counterterrorism, and the promotion of human rights."332 This U.S. policy 
includes:  
• Discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies (including Israel) 
and jeopardize other interests; 
• Preserving the flow of energy resources and commerce that is vital to the 
U.S., regional, and global economies; 
• Ensuring transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations;  
• Countering terrorism (CT);  
• Stemming the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons; 
and 
• Promoting economic growth, democracy, and human rights.333  
The stressed importance of the Middle East region for U.S. interests is also 
mentioned in the NSS that states nonproliferation, counterterrorism cooperation, access to 
energy, and integration of the region into global markets as main general aims for the 
Middle East. Thereby, the U.S. is willing to support a partnership with states in the region 
and, therefore, appealing to the Middle East peoples' aspirations for justice, education, 
and opportunity. Deduced from this officially stated policy, the history of the cold war, 
and the role as last remaining superpower, the U.S. interests within the region have to be 
considered broader than those of France or Germany. 
Balancing the priorities mentioned above necessitated the willingness to cooperate 
with friendly Arab regimes and Israel in the region to reach the political aims. In the 
world of today, the U.S.'s most important objectives are the containment of: 
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• Radicalizing forces such as Al Qaeda and affiliated extremist Islamist 
movements,  
• Hamas and Hezbollah,  
• Iran, especially with regard to the possible development of WMD, and  
• Syria and its influence in the region. 
Defining the U.S. interest within the region requires a close look at these 
overriding political aims, and any taken action has to be examined in relationship to 
them. The interactions that are caused by any political or military action by the U.S. in 
the region have to be considered by the government carefully and, therefore, also have to 
be considered as an important part of the U.S. decision-making process with regard to 
Libya and Syria. Thereby, the negative experience of U.S. military interventions of the 
recent past in Iraq and Afghanistan created a mindset within U.S. politics that generally 
reduced the readiness to use forces as a first choice when strategic U.S. interests are 
threatened.334 
Conclusively, the national interests and geo-strategic goals generally classify the 
role and relevance of humanitarian interventions as an important part of foreign policy. 
Defined in the NSS, and supported by Obama's partly liberal staff, the U.S. is able to 
promote and theoretically also willing to enforce the idea of humanitarian interventions 
by the use of U.S. forces for defending human rights. After showing that the normative 
idea of a humanitarian intervention is implemented in official U.S. foreign policy, and 
connecting this approach with the general strategic goals for the Middle East, we must 
now examine the feasibility and the will for interventions in cases like Libya in 2011, or 
for the ongoing Syria conflict. 
Since it is obvious that the national interest and the geo-strategic goals of U.S. 
foreign policy particularly allow and support a military humanitarian intervention, it is  
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also obvious that the implementation of such military missions for every case depends on 
political constraints caused by domestic politics and an advanced interpretation of geo-
strategic goals.  
2. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Libya  
a. Domestic Politics  
From a domestic point of view, several reasons run counter to a military 
engagement of the U.S. in Libya. In early 2011, the U.S. population was war-weary. 
After eight years of conflict in Iraq and nearly 10 years of war in Afghanistan, with costs 
of more than 1,283.3 billion U.S.$335 in times of economic crisis and more than 6,000336 
U.S. soldiers killed in both conflicts, the enthusiasm of the public for military conflicts by 
U.S. forces was limited.  An opinion poll in mid-March 2011—where only 32% of the 
population was in favor of a military engagement by the U.S. Air Force in Libya, only 
22% favored the use of ground forces, and only 23% of the interviewed U.S. citizens 
favored an U.S.-led role in this upcoming conflict—showed this strong popular refusal 
for new military operations.337 Therefore, from a domestic point of view, Obama should 
have avoided any new military intervention in general. A sometimes-offered argument 
that Obama used the Libya conflict to show his own strong leadership and vigor was 
baseless, as proven by polling results after the conflict ended. Although the U.S. had no 
own victims and the whole mission was assessed a military success, only 37% of the 
interviewed U.S. citizens supported the engagement, while 49% answered that the U.S. 
"should not have gotten involved."338 
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b. Geo-Strategic Interests 
Some U.S. politicians state that the U.S. had no direct vital interest in 
Libya.339 This is worth repeating in any discussion about the direction of U.S. national 
security because the uprising created no military threat for the U.S. and did not threaten 
the security of the U.S. or its citizens. However, two main arguments contradict this view. 
First, reading the NSS carefully shows that promoting democracy and peace are also 
official parts of the national interest of the U.S. More important is the second 
consideration about U.S. foreign policy. Assessing the U.S. interests for Libya requires a 
close look into the political environment of the whole region and the possible political 
interactions. The national interest and geo-strategic aims of the U.S. in Libya can be 
explained by implementing the officially stated aims of the NSS and, in a broader 
approach, the additional geo-strategies interests of the U.S. in Libya. 
c. Humanitarian Situation 
Two of the four general U.S. strategic goals mentioned in the NSS were 
obviously applicable with Libya. The aims of 'respect for universal values around the 
world' and the idea of an 'international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes 
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation' could explain the 
engagement very clearly, while U.S. President Obama additionally saw a threat for U.S. 
Allies caused by refugees from Libya that "put a strain on the transitional governments in 
Egypt and Tunisia and on American allies in Europe."340  Finally, three of four U.S. 
strategic goals were applicable to Libya; only the strategic goal to avoid a direct threat for 
the U.S. was denied. Therefore, the norm-based arguments justify an intervention from a 
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US perspective. Parts of the scholarship agreed in this belief that norms were the driving 
force for the intervention, although often, additional interests are at least recognized.341  
Although humanity has been the strongest argument that could be 
announced from the beginning of the considerations to intervene in Libya, the Obama 
administration tried to deliver the message that the situation that existed in Libya in 
March 2011 was unique. U.S. President Obama explained this uniqueness of the Libyan 
situation in his address to the nation on 28 March 2011 by stating: 
It is true that America cannot use our military wherever repression occurs. 
And given the costs and risks of intervention, we must always measure our 
interests against the need for action. But that cannot be an argument for 
never acting on behalf of what's right. In this particular country - Libya; at 
this particular moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a 
horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that violence: an 
international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the 
support of Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people 
themselves. We also had the ability to stop Gaddafi's forces in their tracks 
without putting American troops on the ground.342 
The early definition of the Libyan situation as unique followed the geo-
strategic calculus that with the 'Arab Spring' rebels groups in other Arab countries could 
also make claims for military support like the rebels in Libya. The public consideration of 
the uniqueness attempts to underline the officially stated argument that only humanitarian 
reasons were the driving force for the Libyan intervention, and simultaneously tries to 
blight any new demands for support in other countries within MENA. U.S. President 
Obama could only explain the intervention using normative reasons in public, and  
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simultaneously, the U.S. government needed to prevent new desires for the support of 
other groups in Middle East by underlining the exceptionality of the humanitarian 
situation in Libya. 
To stop the discussion at this point and conclude that these three norm-
based geo-strategic goals solely shaped the decision for the intervention in Libya would 
create a wrong impression. Concerns about the humanitarian situation may have 
influenced the U.S. decision-making process in part, but additional geo-strategic 
considerations that recommended an intervention in Libya are also of importance. 
d. Redemption Politics  
Like almost all the Western states, the U.S. misinterpreted the beginning 
of the Arab spring in Egypt and Tunisia, and continued their support for the old regimes. 
Even when former Egyptian president Mubarak and the former Tunisian President Ben 
Ali started to fight their own populations, the U.S. stayed hesitant and indecisive.343 
Finally, the U.S. distanced itself from the old leadership in Egypt because they simply 
saw no other possibility, and not because of any understanding or support for the new 
movement. Quickly after the failure of long-time established U.S. politics became 
obvious, the start of the uprising in Libya offered an opportunity for the U.S. to revise 
this impression and to set an example that they supported the new movement within the 
Middle East.344  
                                                 
343 For Egypt the U.S. supported his long-term ally President Mubarak at least until 03 February, a 
time when the fighting’s at the Tahrir square in Cairo had started and the whole revolutionary process 
seemed irreversible. The U.S. tried to negotiate a transition process with Mubarak as an interim President 
until 03 February and until that day they do not demanded Mubarak to step down. This position was 
strongly criticized in Egypt and worsened the mutual relationship between the Obama administration and 
the new leadership. Amongst others: U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Egypt: 
The January 25 Revolution and Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy by Jeremy M. Sharp. CRS Report RL 
33003. Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, February 11, 2011. 
344  "This was an opportunity for the United States to respond to an Arab request for help. It would 
increase U.S. standing in the Arab world, and it would send an important signal for the Arab Spring 
movement." Unnamed governmental source; Joby Warrick, “Clinton's efforts in Libyan war called vital.” 




Additionally, the special situation that had been caused by the 'Arab 
Spring'—the intervention in Libya—also created a good opportunity to demonstrate the 
support and goodwill of the U.S. to the Muslim world. Although the U.S. was aware that 
the Libyan NTC was mainly influenced by radical Muslim groups, and that the outcome 
removing Qadhafi would probably not be as democratic or pro-U.S. as the U.S. wanted, 
Obama decided to intervene.  
e. Economics 
The mutual U.S.-Libyan economic ties were limited before the 
intervention. Before Qadhafi came to power, the U.S. oil-industry had a position of 
importance for the Libyan oil industry. With the economic reforms of the regime in the 
2000s and the mutual political rapprochement, the U.S. oil-industry was able to increase 
its share of Libyan oil-production very fast and several new projects were pre-planned.345 
With Libya's large oil reserves of 43.66 billion barrels,346 the Libyan oil-industry is a 
worthwhile and promising economic partner, and one of the largest suppliers in the 
world. The U.S. not only had an interest in maintaining the established contracts and 
expanding the mutual relationship, but also, in a broader context, in stabilizing Libyan oil 
production. A long-lasting conflict within Libya without any significant oil production, or 
sprawling economic embargos that remove the Libyan oil production from the world 
market, can damage the world economy through an increased oil price and, therefore, 
hurt the already battered U.S. economy as the world’s largest economy and the second 
biggest export nation.347  
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A humanitarian background for the participation of the U.S. in the 
intervention is comprehensible. The ideals of Barak Obama, the composition of his 
administration—that has the historical Rwanda example at the back of its mind—and the 
defensive U.S. policy during the intervention with the claim "to lead from behind," 
suggest that the intervention has been fueled by the will to prevent a massacre. 
Nevertheless, other reasons also have an important share of the U.S. decision-making 
process. 
After several military conflicts with Muslim countries, the Libyan case 
gave the U.S. an opportunity to prove that values like democracy, freedom, and humanity 
are valid for every group and religion. The unnecessarily long adherence on established 
political connections within the Middle East made a strong signal for the U.S. to act with 
urgent necessity. The weak Libyan government and their small and bad-equipped forces 
offered a good opportunity to send this strong signal to the Muslim population in the 
region without any significant military risk. Nonetheless, the intervention was only 
possible because of Libya's international isolation and inner weakness. Without being in 
the center of gravity for U.S. foreign policy, and without any large impacts of an 
intervention to other important actors or the region, the U.S. could join the mission and 
thereby state the willingness to intervene because of normative reasons, and thereby send 
a signal to the changing Middle East society. As a matter of prudence, President Obama 
stressed the uniqueness of the Libyan case early. 
Although the U.S. had an economic interest in Libya, this rationale had 
only a minor part in the geo-strategic considerations that finally led to engagement in 
Libya. 
Finally, authors like Roberts, Slaughter, and Kuperman, who doubted the 






total—and additionally demonstrated that U.S. politics, motivated by the aim to create a 
regime change348 "grossly exaggerated the humanitarian threat to justify military action 
in Libya,"349—end up being right. 
3. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Syria 
a. Overview 
Although the development of the humanitarian situation in Syria would 
seem to signal the need for a U.S. engagement against the al-Assad regime based on the 
NSS, the U.S. has taken only diplomatic action to this day. While the Pentagon has 
already started to prepare preliminary military options in Syria350 —a routine step for 
military contingency planning during crises overseas—the Obama administration 
attempts to avoid any military involvement by offensive efforts to promote the strength of 
the regular Syrian forces while simultaneously downplaying the relevance of the Syrian 
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nothing.”351 The Pentagon, warning that the Syrian forces are very capable and own 
biological and chemical weapons, also supports this approach of bringing out the high 
military risks and the possible sacrifices of an intervention.352  
At a first glance, this political strategy appears uncommon, because every 
measure that harms Syria finally also weakens al-Assad’s close ally Iran. Therefore, 
further isolating Iran, the state that probably has the greatest tensions with the U.S., 
would be rational and support the threatening posture of the U.S.353 The policy of the 
Obama administration to avoid a conflict with Syria consequently must be based on 
several arguments that overtrump the idea of harming Iran through an engagement in 
Syria. Domestic reasons, national interest, and geo-strategic motives are recognizable to 
explain why an intervention in Syria is much more unsolicited than in Libya. 
b. Domestic Politics 
Similar to the situation in Libya in early 2011, the U.S. population in early 
2012 is also still war-weary. Despite the end of the Iraq conflict, and the already-ongoing 
reduction of troops in Afghanistan, opinion polls document that the population has no 
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major interest in any engagement in Syria. Only 25% of the population agree that the 
U.S. has a responsibility "to do something" in the Syrian crisis, while 73% reject any 
responsibility.354  
However, based on the experience of the Libyan intervention in 2011, U.S. 
President Obama has to be aware that a military engagement in Syria would not support 
his political reputation with the U.S. public. 2012 is an election year in the U.S. and, 
therefore, the U.S. President will try to avoid any unnecessary political and military risks. 
An intervention in Syria contains several risks for Obama's domestic politics, and to 
repeat a positive result (with only a minor effort as in Libya) is highly unlikely because of 
the more advanced and better-equipped Syrian forces.  
Of much importance for U.S. domestic politics is the status of Israel. An 
engagement against Syria very likely will have some side effects that concern Israel. Any 
outcome of a U.S. engagement that somehow harms Israel would have drastic domestic 
consequences. The pro-Israel lobby within the U.S. is an important power factor and is 
able to damage Obama's election campaign 2012 substantially. Israel, as a direct neighbor 
of Syria and an enemy of the Hamas in Gaza and the Hezbollah in Lebanon (which are 
closely connected to Syria), can get entangled in the conflict very easily with different 
possible political and military outcomes355. As long as the Israeli position towards the 
situation in Syria is not clearly defined, Obama also has to domestically balance the 
demands of the pro-Israeli Lobby within the U.S. with its different political currents. 
Barak Obama needs to avoid any far-reaching political disagreements with the pro-Israeli 
lobby in the U.S.  
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Finally, similar to the assessment of the Libyan intervention, from a 
domestic viewpoint the U.S. President will absolutely avoid any new militarily 
engagement in 2012.  
c. Geo-Strategic Interest 
In distinction to the Libyan rebellion, the uprising in Syria affects the geo-
strategic interest of the U.S. in several political areas. In addition to the superficial 
argument of defending humanitarian rights, other interests of the U.S. are concerned with 
the events in Syria. Syria's political ties with Hezbollah and Hamas, U.S.-Israeli relations, 
the role of Iran, relations to the old cold war foe Russia, and the risk of a long-lasting 
civil war in a highly unstable region with its economic effects—all shape the special 
interests of the U.S., although the violence in Syria itself does not create a direct military 
threat for the U.S. or U.S. forces.  
d. Humanitarian Situation 
The assessment of the situation in Syria by different sources356 and by an 
independent international commission of the UN infers that the Syrian government is 
responsible for “gross human rights violations” and that “such violations originated from 
policies and directives issued at the highest levels of the armed forces and the 
Government.”357 This assessment is acknowledged by the U.S. government. The 
condemnation of Syria by the UN General Assembly on 16 February underlines that the 
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humanitarian situation in Syria is dramatic and simultaneously the Syrian leadership is 
unwilling to end the crisis. Therefore, similar to the Libyan case, an engagement by the 
U.S. for purely humanitarian reasons as stated in the NSS358 would be justified and 
possible.  
Two of the four general U.S. strategic goals mentioned in the NSS with 
regard to human rights are obviously applicable to Syria. The aims of 'respect for 
universal values around the world' and the idea of an 'international order advanced by 
U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger 
cooperation' could explain a U.S. engagement very easily. To avoid this conclusion, 
shortly after the Libyan intervention started, Barack Obama already made clear that the 
situation in Libya was unique and, therefore, could not be transferred to other cases. To 
this day, this assessment is officially stated to explain why the U.S. does not attempt to 
pressure the international community to intervene in Syria.359 Following this argument, 
humanitarian reasons are only of minor importance. Unlike the Libyan case, Obama has 
acknowledged that following humanitarian ideals contain unpredictable risks for 
domestic politics. 
Therefore, in addition to these very general and very ambitious normative 
strategic goals of the NSS, some other, more important strategic interests have to be 
considered. These interests for the U.S. are the indirect effects that would emerge from 
the conflict in Syria and influence U.S. strategic interests.  
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e. Syria's Political Ties 
The geographic location of Syria in the center of the Middle East and 
sharing a border with Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and its close political ties 
with Iran and the close connection with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, 
broadens the importance of Syria. Different strategic implications result from Syria's 
foreign policy relations. 
Israel and the U.S. are unconditional allies and an expanded conflict in 
Syria would have a large influence on the U.S. policy in Middle East with regard to 
Israel: 
• A regime change has an uncertain effect on Israel. Israel could be 
strengthen by the fall of the Syrian regime if a stabile democratic is 
established instead of the existing autocratic one, but could be 
weakened if the conflict turns into a civil war, the Syrian arms fall into 
extremists hands, or the new leadership follows a more radical anti-
Israeli approach; 
• Their long-time foe Iran could use an intervention in Syria to blend 
into the conflict and try to use a larger conflict to increase its hostilities 
against Israel;  
• Hamas and Hezbollah could be strengthened by a conflict and use an 







• A civil war in Syria would "be a nightmare" for Israel because the 
anarchy of civil war could leave Israel without any political 
counterpart and without reliable authorities to threaten reprisals 
against.360 Simultaneously, it is highly likely that other extremist 
organizations would try to use the unstable situation within the region 
to increase its military and terroristic attacks against Israel. 
Although some experts and politicians already assess that Israel could 
perhaps benefit from an intervention and the regime change that follows because "his [al-
Assad] departure is still preferable to all alternative scenarios"361 and simultaneously 
Israel's current foreign policy seems to support this assessment362, this approach contains 
several unknown variables with regard to Israel. As long as the political implications are 
unclear, there is a high probability that these different scenarios could cause a 
destabilization of the whole region, a development that the U.S. urgently wants to avoid. 
Iran and Syria’s close political alliance has a huge influence on the geo-
strategic interests of the U.S.. Based on the religious proximity between Alawites and 
Shii, Syria is the only important state that is allied with Iran in the Middle East. More 
important than Syria, Iran is in the political focus of the U.S. Based on recent history 
since the Iranian revolution in 1979, mutual reluctance, the past and still ongoing Iranian 
interference and support for terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan and its direct consequences 
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for U.S. troops363, the assumed Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weapons, and the 
active support for the al-Assad regime during the ongoing rebellion,364 the mutual 
relations between Iran and the U.S. are hostile.  
The close connections between Syria and Iran lead to the situation that 
every action of the U.S. against Syria and every development within Syria have a huge 
impact on U.S.-Iranian relations.  Therefore, the domestic Syrian conflict projects the 
conflict between Iran and the U.S. As a consequence, the U.S. has to act very carefully 
because a Western military intervention in Syria could cause a direct involvement of the 
Iran or at least enforced support for Syria to repel intervention forces. 
Although U.S.-Russian relationship seems to have normalized since the 
cold war ended twenty-one years ago, the Syrian conflict reveals several unsolved 
political disputes and a lack of political similarities. The still-unsolved disputes about the 
missile defense project and the still-dense NATO-Russia relations, as well as the common 
political goals of arms control, counterterrorism, and the global economy could 
experience a significant setback if the conflict between these countries escalates in future. 
The different interests in Syria are manifold. For Russia, Syria is an important economic 
partner (including arms contracts and a planned nuclear cooperation), and also a provider 
of the latest Russian naval base in the Mediterranean. However, in addition to these 
specific interests, there are also geo-strategic considerations. Although the Russian 
government has no interest in risking a civil war in Syria, and a spread of the conflict into 
the region, they do not want the U.S. to take away Iran's last strong ally and they fear an 
increased influence sphere of the U.S. in Middle East. The conflict in Syria is a new 
chapter in the geo-strategic conflict between a former super power and the last remaining 
super power.365  
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The Russian-U.S. relationship already deteriorated when U.S. Secretary of 
State Clinton called the February veto "despicable," and laid at Moscow's feet the 
"murders" of Syrian "women, children, [and] brave young men." and the Russia prime 
minister Putin blamed the U.S. policy for its "bellicose itch.”366 This deterioration is also 
based on the different political ideas behind their foreign policies. While Russia 
emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty in general, and for Syria particularly, U.S. 
foreign policy is determined by another emphasis between state sovereignty and human 
rights. 
Well aware that Russia plays an important role for the still unsolved 
situation in Afghanistan, and is also needed to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions, the U.S. 
administration is reserved about a military intervention in Syria, especially without a UN 
mandate, because they want to stop the ongoing alienation of mutual relations. A further 
deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations should be avoided from U.S. perspective and, 
therefore, Obama's policy towards Syria has to integrate, and is influenced by, the 
Russian political sensitivities.   
f. Civil War in Syria  
Despite the fact that large parts of the mass media already call the Syrian 
conflict a civil war, the level of violence has not reached the status of an all-out civil war, 
but depending on the duration of the conflict, the risk rises.367  
Syria, the multi-ethnic country, could blunder into a civil war fueled by 
different reasons. A civil war caused by sectarian conflicts and fueled by foreign 
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powers368, a foreign intervention that would cause military, financial, or logistical 
support for the al-Assad regime by its allies and a slow transition of the existing conflict 
in a full-scale conflict—these are all realistic scenarios. 
For U.S. foreign policy, which has tried to balance its own interests and 
political stability in the region since more than four decades, an uncontrolled and all-out 
civil war would be the worst case for U.S. foreign policy and its geo-strategic interests in 
the Middle East region. Three major reasons underline this assessment:  
First, the different groups are supported by different Arab states, China, 
and Russia. The involvement of different sects and their supporting states could turn the 
domestic Syrian conflict into a regional conflict that could destabilize the whole region. 
Consequences for the U.S. ally Israel, an oil-price shock that hurts the world economy 
(and especially the already battered U.S. economy), the emergence of Syria as another 
failed state that could be used as a base for militant extremist groups and could lead to an 
increase in worldwide terrorism—these are scenarios that contradict U.S. geo-strategic 
interests. 
Second, if the U.S. participates in a military intervention on Syria that 
expands into a civil war, they automatically would be involved in ending this conflict. 
After the experience with the sectarian civil war in Iraq from 2006-2008, and the 
difficulties to hand over authority in Afghanistan, the U.S. wants to avoid a new similar 
scenario in Syria. 
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Third, the U.S. has dedicated a huge effort to stabilize the Middle East and 
support Israel during the last four decades. An uncontrolled civil-war would finally 
undermine all U.S. approaches to stabilize the region. The influence of Iran could rise, 
and it could try to use a larger conflict to accelerate its possible nuclear ambitions. 
g. Summary  
The U.S. policy towards Syria is shaped by geo-strategic considerations. 
Although the humanitarian crisis and the need to stop the violence are obvious, and the 
U.S. has particularly stated in the NSS that this justifies an engagement, the U.S. is not 
interested in engaging in Syria. Domestically, an intervention is not desirable and on a 
geo-strategic level an intervention could drag the whole region into a conflict. This would 
have serious effects on the ongoing tensions between the U.S. and Iran, on the situation 
with Israel, and is, in the end, likely to destabilize the whole Middle East. The U.S. is not 
interested in an ongoing destabilization of Syria for political and economic reasons. 
Nevertheless, this assessment may be considered again and the calculation may change, 
when domestic or geo-strategic interests change because of political pressure within the 
U.S. 
While the U.S. had no clear-cut course on how to handle the situation in 
the initial phase of the conflict369 the Obama administration finally, mid-course, changed 
its policy into a waiting attitude and now seems to seek to avoid an intervention. 
Currently, the U.S. can easily blame Russia and China for preventing a UNSC resolution 
with their veto, while at the same time, this veto prevents a discussion about the measures 
that may be included in a resolution against the al-Assad regime and a deeper 
involvement of the U.S. Even if both countries would change their opinion, it is still 
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highly unlikely that the U.S. would participate in an intervention in Syria at this time.370 
Based on the insight that a regime change that is orchestrated from the outside contains 
the highest political and military risks for the whole region and constitutes the worst case 
for U.S. geo-strategic interests, the U.S. now tries to downplay the utility of an 
intervention.  
Keeping the status quo with a non-democratic al-Assad regime ruling the 
country, a peaceful transition into democracy based on al-Assad's will to change the 
situation, or the disempowerment of the ruling regime by the Syrian opposition without 
intervention from outside are solutions that promise the best outcome for U.S. interests. 
In awaiting those developments, the U.S. tries to gain time by downplaying the chance 
for success and emphasizes the strength of the regular Syrian forces.  
C. FRENCH INTERESTS IN LIBYA AND SYRIA 
1. French National Interests and Geo-Strategic Objectives 
Believing it has a special role in the world marks the French self-awareness. 
France’s assumed rank and influence in the world are important to French policymakers. 
Permanent membership on the UNSC, close relations with parts of the Arab world and 
former worldwide colonies, aspects of power such as nuclear weapons, and evocation of 
human rights are central to France’s self-identity in international affairs.371  
In this context, the French government has published its "French White Paper on 
defense and national security"372 in 2008, the first strategic paper since 1994. The focus 
of French national interests is on responding to "all the risks and threats, which could 
endanger the life of the Nation."373 The paper defines the French strategy in a 15-year 
perspective focused on defense and national security. The emphasis of the paper is a 
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definition of five strategic functions374 that are based on the idea of multilateralism, self-
defense, and an equal status of military and civilian measures to encounter crisis—
including an explicit reference to intervention. The White Paper also underlines the 
priority of the European ambitions of France with the aim of "Making the European 
Union a major player in crisis management and international security,"375 but remains 
very tentative. 
The idea of interventions as a pillar to prevent conflicts is generally defined for 
special geographical areas. Nevertheless, the included "guidelines governing the 
commitment on French armed forces abroad" explicitly state: 
• The substantial and serious character of the threat to our national 
security or to international peace and security; 
• The consideration, prior to the use of armed force, of other possible 
measures, without prejudice to emergency situations involving 
legitimate defense or the responsibility to protect (R2P); 
• Compliance with international rule of law; 
• Democratic legitimacy, entailing the transparency of the goals 
pursued and the support of the nation's body-politic, expressed in 
particular by its parliamentary representatives;376 
Although the paper stresses the importance of a responsibility to protect, it does 
not emphasize or even mention any kind of humanitarian intervention and human right 
protection measures. 
Conclusively, the French strategy only mentions the possibility to intervene 
within the framework of responsibility to protect as a last resort, when other measures  
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have not succeeded. A commitment to intervene in cases of violations of human rights is 
not included. The decision about a military intervention will finally depend on decisions 
made on the basis of individual cases.  
From a geo-strategic perspective, the French national strategy focuses on the 
geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Arab-Persian Gulf, and the 
Indian Ocean. Generally, "France’s focus is shifting away from sub-Saharan Africa to the 
Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf, illustrated by its closing its military base in Senegal 
and opening one in Abu Dhabi."377  
For the Middle East, the paper describes a high risk of war that results from 
growing interconnection and conflicts about energy raw materials and food. Preventive 
measures are the tool that is recommended to stop conflicts in the region. However, the 
French White Paper explicitly emphasizes the use of the military in an approach of 
"increased freedom of action for France" 378 within the geographical axis. French geo-
strategic goals are: 
• To defend our population and territory; 
• To contribute to European and international security; 
• To defend the values of the republican compact which binds 
together the French and their state: the principles of democracy, 
including individual and collective freedoms, respect of human 
dignity, solidarity, and justice.379 
In the context of this paragraph, the economic interests of France are mentioned in 
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security, and other public policies, including economic policy. For economic policy, 
additionally, the amendment is made that it only of interest when it "contributes directly 
to national security."380 
The French president chairs the "Defence and National Security Council" 
(Conseil de Defense et de Securite Nationale, CDSN) that gives the policy guidance for 
the use of French forces.381 The structure of the CDSN that is composed of different 
national ministers and the National Intelligence Council is clearly dominated by the 
French President. 
Conclusively, the national interests and geo-strategic goals of France are stated 
very generally but in total classify the role and relevance of humanitarian interventions as 
an important part of French foreign policy. Following the definition of the 'White Paper,' 
France is theoretically also willing to enforce the idea of humanitarian interventions by 
the use of forces, although some terms are stipulated.  
After having proven that the national interest and the geo-strategic goals of 
French foreign policy particularly allow and support a military humanitarian intervention, 
it is obvious that the implementation of every military mission depends on political 
constraints created by domestic politics and an advanced interpretation of geo-strategic 
goals. The theoretical influence of the EU (with its different tools to create a common 
policy and strategy and finally even to engage with own assets) has not influenced the 
French decision-making process. For both cases, the EU was unable to find a common 
position or policy to this day. The EU, thereby, had not balanced France’s ambitious 
policy goals in regard to Libya, and President Sarkozy could pursue French objectives. 
Thereby, the geo-strategic approach of France is generally less ambitious than the 
approach of the U.S. The feasibility and the will of interventions in the cases of Libya in 
2011, and for the ongoing Syrian conflict, have to be examined. 
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2. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Libya  
a. Domestic Politics 
The ruling government and the French President Nicholas Sarkozy were 
under huge political pressure in early 2011. The failure in handling the emerging 'Arab 
Spring,' the dismissal of the French Foreign Minister because she was suspected of 
corruption, and controversial links to the Tunisian Ben Ali regime before the 
revolution382 and general discontent with the government politics383 led to a large 
decrease in the popularity of Nicholas Sarkozy. An interim peak of this development was 
reached when an opinion poll predicted on 5 March 2011 that Sarkozy had fallen back to 
position three for the 2012 Presidential election, beaten by the far-right candidate and the 
socialist candidate.384 Especially, the popularity of the right-wing candidate was 
politically dangerous for Sarkozy, because Sarkozy's own party constantly lost its 
supporters to them. 
In 2010/ 2011, large parts of the French population were dissatisfied with 
French immigration politics385 and the secular France had an "Islam debate,"386 fueled by 
the French right-wing party. At this time, Qadhafi played an important role in European 
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refugee politics because most African refugees started their attempts to reach Europe 
illegally in Libya. Knowing about the fears of the Europeans in regard to an uncontrolled 
immigration to Europe, Qadhafi tried to blackmail the EU to pay money to his regime387 
or his Libya would not stop the illegal human trafficking to Europe. In this situation, the 
French minister for European affairs warned on 2 March that up to 300,000 illegal 
immigrants from North Africa could come to Europe during 2011.388 The ongoing and 
increasingly hysterical discussion in the French public about Islam and the problem of 
Muslim refugees damaged Sarkozy's reputation and benefited the right-wing party.   
With his popularity at a record low, and facing an election in 2012, the 
ongoing dispute over domestic policy, the rise of the right-wing opposition, and the 
failure in reacting appropriate to the development in Egypt and Tunisia, Sarkozy urgently 
needed to demonstrate leadership. 
At this time of Sarkozy's political weakness, Bernhard Henri Levy, an 
influential French philosopher, commentator, and human rights activist, additionally 
pressurized Sarkozy. In personal phone calls in early March 2011, he argued that the 
"blood of the massacred will stain the French flag,"389 and thereby underlined the 
normative obligation of France to intervene in Libya and single-handedly brokered the 
first meetings between Sarkozy and the Libyan rebels. Sarkozy followed his interference 
into French foreign policy and came to conclusions very fast, without even integrating the 
Minister of foreign affairs. 
The uprising in Libya, therefore, was a good opportunity to show strength, 
contain the right-wing party, and show resoluteness in regard to possible immigrants. As 
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an outcome of this domestic situation, France was the first country that recognized the 
Libyan NTC on 10 March 2011, the French Air Force hasty attacked Libyan troops 
before the mission officially started (and without informing the allies),390 and later on, 
France also supported the rebels with arms without informing its allies.391 
b. Geo-Strategic Interest 
On a geo-strategic level, a direct French interest based on official papers 
and statements in Libya is only discernible for the aims to spread human rights and the 
idea of humanism. Apart from that, no officially stated vital French interest was 
threatened by the domestic development in Libya in early 2011. No military or security 
threat for France was created, the economic relations with Libya and its proposed 
collapse were too small to endanger the country or "[contribute] directly to the national 
security"392 of France, and the illegal immigration situation was also not sufficient to fit 
into the broad definition of the French paper. 
Nevertheless, France had additional motives and reasons that could be 
classified under French geo-strategic interest in Libya. 
c. Direct Influence in North Africa  
France had been a colonial power in North Africa until 1962. Its former 
colonies in North Africa were Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (administrated by 
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the UN); additionally, several other colonies in Africa were established in the 1900s. The 
relations with some of the former colonies remained close after their independence, and 
France has tried to influence the domestic and foreign policy within its former colonies in 
the past, and also still tries to influence the development to this day.393 This is a result of 
the still-existing post-imperial ambitions of France and the historical claim to be an 
important power in the world. 
As a heritage of the colonial history, up to 240,000 French nationals still 
live in Africa, almost all in its former colonies. Between 1962 and 1995, French forces 
intervened nineteen times in Africa—and the majority of the interventions aimed to 
protect French nationals or subdue uprisings against legitimate governments.394 The 
character of the interventions changed after the Rwanda disaster395 to multilateral 
interventions, and the influence of France has decreased significantly since the mid-
1990s, although France still has approximately 6,000 troops in Africa.  
However, France never stopped its attempts to increase its political 
influence in the region. In addition to the EU initiative of the Euro-Mediterranean-
Partnership (EMP) that was established in 1995 and included all EU members, Nicolas 
Sarkozy presented the idea of a “Mediterranean Union" during his election campaign in 
2007, founded on the idea "to help resurrect France’s historic position as a mentor of 
Islamic territories in northern Africa and the Levant."396 The project should first place be 
understood in the context of President Sarkozy's global diplomatic ambition, and as an 
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example of the French method to impose a sovereign vision and deal selectively with 
foreign partners. Escribano and Rodriguez additionally argue that "the proposal also 
reflected a view widely shared in France as to the country’s strategic position in the 
Mediterranean region."397 
After the attempt failed to keep some EU members398 out of the new 
organization as the French proposed it, the EU founded the "Union for Mediterranean" 
(UfM). However, the reduced version also satisfied France, because the country still 
defined itself as the most important link between the EU and North Africa, and this new 
project underlined the French post-imperial ambitions in the Maghreb. Sarkozy himself 
acted as one out of two co-presidents of the UfM, while the other one was Egyptian 
President Husni Mubarak, and the President of the organization was from Jordan. This 
initial structure of the UfM underlines the attempt of Sarkozy to take the political lead in 
EU-MENA relations. 
Another important factor behind French interest in North Africa is the 
economy. Although French businesses have longstanding operations in Africa, the whole 
continent accounts for only 5 percent of France’s exports.399 While many experts expect 
a phase of economic boom in Africa, France wants to participate and turn "Africa’s 
promising economic growth and development into a greater opportunity to promote 
French economic interests."400 
Therefore, the geo-strategic aim to stop the decrease of influence, or to 
increase the French influence in the traditional French sphere of interest, is an argument 
as to why France was one of the driving forces to intervene in Libya. The change in 
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leadership in many African countries through democratic elections and uprising and the 
replacement of a generation of African leaders, has shown that the cozy relations France 
had established with Africa—what has been called "la Francafrique"—must be replaced 
by new modern relations, which are probably more balanced between the states. 
Nevertheless, France wants to be able to control and influence the political process that 
has taken root in its traditional influence sphere. The haste that France's President 
Sarkozy showed in his attempts was caused by the failure of France’s assessment 
regarding Egypt and Tunisia, and the derived need to show engagement.  
d. Redemption Politics  
Like many other countries, France was surprised by the emergence of the 
'Arab Spring' that started with the suicide of a Tunisian street vendor on 17 December 
2010, and reacted very slowly on it.401 In contrast to the governments of most Western 
countries, the French reaction to the violent attempts of the Tunisian regime to suppress 
the anti-regime demonstrations was not refusal and condemnation, but support for the 
Tunisian regime. On 12 January, the French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie 
refused to “pose as a lesson giver in a situation we realize is complex” and suggested that 
French police forces could help their Tunisian counterparts “appease the situation through  
law enforcement techniques.”402 This attitude was based on the French self-awareness as 
a regional power, the close connections between France and several Maghreb states, and 
the idea of not risking good bilateral relations by supporting rebels. 
One day later, French Prime Minister François Fillon made the first 
critical comment on the situation in Tunisia when he denounced what he called “a 
disproportionate use of force” by Tunisian authorities.403  
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While the EU, the UN, and the U.S. criticized the Tunisian regime and 
made firm statements, France was isolated in international politics nearly one month after 
the protests had started because of their support for the Tunisian regime. The reaction was 
massive criticism by the French opposition, as well as by human rights organizations and 
scholarship, and it damaged the reputation of France and particularly that of the French 
President Sarkozy.404 Any new attempts to improve the French international standing 
during the Tunisian uprising failed because the Tunisian President was already ousted on 
14 January 2011. 
Therefore, the uprising in Libya was a welcome opportunity for the French 
government to show to the MENA region—and also to their own population and French 
allies—that France is willing and able to support regime change in Middle East. Taking a 
lead role in the Libyan mission was the strongest possible symbol to demonstrate this 
will, and France finally hoped that "it can make a mark on whatever emerges from 
upheaval across the Arab world, and make up for lost diplomatic confidence."405 
e. Preventing Immigration 
As described above, the French government is involved in a domestic 
discussion about illegal immigrants and the role of Islam within France. With 4-6 million 
Muslims in France,406 the country has the highest rate of Muslims within the European 
population. Parts of the traditional French establishment have started to protest against 
the uncontrolled immigration and the increasing number of Muslims in the country. 
Therefore, in addition to the domestic aim of the intervention to show the population that 
the government cares for their concerns, Sarkozy indeed wanted to prevent uncontrolled 
immigration into the EU. 
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Summarized, the main reason for the Libya intervention, and the French 
struggle for leadership in this military mission, was based on domestic and geo-strategic 
considerations. For domestic politics, the French President Sarkozy desperately needed to 
significantly strengthen his political position, especially on the right. An intervention in a 
former colony, against an unpopular dictator who threatens the EU with an uncontrolled 
flow of immigrants was an ideal opportunity to show determination.  
The political aim to intervene out of a responsibility to protect is quoted 
several times by Nicholas Sarkozy, who stated "France had “decided to assume its role, 
its role before history” in stopping Colonel Qaddafi’s “murderous madness;”407 but these 
arguments seem to have little credibility. In addition to the domestic reasons, geo-
strategic reasons to regain credibility in North Africa and the Muslim world (and a 
habitus as traditional power in the region) are also reasons that shaped the decision to 
intervene.  
France risked national solo efforts to succeed at all costs. These political 
risks, including non-arranged actions and doubtful measures like the arm shipment to 
rebel groups, followed domestic and geo-strategic interests.  Finally, the idea of a 
humanitarian intervention was only a useful vehicle for France to demand its own aims. 
3. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Syria 
a. Domestic Politics 
Nicholas Sarkozy's attempt to distract the French population from 
domestic problems and to underline his leadership skills—and using the intervention to 
gain popularity—has failed. Different opinion polls of April 2011, four weeks after the 
intervention started, saw a significant deterioration of the results. Sarkozy gained 20% of 
votes, and the right-wing candidate only 19%, but the socialist candidate reached 27% 
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and was able to increase the gap with Sarkozy.408 In another poll in May 2011, the right-
wing candidate got more approval and Sarkozy’s results were at a historical low. 
Syria is generally of less importance than Libya in French domestic 
politics. While both countries are relatively unimportant for the majority of the French 
population, Libya was automatically linked with the idea of human trafficking and illegal 
immigration, while Syria is unsuspicious in this regard.  
The French population is war-weary after ten years of continuous military 
engagement in Afghanistan.409 Opinion polls show the decline of approval for the 
mission in Afghanistan.410 Nevertheless, a narrow majority (51%) of the French 
population would back a U.N.-authorized military intervention in Syria,411 but this is 
easily explained by the outstanding ease of the operation "Unified Protector.” In this 
situation of this general war-weariness, and reinforced further by the fact that the Libyan 
intervention had no positive effect on his reputation, the French President will avoid 
additional military engagements that contain risks in an election year. It would be highly 
unlikely to have a positive result in Syria with only a minor effort, as in Libya. It is 
foreseeable that the thin majority of supporters for a Syrian intervention will change its 
mind as soon as a new operation leads to the killing of French soldiers. In conclusion, an 
intervention in Syria contains several political risks for Sarkozy that he will have to avoid 
until after the elections in April and May 2012.  
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b. Geo-Strategic Interest 
Similar to the assessment of the France geo-strategic interest in Libya, the 
official statements and papers would only allow for an intervention in Syria based on the 
aim to spread human rights, democracy, and the idea of humanism. Apart from that, the 
Syrian uprising does currently not threat vital French interests.  
The development in Syria does not have any impact on French security 
and, similar to the Libyan case, the economic relations and their proposed collapse were 
too limited to endanger the country or to "[contribute] directly to national security." 
While the French geo-strategic interest in North Africa is obvious, the French 
connections and interests in Syria are of less importance. In contrast with the U.S., 
France's foreign policy and geo-strategic approach is much more limited, and is focused 
on special areas of interest rather than the whole world. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
consider the geo-strategic interests of France in Syria. 
c. Economy, Lebanon, and 'Arab Spring' 
Although France had a mandate over Greater Syria between 1920 and 
1943, and the relations were still close after the spilt of the country, the last decades were 
dominated by divergences. The French support for Lebanon especially constrained the 
mutual relationship.  
After the foundation of the UfM in 2008, relations improved, and in 2010 
an important trade agreement worth 10 billion Euros was signed. Besides the interest in 
keeping and expanding the economic relations, especially in the oil-industry412, no real  
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geo-strategic aims are recognizable. The importance of Syrian oil imports to France is 
low. France only imported approximately 25.000-barrel oil per day from Syria; this is less 
than 2% of France's daily oil consumption.413 
France’s traditional sphere of interest in the region is Lebanon and North 
Africa. The conflict in Syria has had no huge impact on Lebanon to this day. After the 
successful military operation in Libya, there is no longer any visible need to show affinity 
to the 'Arab Spring,' for any kind of redemption politics or to demonstrate the French will 
to contain or expand its still existing post imperial ambitions in Syria. 
d. Summary 
The French President condemns the action taken by the government in 
Syria and threatens "that the Syrian authorities will have to explain their crimes before 
international penal courts"414 and proposes to found a "Friends of Syria" group after the 
second UNSC veto against a resolution on Syria in February 2012. Nevertheless, the 
French engagement on Syria is only ordinary diplomatic business. Neither the statements 
of the French President nor its claims to end the violence have the same dramatic impact 
as the preparation for the Libyan mission. 
The French interest to intervene in Syria is only minor. This is underlined 
by four main arguments. First, the large Syrian Forces and their sophisticated abilities are 
a real threat to the French Forces. An intervention with a calculated risk like in Libya is 
not possible. Second, domestic politics are in the focus of Sarkozy. An engagement in a 
new military mission could additionally endanger his already difficult reelection. Third, 
no French interests are threatened by the situation in Syria. The mutual economic 
relations are only small and the aims to claim regional leadership and show support for 
revolutionary movements have already been achieved in Libya. And the fourth reason—
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although France claims to be an important power in the world, the French sphere of 
interest is actually small. Syria and the Middle East is an area that has traditionally been 
dominated by the U.S. since the cold war. Therefore, President Sarkozy is well aware that 
every action within the Middle East needs the approval and support of the U.S. as the 
decisive and stronger ally. 
Finally, the idea of spreading and defending human rights, the principles 
of democracy, respect of human dignity, solidarity, and justice—as stated in the French 
"White Paper"—would allow an intervention on a multilateral approach. As long as 
Russia and China block a UNSC resolution, France will not take any military action 
because President Sarkozy is not willing to act, and a justification for an unauthorized 
intervention is more difficult. It is also questionable if he would be willing to lead France 
in a new military adventure before the French elections—even with a UN mandate.  
After the French presidential election, the situation may change. It is 
highly likely that the French President, backed by the French claim to be an important 
power, will not stand aside when a multilateral force under a UNSC mandate is willing to 
engage against Syria. Then he will probably underline France's assumed international 
importance by joining a coalition against Syria. However, France will not retake the role 
as a driving force for intervention again. 
D. GERMAN INTEREST IN LIBYA AND SYRIA 
1. Germany's National Interest and Geo-Strategic Objectives 
The discussion about national interest and geostrategic goals in Germany is a 
complicated social and political process that usually proceeds behind closed doors and 
without any perception by a broader audience.415 National interests and geostrategic 
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goals are defined only roughly in the 'White Paper on German Security Policy' 
(Weissbuch der Bundeswehr)416, published in 2006, and the 'Defence Policy Guidelines' 
(Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinie)417 of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), 
published in 2011.  
Both papers underline the defensive character of German foreign policy. Main 
tasks are to preserve justice, freedom, democracy, and security for the German citizens in 
a multilateral framework and within a comprehensive concept of security; but also: 
• “To prevent, whenever possible, regional crises and conflicts that may 
affect Germany’s security and to help manage such crises"418;  
• "To help uphold human rights and strengthen the international order on the 
basis of international law;"419 and 
• "Advocating the universality of human rights and principles of democracy, 
promoting global respect for international law and reducing the gap 
between the rich and the poor regions of the world."420 
While humanitarian intervention is not mentioned directly, the concept of a 
responsibility to protect (and its seemingly growing importance) is mentioned in the 
extended German version of the 'White Paper.' However, although the German papers 
extensive refer to the importance of human rights and international law, no one of these 
papers finally gives a mandatory guidance or offers a binding principle. German 
participation on any kind of intervention in the case of humanitarian crisis finally needs 
an assessment on a case-by-case basis. 
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Possible geo-strategic goals of Germany are defined only very generally. The core 
elements of German foreign policy are multilateralism, integration into European politics, 
the emphatic references to the trans-Atlantic value system, a civilian focus (including the 
widespread abandonment of military instruments), and the trans-Atlantic partnership.421 
As a consequence, Germany formulates strategic interests without defining any special 
spheres of strategic interest and, then, only universally.422 The government stated in 2012 
that: 
Freedom and human rights, democracy and rule of law, peace and 
prosperity and sustainable development, sustainable bilateral relationships 
and effective multilateralism are the principles from which we derive our 
goals.423 
Astonishingly, for the third-largest export nation in 2011 that was responsible for 
8.3% of worldwide exports in 2010, economic interests are not particularly mentioned in 
the definitions of German interest.  
Germany's geo-strategy is finally not defined for specific regions and has to be 
defined on case-by-case basis in close coordination with the EU and the parliament. The 
close integration of Germany’s foreign policy with the EU (as a part of recent German 
history) hampers the development of an independent and appropriate political position, 
prohibits the development of individual German political positions, and simultaneously 
limits its political influence. This self-marginalization and dependency on the EU leads to 
a slow decision-making process and a voluntary limitation of Germany’s own strategic 
options.424 The missing common policy of the EU for both cases, and the necessity to 
find its own independent solution and approach, has hampered the German decisiveness.  
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In contrast with the dominant political position of President Sarkozy and the far-
reaching authority of President Obama to use forces, the German chancellor Merkel does 
not have the authority to use German forces. The German chancellor has generally less 
direct influence on foreign policy because the German foreign ministry is responsible for 
diplomacy and foreign relations. Although Angela Merkel has the policy-making power, 
her influence in regard to geo-strategy is limited because she has to rely on several 
different ministries and administrations within the government in her decision-making 
process.425 For any missions of the German forces, the approval of the German 
Parliament is mandatory.426 
In addition to the reduced assertiveness for geo-strategic considerations of the 
German head of government, Germany's foreign policy generally follows no "Grand 
Strategy.” As a consequence of its past, Germany tries to avoid any open action that can 
be considered as aggressive or a geo-strategic approach that seems to search for political 
or economic advantages. Its modest foreign policy is not comparable with the geo-
strategic approach of a super power or the aspirations of a former colonial power. 
2. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Libya  
a. Domestic Politics 
Since the end of WW II, the German population has thought of the 
German Armed Forces as a defensive force with a focus on Germany and Europe, and the 
alignment of German foreign policy was still based on self-awareness as a "civilian 
power."427 Based on this knowledge, the then-chancellor Schroeder was able to adopt a  
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strict anti-war position in 2002 when Germany refused to join the coalition of the willing. 
This political gambit damaged trans-Atlantic relations sustainably, but secured 
Schroeder’s endangered reelection in 2002. 
In early 2011, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the political party of the 
German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, was under massive domestic pressure 
because of several unpopular political decisions and, additionally, he himself as the 
"party leader looked shaky amid internal opposition."428 In opinion polls the FDP got 
only 4% of the votes, a historical low and below the necessary 5% threshold of the 
German parliament. Only weeks after the decision, very important state elections in 
Baden-Wuertemberg were scheduled. Simultaneously, the population was war-weary as 
the limited support for the still ongoing Afghanistan mission showed that a majority of 
71% of the population voted against the mission.429 
Westerwelle, as Foreign Minister, takes responsibility for German foreign 
affairs, and he surely had to influence the important decision about Libya with the 
chancellor. Chancellor Merkel herself had two strong arguments to support Westerwelle's 
approach. First, she needs the FDP as junior partner in several coalitions on state and on 
federal level and needs to avoid its marginalization. Second, the chancellor and the whole 
government were well aware that the population was war-weary after ten years of war in 
Afghanistan and, therefore, did not want to pull Germany into another mission.430 Third, 
this argument also has an international aspect since Merkel and Westerwelle agreed that 
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the time has come to emancipate German foreign policy and to no longer subordinate 
national interests for the sake of allies.431 The German defense minister Thomas de 
Maiziere underlined this new position by stating:  
We reserve the right, in Germany's interests, not to participate this time 
around. We cannot remove all the dictators in the world with international 
war.432 
Therefore, the surprising abstention at the UNSC (together with China, 
Russia, Brazil, and India) followed the same pattern of domestic maintenance of power, 
as in 2002, out of a new German self-awareness. The trans-Atlantic relations were 
initially fraught in order to support domestic politics, but at this time also the relations 
with Germany’s most important partners within the EU (France and Great Britain), were 
compromised for a short time, and the decision constituted a major break with Germany's 
foreign policy tradition of generally voting with its traditional partners.  
If the aim had only been not to send forces into a new mission, Germany 
also could have voted for the resolution, but then reject a direct participation—but 
Germany additionally wanted to send a signal of political strength to its partners. 
b. Geo-Strategic Interest 
Germany has not defined any direct geo-strategic interest with regard to 
Libya, and not even with the region; therefore, the German geo-strategic interest in regard 
to Libya in 2011 was a very universal, normative one. Although the crisis in Libya surely 
has not influenced Germany's security, the emphasis within the German security strategy 
to prevent and support human rights, the rule of law, and democracy could have been a 
sustainable rationale for an intervention.  
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However, Germany's decision to abstain from the UNSC resolution could 
also be explained by its limited geo-strategic interest in Libya, and the non-enforceability 
of any national interests other than humanitarian ones in the German population. 
Germany's leadership disbelieved the humanitarian argument of its allies and had reasons 
to fear that the population would also reject this argument. 
c. Economy 
Although economic motives are not mentioned in the official German 
documents, Germany had an economic, geo-strategic interest in Libya in 2011. While 
Libya was a generally unimportant trade partner for Germany, it had some importance as 
an oil supplier. Approximately 6% of the German oil consumption was provided by 
Libya in 2010.433 This amount of oil is easily substitutable on the international oil 
market. However, as long as the German consumer does not realize any impact of the oil 
embargo and the outage of Libyan oil-imports does not have any significant influence on 
German industry or society, the economy is inappropriate to consider as a reason for 
intervention. Finally, the importance of the mutual economic relationship is too 
minuscule to justify an intervention. 
By considering foreign policy, the government’s interest was to keep 
Germany out of the mission without stopping the resolution completely, and without 
damaging the close alliance with the EU and the U.S. The inducement for the rejection of 
the mission on international level was based on the general rejection of the political role 
and constitution of the NTC, and on the risks of a military intervention. This main idea of 
standing in-between seemed to work as long as the U.S. was also skeptical with regard to 
a military intervention, because as long as Germany could vote with the U.S., its own 
position was sustainable. However, the German assessment of the U.S. position was 
flawed. When the U.S. shifted its position on 15 March from rejection and skepticism to 
                                                 
433 U.S. Energy Information Administration. “Country Brief Germany”. U.S. Energy Information 




support and engagement, no one informed the German leadership.434 Therefore, the very 
difficult attempt of German politicians to find a middle course finally failed and left 
Germany isolated. 
d. Summary  
In conclusion, the German position to abstain on the Libya vote was 
dominated by domestic interests. Nevertheless, Germany tried to muddle through the 
situation by hoping that the resolution would be denied, postponed, or abstained by some 
other partner nations. Before the vote on 17 March, however, it was obvious that 
Germany would be isolated in the Western hemisphere after the vote. From the geo-
strategic view, Germany only had reasons to engage in Libya based on the high self-
imposed claim to protect human rights and, to a minor degree, the economy. However, 
the idea of protecting human rights by the use of force is also generally rejected by the 
population. 
The very universal concepts of German foreign policy and the necessary 
decision on a case-by-case basis finally unmasked the difference between making 
statements about protecting human rights and acting to protect them. The main German 
argument, that an intervention could contain risks, is probably valid for any possible 
intervention. If it stands upon this argument, Germany could never enforce the stated geo-
strategic goals of promoting humanity and justice. 
3. Geostrategic Goals and Domestic Politics in Regard to Syria  
a. Domestic Politics 
The German abstention in the UNSC in regard to the Libyan resolution 
had two major effects:  
First, German foreign relations with some long-time allies have been 
stressed in 2011, although the conflict has been brief and the foreign relations of 
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Germany recovered quickly.435  However, the reactions to the German decision were 
harsh, especially in Germany when critics from members of the ruling parties, the 
opposition, and political scholarship rejected the decision and statements like the 
"decision is a serious mistake of historic dimensions, with inevitable repercussions"436 
were common. Surprisingly, criticism in the international sphere of politics was 
comparatively serene. Although the criticism was only short-lived, the German 
government wants to avoid any new concerns about the German position.  
Second, the goals of domestic politics—which led to the surprising 
decision in the Libyan case—were not reached. The FDP could not gain any advantage 
out of the abstention, in contrary; the party reached with only 3% of the votes a new 
historic bottom in opinion polls in 2012.437 As an outcome—and with relation to many 
urgent domestic problems that concern the German population438—the government will 
avoid any decisions that infuriate the population. Opinion polls show an overwhelming 
majority of 66% against any military intervention in Syria, and especially of any German 
participation (with 76% rejection).439  
Finally, domestic politics in Germany conveys the impression that new 
military missions are highly unlikely at this time, although the government wants to avoid 
an isolated position in international politics (as with the Libya resolution). Therefore, 
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German support for an intervention based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charta may be likely, 
but would probably exclude the use of military force for enforcement of the peace.  
b. Geo-Strategic Interest 
Germany has no particular strategic concept for Syria because it has not 
defined any direct geo-strategic interest with the country or the region; therefore, the 
German geo-strategic interest in regard to Syria in 2012 is (similar to the Libyan case) a 
very universal, normative one. The uprising in Syria surely does not influence Germany's 
security. Only the emphasis within the German security strategy to prevent and support 
human rights, the rule of law, and democracy could be used as a sustainable rationale for 
an intervention.  
Besides this possible normative argument for an intervention, Germany 
has little geo-strategic interest in the Syrian economy. 
c. Economy 
The mutual relations are mainly based on economics. Thereby, Syria was 
Germany's eight-largest oil supplier before the crisis, although Syria generally was an 
unimportant trade partner for Germany. Surely, Germany has an interest to reestablish 
economic ties after the conflict has ended, although other countries have divvied up the 
ousted oil imports from Syria. Economic motives for the use of force are not enforceable 
in Germany. 
d. Summary 
Finally, the German decision-making process in regard to a possible 
military intervention follows the same pattern as it did with the abstention to UNSC 
resolution 1973. Again, the discussion is dominated by domestic politics and the 
reluctance of the German population for any military interventions. Only a major 
dramatic change in Syria and a significant deterioration of the humanitarian situation 




will generally not support any kind of military intervention and the necessary German 
decision-making process on a case-by-case basis will at least lead to intensive discussions 
and domestic protests. 
The moderate reactions of the German allies after the abstention have not 
changed the basic position in Germany's domestic politics. After the attempt to gain 
support for domestic politics by taking an isolated position in the international 
community failed, it is unlikely that the German government will repeat this procedure. 
This time Germany is willing to support a UNSC resolution against Syria. 
In both failed attempts at the UNSC in October 2011 and February 2012, Germany voted 
in favor of the resolutions and, furthermore, has also been a driving force in drafting the 
October 2011 resolution.440 This support for a resolution is not driven by a change of 
German foreign policy, but is instead a response to the harsh criticism after the abstention 
on UNSC resolution 1973, and is a “way back” to its role as a reliable ally. Germany 
needs to avoid any new isolation and, therefore, will follow its traditional allies U.S., 
France, and Great Britain.  
Simultaneously, a German vote in favor for a resolution does not mean 
that Germany is willing to support any kind of military intervention. The self-imposed 
claim to protect human rights and defend and promote democracy (that is stated in the 
very universal concepts of German foreign policy) is based on the idea of a civil society. 
German participation in a military intervention is still highly unlikely.  
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V. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 
After considering and discussing the initial political situation within Libya, Syria, 
and the three exemplary case countries of Germany, France, and the U.S.—and 
evaluating specific reasons for acting or restraining in both cases—the necessary 
connection between the theoretical framework of military interventions in general 
(Chapter II), the different political motives (Chapter IV), and the real influence of norms 
as the basis for humanitarian interventions has to be considered (Chapter II and III). 
Both cases are often assessed  as similar ones in public, a perception that is 
understandable when even the rhetoric of the Western governments is all but identical for 
both cases. U.S. President Obama stated on Libya: 
...the violence must stop; Muammar Gaddafi has lost the legitimacy to 
lead and he must leave441 
He made very comparable comments on Syria: 
I strongly condemn this brutality, including the disgraceful attacks on 
Syrian civilians in cities like Hama and Deir al Zour... For the sake of the 
Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.442  
  
                                                 
441 The White House Blog. “The President on Libya: "The Violence Must Stop; Muammar Gaddafi 
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For France and Germany, the official statements in both cases are also be 
interchanged443, nevertheless, the conclusions of these similar statements are different 
and the crucial claims are not enforced with the same consequences. The assessment of 
the humanitarian situation in both cases, Syria and Libya, supports the conclusion that the 
dramatic extent of violation of human rights is mainly caused by the ruling regimes, 
although for the Syrian case rebels also fuel the violence by committing atrocities and 
acts of inhumanity.444   
Discussing the situation within Libya and Syria conclusively and briefly, the 
general conditions of the international political framework that existed directly before the 
uprisings started, the particular national interests of the three case countries, and the 
classification of norms in the context of humanitarian interventions for Libya and Syria, 
will support my argument.  
A.  LIBYA AND SYRIA -TWO DIFFERENT CASES? 
In public discussions, a direct comparison between the situation in Libya and 
Syria is very common, and leads to demands like "Next stop, Damascus; After Libya, 
                                                 
443 For example: Nicholas Sarkozy in a statement with Great Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron 
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Egypt and Tunisia, it's time to end the brutal reign of President Bashar Assad in Syria"445 
without considering the distinction between the cases. Simplifying the facts by merely 
contrasting two authoritarian rulers and the number of victims of a conflict does not meet 
the necessary basis for comparing the cases. Furthermore, a more detailed view on the 
framework condition already proves that both cases are not very comparable. 
Despite the proximity of time and place for these political events, the general 
political situation in the whole Middle East North Africa (MENA) region had already 
changed decisively when the Syrian uprising started. Two main factors shaped the 
different intervention decisions in these two countries: the timeline of both uprisings in 
connection with the 'Arab Spring,' and differences in the country’s positions in world 
politics, economics, society, and militarily (which taken alone is sufficient to explain the 
“otherness” between these cases).  
1.  Time of Occurrence 
As extensively analyzed, the close relation between public demands and decisive 
action for the Libyan case, and the gap between demanding and enforcing change in 
Syria, is obvious. The timeline of the two uprisings in Syria and Libya is of particular 
interest for explaining the international political framework and the rationale of the 
international community not to intervene. 
When the Syrian uprising had its first peaks with the "Day of Dignity"446 on 15 
March 2011, and the violent reaction of the security forces after the Friday prayer on 18 
March 2011, the Arab Spring had already endured four months. The Tunisian and 
Egyptian leaders Ben Ali and Mubarak has already been forced to step back and the 
military intervention on Libya had started one day before. Therefore, the events in Syria 
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lacked the undivided interest of the media and international politics. Especially the full-
scale engagement in Libya reduced the attention on every other case regarding the 'Arab 
Spring' in the MENA region (including the Syrian case), because the media, politicians, 
and finally the population were focused on the military intervention in Libya.   
In addition to the lack of the necessary public attention, this unfortunate timing of 
the start of the uprising in Syria had another disastrous consequence for the rebels. After 
Russia and China had accepted the military engagement for the Libyan case at the UNSC, 
the NATO interpretation of the mandate prevented any approval of effective UNSC 
resolutions against Syria (and continues to do so to this day). The Russian government 
uses its own assessment that the NATO campaign "in many cases go beyond the 
framework set by the Security Council"447 and that the use of  "excessive military force 
would lead to further additional casualties among civilians"448 to conclude that Russia 
will "never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened in 
Libya."449 Thereby, the prospect for a UN mandate for an intervention in Syria is highly 
unlikely. The undesired outcome of the Libyan conflict for the Russian government 
finally prevents a similar decisive action by the UNSC. 
However, the nations that were engaged in Libya are also (for several domestic 
and geo-strategic reasons, as described in this paper) less euphoric about another 
intervention in the MENA region. Additionally, the unclear political outcome of the 
uprising from the beginning of the intervention in Libya is another reason to be more 
cautious for an engagement in Syria. The Western hopes to establish a democratic regime 
in Libya have not still been fulfilled and the domestic conflicts in Libya are still ongoing.  
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Finally, the earlier beginning of the Libyan uprising in comparison to the Syrian 
rebellion had a high importance for the attention and the support by the Western states 
and the world public. The rebels in Syria started their protests too late. Already, the 
timeline itself distinguishes both cases deeply. 
2. Syria and Libya: A Brief Comparison 
The political, social, and military framework in Syria and Libya is very different 
in almost every aspect. Comparing the initial situation for the likelihood of an 
intervention, without regard for the development of the 'Arab spring' or geo-strategic 
interests of the nations, the probability that Libya would have been attacked was much 
higher from the beginning.  
a. Leadership and Society 
While Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi was a highly 
unpopular leader in world politics and discredited himself during his 42-year dictatorship 
with his support of terrorism, his unpredictability, and his aggressive anti-Western 
rhetoric, the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was assessed as a well-educated pro-
Western politician. Despite his political disputes with the West and his policy of 
modernizing authoritarianism, he was still perceived as reform-orientated leader. In 
contrast to Qadhafi's very centralized system of mistrust, al-Assad's leadership is based 
on a broader ground, and is much more stable. 
The Libyan society, with its 6,400,000 citizens, was comparatively 
homogenous before the conflict. The roots of Libya are Arabic and Islamic, with 97% of 
the population being Sunni Muslim and 97% of the population being Arabic or Berber.450 
Libya, in its artificial post-colonial borders, is home to about 140 different tribes,451 but 
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with 70% of Libyans living in urban areas, tribal identity was not the primary one before 
the conflict started. Nevertheless, the tribal structure, especially the conflict between 
eastern and western tribes, still influenced the events within Libya before, during, and 
after the conflict.  
Severe conflicts between the regime and different Muslim organizations 
during his reign resulted in a growing religiosity during Qadhafi's reign,452 and 
increasing numbers of the population sympathized with a "Brotherhood-type of ideology 
and aspired to the kind of Islamic alternative promoted by the Brotherhood."453 The 
Libyan society is very conservative and religious. 
The Syrian state, with its 20,200,000 inhabitants, is much more 
heterogenic than Libya. The ruling family has an Alawite background and is thus part of 
a religious minority group in Syria, where Sunnis Muslims make up 74 percent of Syria's 
population (Alawites make up 12 percent, Christians 10 percent, Druze 3 percent, while 
Ismailis, Yezidis, and a Jews make up the rest). While 90% of the population has Arabic 
roots, the rest of the population belongs to other fractions like Kurds or Armenians. The 
different religions, ethnicities, and nations make it very difficult to find a common ground 
for a rebellion. Additionally, experience from other domestic conflicts in the Middle East 
demonstrates that the minorities have to fear political marginalization, or even being 
expelled from the country, when a new regime replaces the current one.   
b. Military 
As soon as the rebellion started, Qadhafi tried to contain the movement 
and used his security apparatus to violently crack down on the uprising. However, his 
forces were unreliable and weak. Based on Qadhafi's mistrust against his own military, he 
kept the power of the regular army small to avoid the emergence of military commanders 
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who might rival himself and his family.454 Additionally, the various embargoes against 
Libya within the last two decades had weakened the military. The defection of large parts 
of the regular forces in eastern Libya was an obvious result of this development. Qadhafi 
was then forced to respond to the quick spread of the rebellion caused by lack of troops 
available in the region—and he had to rely on mercenary troops that lacked every kind of 
loyalty. 
In comparison to the Libyan security apparatus, the Syrian forces are in a 
much better condition. Outnumbering the Libyan forces, the Syrian forces are equipped 
and trained mainly by Russia (and also by China and Iran). There is some uncertainty 
about the weaponry of the regular Syrian forces, and the country's actual military 
capability is difficult to predict. The better organization, with much higher loyalty455, 
structure, and equipment in comparison to the Libyan forces in early 2011; the size of the 
Syrian forces and the strong allies is another reason to explain why the Western states are 
hesitant to act as quickly as they did for the Libyan case.  
c. Geography 
The geography of Libya, with 95% dessert and its major population 
centers along the Mediterranean, is much more suitable for fast and decisive military 
maneuvers than the mountainous Syrian hinterland with its large population centers.  
d. Conclusion 
While Qadhafi's personnel unpopularity in world politics and his eccentric 
leadership increased the probability of an intervention, the Libyan social structure, the 
geography of the country, and the strength, size, and leadership of the Libyan military 
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influenced the willingness to intervene in Libya decisively. Libya was, in comparison to 
Syria, a military and political objective that gave reason to expect only limited resistance 
and offered the opportunity for a quick and decisive success. Syria—with its larger and 
more heterogeneous population, its strong allies, its larger military, and the rugged 
terrain—poses a much higher military and political risk. Additionally, the unfortunate 
point of time when the Syrian uprising started (in contrast to the Libyan uprising) 
severely influenced the respective decision-making processes.  
Finding that both cases are only comparable in the sweeping violation of 
human rights and violence against civilians, but not in the framework conditions, 
underlines the first and the second hypothesis of this thesis. The intervention cannot be 
solely or predominantly seen as a result of humanitarian considerations—because, if it 
was, then the international community would have had to act in Syria as they did in Libya 
before. The second hypothesis—that it was only the Libyan weakness that resulted in the 
action against Qadhafi, while the Syrian military strength (including its allies) has 
prevented a Western engagement—is also supported by the assessment that both cases 
are similar with regard to the humanitarian question, but very different with regard to the 
political, geographical, and military starting conditions. 
B. THE POLITICAL RATIONALE OF THE U.S., FRANCE, AND 
GERMANY  
Although all three governments rhetorically condemn the leadership of Libya and 
Syria for their actions against their own populations, the reaction has already shifted 
between that given in the recent past and today. 
The officially stated advocacy for human rights, humanity, and democracy by all 
three states is a political credo that is an essential part of a modern democracy. When it 
came to this point in Libya and Syria, surely, the idea of defending human rights played 
an important role for some politicians but, as analyzed in this thesis, those ideals did not 
play the major role for the Libyan case and still do not play the major role for the Syrian 
case. All three states followed (and still follow) national interests and superordinate these 




The U.S., as the most powerful state within this case study, initially hesitated to 
engage in the Libyan conflict, and also transferred responsibility and leadership to 
NATO, in an attempt to "lead from behind"456 once the intervention started. Driven by 
domestic reasons and geo-strategic non-interest, the U.S. favored a non-military solution. 
Finally, the assessment that an intervention may be very helpful to gain trust and 
sympathy within the new movements in the Middle East, the hope of economic 
opportunities for the battered U.S. economy, and the tendency within Barack Obama's 
administration to evaluate humanity as an important norm led to the engagement. 
Thereby, the assessment that the Libyan regime will not endure the military and political 
pressure for a long time and cannot endanger the alliance troops was crucial. 
For Syria, the situation is different. Three main arguments are of importance. 
First, with the experience of the Libyan intervention (that an intervention has no pay-off 
for domestic politics)457 a main trigger for Obama's engagement has vanished. Second, 
neither the assessed positive impacts of the Libyan intervention for the U.S. image in the 
MENA region, nor for U.S. economics, have happened. Third, based on the assessment 
that an intervention in Syria is much more difficult than in Libya, contains the risk of a 
civil war and a regional conflict, is likely to influence U.S.-Israeli and U.S.-Iranian 
relations significantly in an unwanted manner, and in general, could damage the results of 
a century of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, an intervention is not wanted.  
It is very difficult to classify U.S. foreign policy into one classical IR theory, and 
the discussion in scholarship about this classification is currently ongoing. Reality 
catches up with the idea that the U.S. acted out of humanism, and early attempts to 
glorify the intervention in Libya and the whole ‘Arab Spring’ as a paradigm change are 
now assessed as premature. The assessment of the motives for the Libyan intervention in 
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scholarship by Walt458 or Kaplan459 underlines the reality that considerations about 
intervening (or not) finally followed U.S. national interests as opposed to normative 
arguments.  
For the U.S., that traditionally follows a realism approach in its overall foreign 
policy; the behavior for both cases fits into this approach. By having proved in this thesis 
that not humanitarian reasons, but different political interests, shaped the decision-
making process of the U.S. to intervene in Libya and the still ongoing attempt to avoid 
any action in Syria, U.S. policy finally followed superior regional interests. Maintaining 
the status quo in the region by assuring the population that the U.S. is willing to support 
change in the region—while simultaneously avoiding any escalation in the different 
conflicts—is an example of this policy. The domestic and normative reasons that are 
discernible in the U.S. decision-making process finally played only a minor role. 
Therefore, the classification of U.S. foreign policy as one of realism supports my first and 
second hypothesis. 
France, which still defines itself as the 'Grande Nation,' including the claim that it 
is still an important political power, had similar experiences as the U.S., in that the pay-
off both for domestic politics and foreign politics was very limited. The attempt by 
President Sarkozy—to support his election campaign by a military operation—failed, the 
outcome of the regime change in Libya is disappointing, and the attempt to regain 
influence in the traditional sphere of influence in North Africa has not worked out. 
Finally, for France, the intervention had no decisive positive effect at all. Libya, however, 
was most likely a one-off intervention: France would not wish to consider a military 
intervention in the Middle East or North Africa only for humanitarian or democratic 
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reasons any more than the United States or any other state would.460 The costs and risks 
of further engagements would be too high. Libya—as an only sparsely populated country 
of mainly desert landscapes just across the Mediterranean, just some hundred miles from 
France—facilitates military operations. It contained a calculated risk, one that the French 
government was willing to take.461  
The French assessment for Syria (and the derived consequences) is also similar to 
the U.S. assessment. The political insignificance of the Libyan intervention, and the 
knowledge that an intervention in Syria contains a much higher military risk, does not fit 
into the interests of the government in Paris. France cannot gain any strategic advantage 
through an intervention in Syria. 
France's will to intervene in Libya, and it's unwillingness to do so in Syria, cannot 
be assessed as a realism approach. Although Sarkozy, before and during the Libya 
intervention, acted arbitrarily several times, he consequently found a stressed position for 
France and his government, and has attempted to improve the standing of France 
(especially in the MENA region). French security policy, in general, is embedded in the 
common European foreign and security policy and a European security and defense 
policy. This policy follows a more liberal institutional approach that has emerged during 
the last twenty years. While "a growing number of scholars claim that European foreign 
and security policy, like Europe’s power and influence more broadly, is on the rise,"462 
the slow speed of the development of a common European security policy allows France 
to "[provide] the French with an opportunity to continue to assert themselves.”463  
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Leading the anti-Qadhafi coalition, finally, is one manifestation of this attitude. France's 
stressed position within the EU and NATO during the Libyan crisis is an expression of 
France's claim for leadership within these organizations. 
Germany, still trapped in its defensive political role of the cold war era, muddled 
through the conflict in Libya hoping not to damage its political position seriously and is 
not interested in any military action in Syria, as well. Germany's foreign policy is 
generally based on loyalty to its close allies within the EU and NATO, denoted by a 
foundation of Germany's policy in international relations that has remained very stable 
over the recent decades, or as Joffe states, a "wonder of continuity.”464 Finally, 
Germany's position has been shaped by domestic considerations for the Libyan case, also 
based on the lack of a common EU position. For the Syrian situation, Germany will 
probably join an NATO- or EU-led alliance if one of these organizations decides to take 
action. This participation would happen not because of a new interest in defending human 
rights, but only to avoid new criticism, and to regain the traditional image of reliability. 
Germany had only limited political interests in Libya, and has even smaller interests in 
Syria. The population in general does not want a German participation in an intervention, 
and the still very reserved German foreign policy would prevent an offensive 
participation in an intervention in Syria. Probably, Germany would not again abstain 
from voting at the UNSC, but simultaneously, they would not engage in an offensive 
intervention. The non-existing accordance between the political approach to defend 
human rights as a 'civilian power,' and simultaneously giving domestic reasons the 
preference, underlines my first hypothesis. 
1. Conclusion 
The political rationale of all three countries includes human rights, but for every 
one of these countries other arguments outweigh the claim to defend human rights and 
democracy with military means. Realism or domestic politics dominate the decision- 
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making process within all three countries, distinguished by political power and political 
claims. The behavior and the political rationale of all three countries support my first and 
second hypothesis. 
C. THE FRAMEWORK OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN SYRIA 
AND LIBYA 
A brief classification of the theoretical framework of the intervention in Libya, in 
comparison to the current situation on Syria465, will underline that less humanitarian 
reasons than other political arguments can explain the different storyline of the 
development in both countries. 
From a legal perspective, the intervention in Libya, coming with a UNSC 
mandate, has to be assessed as legal, while the current considerations of engaging Syria 
without a mandate is highly controversial in international jurisprudence. As long as the 
UNSC is unable to find a common ground and mandate for an intervention against Syria, 
this point distinguishes both cases deeply. The missing mandate for the Syrian case acts 
as a decisive reason (and excuse) for most Western nations to not even consider an 
intervention seriously.  
For the Libyan case, the incidence of the intervention is based on the existing 
UNSC mandate, the reports about atrocities, and finally, can be explained as a result of 
several different national and geo-strategic interests. In deep distinction to this very 
stringent argument why the intervention in Libya occurred, the non-incidence in Syria 
can be explained by the missing UNSC mandate and the commonly occurring argument 
of disinterest (no national interest in the country), risks (unpredictable risks and the 
danger of a conflict that is getting out of hand) and the lack of a chance of success 
(difficulties to determine a desired outcome) as explained in this thesis.  
 
 
                                                 




Additionally, all three nations suffer from an economic crisis and significant 
budget problems. The limited resources additionally hamper the will to intervene, and the 
dependency on U.S. forces challenges the whole enforceability of further humanitarian 
interventions.  
D. THE POWER OF NORMS   
The normative arguments to protect humanitarian rights and to save civilians are 
the basis for any rationale that supports an intervention, and serves as the only valid 
explanation for military intervention against a sovereign state. The conflict between state 
sovereignty and humanitarian rights, both important norms and values, has been fueled 
by the intervention in Libya. Large parts of the scholarship argue that the Libyan 
intervention finally expresses the submission of sovereignty to human rights. To deduce 
from the intervention in Libya that this subordination of human rights is lasting would be 
wrong, because "the principle of non-intervention still stands strong, but the exception for 
humanitarian is supported by the events in Libya."466 
Norms are generally are of the highest importance for any rationale for an 
intervention. The vast number of normative statements in support of the Libyan 
intervention, and also against the Syrian leadership, underlines the importance of norms. 
They are needed as a basis for any military intervention, but as proven by the non-
intervention in Syria, they are not sufficient to cause military action. Normative 
arguments supported the Libyan intervention, while for the Syrian case the same 
arguments have less importance; although, from a normative viewpoint both cases are 
very similar.  
Although norms seem to be very important in democratic societies, the relevance 
of norms is only minor when other interests exist, or when the norm violation does not 
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concern one’s own population. Norms have generally shaped politics, and have obviously 
had a growing influence over the last century, but their influence is still not decisive in 
international politics.  
Nevertheless, the reserved Western policy for the Syrian case underlines the fact 
that the often-assumed importance of norms in foreign policy is finally not evident. 
Norms were used as an argument to justify and explain the engagement in Libya, but 
were not the driving force. The example of non-engagement in Syria also demonstrates 
this fact. The influence of norms may continue to increase in the future, but the gap 
between the theoretical importance of norms as a kind of Western-society consensus, and 
"realpolitik," will probably not diminish in near future. Singular state interests are of 
higher importance than common norms. 
The still ongoing spread of norms within all societies will keep up the political 
pressure to defend international norms. Nevertheless, the longer the violence in Syria 
persists without an intervention, and the longer the subordination of norms under political 
and military constraints and interests continues, the more the importance of norms will be 









A. POLITICAL DISTINCTIONS AND HUMANITARIAN SIMILARITIES 
Following the justification for the intervention in Libya and according to several 
comments and prospects in scholarship and politics467, the world seemed to be on the 
edge of a new era when the coalition airplanes started to attack Qadhafi's forces in March 
2011. Only one year later, disillusionment about the role and importance of norms, 
humanitarian interventions, and the responsibility to protect has become prevalent.  
Chapter III gave an overview of the characteristics and intensity of the bilateral 
relations between Syria, Libya, and the three Western countries Germany, U.S., and 
France; and, an account of the diplomatic action when the crisis emerged. With the 
examination of the official policy of France, Germany, and the U.S. in regard to 
humanitarian interventions—and its comparison to the actual actions and the non-stated 
domestic, national, and geostrategic interests in Libya and Syria—Chapter IV built up the 
base to conclude that the first hypothesis is applicable. 
With both chapters, this thesis proved that the fast decision-making process for 
the Libyan intervention—and the simultaneously upcoming belief that the international 
community is willing and able to react fast and decisively when a non-democratic regime 
starts to use violence within its country to secure its own power—is still an illusion. The 
comparison of these events (both part of the 'Arab Spring') proved that geo-strategic 
interests, national interests, domestic politics, and a very accurate risk assessment all 
work to checkmate the widely announced and assumed importance of humanity and 
norms. The political restraint of the Western countries when the first uprisings of the 
'Arab Spring' started in Tunisia and Egypt already showed the preference of the nations to 
contain their own interests instead of supporting new, probably more democratic 
movements.  
                                                 




The developments in Libya and Syria, and Western reactions to them, finally 
proved this policy when, within one year, the two normative similar cases of Libya and 
Syria (in the same region) led to two totally different political outcomes. Although for 
both cases the official papers of all three states provided the normative ground for a 
military intervention, only the U.S. and France intervened in Libya, and all three states 
remained inactive for Syria. 
The U.S., France, and Germany had different reasons for their specific actions in 
the Libyan case, and they also have their own specific national interests for the Syrian 
case. Domestic politics and geo-strategic interests dominate the discussion about norm-
based humanitarian interventions. When the UNSC paved the way for a military 
intervention against Libya, all three states necessarily had to state their different interests 
for the Libyan case in public. The only possible justification for military intervention 
against a sovereign state that is possible—and that can find acceptance in broader public 
and international politics—is the norm-based argument for a humanitarian intervention, 
and further, for a somehow-existing responsibility to protect. Any other argument—like 
geo-strategic considerations, specific economic or other national interests—cannot be 
used because norms prohibit any kind of intervention caused by national interests or 
strategies in our days—and therefore, the real arguments have not been used.  
Consequently, the U.S. and France made normative arguments, well aware that 
this argumentation works for the Libyan case, where a politically isolated and eccentric 
dictator ruled for more than forty years. Therefore, the only short-dated and finally 
moderate international criticism of Germany's abstention at the UNSC fits into the 
political landscape. It was a result of the understanding by international politicians that 
the political position to reject a military intervention when crimes against humanity occur 
may be a strategic necessity to avoid any kind of automatism for interventions, and a 
process to prevent lurching from conflict to conflict. Germany, with only limited interests 
in Libya and pressured by a pacifist civil society, refused participation in Libya. This 





The vast distinction between the strong Syrian and the weak Libyan regime in 
every single area that is of importance for a military action—military strength, allies, 
geography, society—is another major reason why Qadhafi was ousted and al-Assad is 
still in office. As shown by the exposition of the international political situation before 
the crisis emerged, and the shift that came with the spread of violence in Chapter III, 
enhanced by the direct military comparison of both states and proved by the application 
of the hypothesis in Chapter V, the military intervention in Libya was primarily based on 
an extensive geo-strategic and military risk assessment. The same assessment for Syria 
led to the insight that a military conflict with Syria contains large military risks, and the 
jeopardy of crisis for the whole region. This argument proves the second hypothesis, that 
the different initial situation for both cases made the decisive difference. The intervention 
in Libya promised to be a bargain for the U.S. and France to achieve their goals, because 
the ratio between risk and aims was fairly good. In contrast, Syria's strength prevents the 
country from a military intervention and the relation between the assessed risks and the 
only limited strategic and political aims, was unfavorable. 
B. THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
CONCEPTS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND "THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" 
In public, and also in scholarship, the non-intervention of the international 
community in cases of crimes against humanity by ruling regimes (like in Syria) often 
causes lack of comprehension and levels criticism against the democratic leaders of the 
West, with arguments like: "President Obama has an opportunity to apply the principles 
of international humanitarian intervention in a manner that will restore confidence in his 
leadership and set a clear example of consistency and stability"468 for the Syrian case, or 
the characterization of the German chancellor as "Merkel in Miniature",469 and attempts 
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to explain "Germany's stumbling foreign policy on Libya"470 after not supporting the idea 
of a military intervention against Libya. These comments represent an astonishing simple 
approach towards the idea of humanitarian interventions and RtoP. 
Based on the wrong assessment that the intervention in Libya demonstrated the 
beginning of a new era in international politics by some scholars, the impression was 
conveyed that humanitarian interventions would become the rule and not the exception. 
This approach overestimates the importance of both ideas in the 'realpolitik' of 
international politics by far. As shown in this thesis, states today—as in the past—care 
first about their own interests. Normative ideals and standards are a political necessity 
and essential parts of democratic self-conception.  However, when the decision-making 
process of states has to be concerned with the idea of waging a war for normative 
reasons, several other reasons will be considered and assessed as more important than 
normative infringements somewhere in the world.  
In competition with domestic politics, geo-strategic interests, the economy, and 
state budgets, the importance of humanitarian interventions shrinks very fast. The 
uniqueness of the Libyan situation has no exemplary character for a somehow increased 
importance of humanitarian interventions at all.  
Surely the general importance of norms, as outlined especially by Martha 
Finnemore, has increased during the last centuries. Nevertheless, the Syrian case (along 
with several other examples of non-intervention in the recent past) demonstrates that a 
fundamental change of the role and importance of humanitarian interventions in world 
politics has not occurred yet. Other reasons are more important. After outlining in 
Chapter II that humanitarian interventions are based on norms, this leads to the 
conclusion that the third hypothesis is not valid. Although international norms, human 
rights, and the idea of political self-determination are widely accepted and taken for  
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granted in the Western hemisphere, this acknowledgement, until now, has not led (and 
probably will not lead) to an increase in the likelihood of humanitarian interventions in 
the future, as proven by the Syrian case. 
C. THE FUTURE OF BOTH CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The interpretation of mission "Unified Protector," and the assumed impact of this 
military intervention on the future of humanitarian interventions and RtoP, is very wide. 
While some authors in scholarship explain 
Security Council action to forestall atrocities in Libya in March 2011 
represented a new upswing in the implementation of R2P,471  
others argue that  
R2P is now at risk because those already hesitant to support it will say, 
“See? It was only used as an excuse to get into Libya—from the start it 
was to overthrow Gadhafi.” They wonder who will be next. The concern is 
magnified because of the lack of action by the UN in Syria.472 
After a first wave of enthusiasm when the 'Arab Spring' emerged and Western 
society seemed to support this movement with the military intervention in Libya, only 
one year later the political atmosphere has gloomed. The Syrian conflict and other 
ongoing conflicts—like the suppressed uprising in Bahrain and even the uncertain future 
outcome of the intervention in Libya—makes it clear that the role of both concepts to 
enforce normative standards will at least remain of lower importance than several 
scholars expected or desired in the spring and summer of 2011.    
The Libyan case has illustrated the impression that a normative rational is 
necessary to justify a military intervention, but simultaneously, is not the driving force for 
any action. The unimportance of norms (in comparison to "realpolitik”) was proven by 
the non-engagement in Syria, and by the avoidance of ongoing occurrences in other 
countries.  
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Very soon after the Libyan intervention began, political commentators and 
politicians started to conjecture that the aim of the mission was much more than 
humanitarian support, but that it also included regime change.473 Thereby, criticisms 
about the whole intervention being solely based on the aim to oust Qadhafi are equally 
overstated, like the assumption that the intervention was solely humanitarian.  
Undeniably, "Unified Protector" ended the violent and arbitrary rule of the 
Qadhafi regime and surely the lives of several opposition activists in Libya in early 2011. 
Despite this success, three major reasons finally lead to the conclusion that (in a 
retrospect) the coalition against Qadhafi has, in the end, harmed the noble idea of 
humanitarian interventions: 
1. To find a common ground within the UNSC for a humanitarian intervention 
will surely become more difficult after "Unified Protector." By exaggerating the mandate, 
and with the obvious aim to topple Qadhafi, the humanitarian component of the whole 
mission was marginalized.  
2.  The UNSC, especially the nations that were engaged against Libya, illustrated  
solid evidence for the imperfection of the mission. Without having a mission transition 
strategy after the intervention, the short-term success in stopping a  possible humanitarian 
catastrophe has been replaced by a destabilized and  insecure country that is struggling 
with violence and insecurity caused by a mixture of reawakened tribalism, religious 
fundamentalism, regional separatism, and personal desperation of the people. 
3. The whole rationale of humanitarian interventions itself, to protect human 
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resulting high  number of casualties in the Libyan case. Already at the beginning of the 
Libyan intervention, critics raised the question if the rebellion would cost more lives than 
Qadhafi's reign.474  
This discussion about the humanity of the intervention, a generally very selective 
application of humanitarian interventions, and the implied regime change in Libya have 
all strengthened the critics of both concepts. A direct outcome will be a higher risk that 
further violations of human rights will not be stopped by intervention because of early 
refusal at the UNSC.  
Therefore, the influence of both concepts in the near future on international 
politics will not improve at all. Based on a case-by-case assessment of every single nation 
that considers joining a coalition to enforce humanitarian rights, both concepts will frame 
military interventions against cruel regimes. Thereby, the experience of failed or doubtful 
international interventions like in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya without a clear end state, 
the enormous cost of sending troops, the economic situation, national interests, geo-
strategic considerations, a general rejection of any use of force within several Western 
societies and Western domestic politics—will all finally shape the willingness of every 
single state to join an intervention.  
This war-weariness of Western societies has a direct outcome for both concepts. 
Only NATO has the necessary military capabilities to enforce a humanitarian 
intervention, and NATO itself depends on U.S. forces that are urgently needed for a 
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successful intervention.475 Every claim for an intervention can be stopped in Washington 
or in Brussels, and the likelihood for further military interventions by NATO and the U.S. 
for humanitarian reasons after a decade of war is limited. 
After the 'clean' intervention in Libya, it can be expected in the future that 
publically, the assumed importance of the role of norms and the call for interventions will 
endure whenever a regime is accused of atrocities against its own population. However, 
in international politics, an unemotional assessment of every single nation and its 
sensitivities will shape the decision-making process, especially with regard to the 
anticipated outcome. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta underlined this position when 
he stated: “People who urge military action have to understand that before you take that 
step, you’d better understand where this kind of action leads.” 476  
Although the U.S., France, and Germany (as well as many other Western states), 
mention the idea of defending human rights abroad and support humanitarian 
interventions in their national strategies and policy papers, no state will mandatorily 
assure an overriding importance to these ideas in their daily political business. Any self-
commitment of a Western government to automatically intervene is an illusion, and 
would be tantamount to a letter for resignation of the respective government. 
The 'Arab Spring,' with its multitude of rebellions, has emphasized that the 
concept of a 'Responsibility to Protect' is already in its abridged version of just 
intervening in case of human right violations when the undertaking is not too ambitious. 
The absolute number of cases makes the universal implementation of the concept 
impossible. Every time the concept is considered, and then not executed, for a specific  
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instance of violation—the importance and influence of the concept will shrink. The 
concept includes well-sounding ideas that have the theoretical power to change the world, 
but in daily politics they are not always viable. 
Humanitarian interventions and the responsibility to protect are, finally, 
undeniably useful tools to silence the conscience of democratic states, and at least have a 
regulating character to prevent excesses of atrocities by ruling regimes against their own 
population. Despite this importance, the enormous number of past cases where human 
rights were violated without international humanitarian interventions will be updated in 
the future. 
Finally, the extraordinarily swift action of the international community for the 
Libyan case has to be assessed as a single case without exemplary character. To assume 
that the importance of norms overtrumps national interests is still an illusion. The hesitant 
and biding behavior in the case of the Syrian conflict is still main stream; fast action as in 
Libya is only the exception. The outcome of the Libyan intervention can be assessed as a 
political success because Qadhafi is no longer in charge, but at the same time, the 
intervention left behind a politically destabilized country with an uncertain future. From a 
normative viewpoint, it is questionable if the intervention, with its large number of 
victims, served the ideals of humanity and the idea of humanitarian interventions. 
D.  A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN SYRIA? 
The still ongoing and deliberate political confusion about Syria, and the 
categorical refusal of any condemnation of the Syrian regime by the UNSC (caused by 
Russia and China), simplifies the position of the Western states at this time. Backed by 
the certainty that a UNSC mandate will not emerge, all three states can condemn the 
behavior of the Syrian regime without fear of any real involvement in the conflict. As 
described in Chapter II—in connection with Chapter III, IV and V of this thesis—the 
political stalemate at the UNSC and the impossibility and non-willingness to intervene 
unilaterally (or even multilaterally) without a UNSC mandate has arrived at the right 




interested in an unpredictable international conflict in Syria with its high risks for the 
whole region. Thereby, all parties concerned ignore the fact that the "current preference 
for inaction, while perhaps understandable, threatens to lead to precisely the outcomes 
that its advocates want to avoid,"477 namely a conflict that expands and could lead into 
chaos not just within Syria, but also with drastic effects for the political stability for the 
whole region.478 
Therefore, the three states will wait and not intervene. Only if the conflict is 
worsening significantly in the near future—or if neighboring states, especially Turkey, 
are getting sucked into the conflict—might the situation change. A change of the 
positions of China and Russia in the UNSC—without any dramatic change within 
Syria—is highly unlikely, and an intervention without a UNSC mandate in the Middle 
East is impossible.  
If, notwithstanding, any engagement of the international community in the Syrian 
conflict does happen, it will not be decisively fueled by humanitarian concerns. The 
decision-making process of all three examined nations, just like the decision-making 
process of every nation, will follow a detailed consideration of their own interests above 
all else. This leads to the conclusion that even if an intervention in Syria occurs, it will 
not be a humanitarian one.  
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A. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION SINCE 1990 
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Figure 2.   Armed conflicts between 1987 and 2010479 
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